DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
Volume 18, Special Symposium Issue
August 2019
Special Editor: James Boyle

THE PAST AND FUTURE
OF THE INTERNET:
A Symposium for John Perry Barlow

Duke University School of Law

Duke Law and Technology Review
Fall 2019–Spring 2020
Editor-in-Chief
YOOJEONG JAYE HAN
Managing Editor
ROBERT HARTSMITH
Chief Executive Editors
MICHELLE JACKSON
ELENA ‘ELLIE’ SCIALABBA
Senior Research Editors
JENNA MAZZELLA
DALTON POWELL
Special Projects Editor
JOSEPH CAPUTO
Technical Editor
JEROME HUGHES
JOHN BALLETTA
ANN DU
ARKADIY ‘DAVID’ ALOYTS
JONATHAN B. BASS
KEVIN CERGOL
MICHAEL CHEN
YUNA CHOI
TIM DILL
PERRY FELDMAN
DENISE GO
ZACHARY GRIFFIN
CHARLES ‘CHASE’ HAMILTON
DAVID KIM
MAX KING
SAMUEL LEWIS
Journals Advisor
JENNIFER BEHRENS

Content Editors
ROSHAN PATEL
Staff Editors
ANDREW LINDSAY
LINDSAY MARTIN
CHARLES MATULA
DANIEL MUNOZ
TREVOR NICHOLS
ANDRES PACIUC
GERARDO PARRAGA
NEHAL PATEL
MARQUIS J. PULLEN
ANDREA RODRIGUEZ BOUTROS
ZAYNAB SALEM
SHAREEF M. SALFITY
Faculty Advisor
JAMES BOYLE

JACOB TAKA WALL
JASON WASSERMAN
MOHAMED SATTI
ANTHONY SEVERIN
LUCA TOMASI
EMILY TRIBULSKI
CHARLIE TRUSLOW
JOHN W. TURANCHIK
MADELEINE WAMSLEY
SIQI WANG
TITUS R. WILLIS
ZIXUAN XIAO
CARRIE YANG
TOM YU
TIANYE ZHANG
Journals Coordinator
KRISTI KUMPOST

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Authors’ Biographies ................................................................................ i.
John Perry Barlow Photograph ............................................................... vi.
The Past and Future of the Internet: A Symposium for John Perry
Barlow
James Boyle ................................................................................. 1
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
John Perry Barlow ....................................................................... 5
Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net
John Perry Barlow ...................................................................... 8
Is the Internet Over?! (AGAIN?)
James Boyle ............................................................................... 32
Barlow’s Legacy
Cory Doctorow .......................................................................... 61
Inventing the Future: Barlow and Beyond
Cindy Cohn ................................................................................ 69
A Political Economy of Utopia?
Yochai Benkler .......................................................................... 78
Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law
Julie E. Cohen ............................................................................ 85
Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism
Benjamin Edelman ..................................................................... 97
The Enigma of Digitized Property: A Tribute to John Perry Barlow
Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto .............................. 103
Imaginary Bottles
Jessica Litman .......................................................................... 127
John Perry Barlow’s Call for Persuasion Over Power
Jonathan L. Zittrain .................................................................. 137

Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder ..................................... 143
What Didn’t Happen: An Essay in Speculation
Peter Jaszi ................................................................................ 162
A Declaration of the Mission of University in Barlowspace
Charles R. Nesson .................................................................... 174

AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES
Yochai Benkler is the J&L Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal
Studies at Harvard Law School and the Berkman Klein Center for
Internet and Society at Harvard University. Since the 1990s he has
played a role in characterizing the role of information commons and
decentralized collaboration to innovation, information production, and
freedom in the networked economy and society. His books include
Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization
in American Politics (Oxford University Press 2018) and The Wealth of
Networks: How social production transforms markets and freedom (Yale
University Press 2006). His work can be freely accessed at benkler.org.
James Boyle is William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law at Duke Law
School and founder of the Center for the Study of the Public Domain. He
has written a distressing number of articles and books on intellectual
property, internet regulation, legal theory and legal argument. His other
books include two graphic novels, both co-authored with Jennifer
Jenkins: Bound By Law, on fair use and the permissions culture in
intellectual property, and Theft: A History of Music, a 2000 year long
history of musical borrowing from Plato to rap. Professor Boyle was one
of the founding Board Members of Creative Commons. He has been
awarded the Donald McGannon Award for communications policy, a
World Technology Network Award for Law and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation’s Pioneer Award for his work on the public domain and the
second enclosure movement that threatens it.
Anupam Chander is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law
Center. The author of the widely-reviewed book, The Electronic Silk
Road (Yale University Press), he is an expert on the global regulation of
new technologies. A graduate of Harvard College and Yale Law School,
he clerked for Chief Judge Jon O. Newman of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals and Judge William A. Norris of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. He practiced law in New York and Hong Kong with Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. He has been a visiting law professor at Yale,
the University of Chicago, Stanford, Cornell, and Tsinghua. He
previously served as the Director of the California International Law
Center and Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law at UC Davis. A
member of the American Law Institute, he has also served on the
Executive Council of the American Society of International Law, where
he co-founded the International Law and Technology Interest Group. He
serves as a judge of the Stanford Junior International Faculty Forum. A
recipient of Google Research Awards and an Andrew Mellon grant on
the topic of surveillance, he has served on ICTSD/World Economic

i

Forum expert groups on the digital economy. He serves as an Adjunct
Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University’s School of
International and Public Policy, a faculty advisor to Georgetown’s
Institute for Technology Law and Policy, and as a faculty affiliate of
Yale’s Information Society Project.
Cindy Cohn is the Executive Director of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, which was founded by John Perry Barlow in 1990 and for
whom he was a Board member, serving as Vice Chair and, eventually at
his request, the Rockin’ Chair (of course) until he passed away. From
2000–2015 Ms. Cohn served as EFF’s Legal Director as well as its
General Counsel. Ms. Cohn first became involved with EFF in 1993,
when EFF asked her to serve as the outside lead attorney in Bernstein v.
Dept. of Justice, the successful First Amendment challenge to the U.S.
export restrictions on cryptography in 1993. In 2018, Forbes included Ms.
Cohn as one of America’s Top 50 Women in Tech. The National Law
Journal named Ms. Cohn one of 100 most influential lawyers in America
in 2013, noting: “[I]f Big Brother is watching, he better look out for
Cindy Cohn.” She was also named in 2006 for “rushing to the barricades
wherever freedom and civil liberties are at stake online.” In 2007 the
National Law Journal named her one of the 50 most influential women
lawyers in America. In 2010 the Intellectual Property Section of the State
Bar of California awarded her its Intellectual Property Vanguard
Award and in 2012 the Northern California Chapter of the Society of
Professional Journalists awarded her the James Madison Freedom of
Information Award.
Julie E. Cohen is the Mark Claster Mamolen Professor of Law and
Technology at the Georgetown University Law Center. She teaches and
writes about surveillance, privacy and data protection, intellectual
property, information platforms, and the ways that networked
information and communication technologies are reshaping legal
institutions. She is the author of Between Truth and Power: The Legal
Constructions of Informational Capitalism (Oxford University Press,
forthcoming 2019); Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code and the
Play of Everyday Practice (Yale University Press, 2012), which won the
2013 Association of Internet Researchers Book Award and was
shortlisted for the Surveillance & Society Journal’s 2013 Book Prize; and
numerous journal articles and book chapters. She is also a co-author
of Copyright in a Global Information Economy (Aspen Law & Business,
4th ed. 2015), the leading textbook in copyright law. Professor Cohen is
a member of the Advisory Board of the Electronic Privacy Information
Center.

ii

Cory Doctorow (craphound.com) is a science fiction author, activist,
journalist and blogger—the co-editor of Boing Boing (boingboing.net)
and the author of Radicalized and Walkaway, science fiction for adults, a
YA graphic novel called In Real Life, the nonfiction business book
Information Doesn’t Want to be Free, and young adult novels like
Homeland, Pirate Cinema and Little Brother and novels for adults like
Rapture of the Nerds and Makers. He works for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, is a MIT Media Lab Research Affiliate, is a Visiting
Professor of Computer Science at Open University, a Visiting Professor
of Practice at the University of South Carolina’s School of Library and
Information Science and co-founded the UK Open Rights Group. Born in
Toronto, Canada, he now lives in Los Angeles.
Ben Edelman is an economist at Microsoft, where he writes about—and
advises the company about—questions at the intersection of software,
strategy, economics, and public policy. Ben was previously an associate
professor at the Harvard Business School, where he studied and taught
about the economics of online markets. His work combined software
engineering with legal and economic analysis, aiming to understand both
how online markets function and also how they might improve. Ben
presents his personal views, not the views of his employer. His other
writings are at benedelman.org.
Kathryn Hashimoto is a Copyright Research Fellow at the Berkeley
Center for Law & Technology, University of California, Berkeley,
School of Law. While in law school, she interned at the Electronic
Frontier Foundation.
Peter Jaszi is a Professor Emeritus at American University Law School,
who writes and lectures about copyright law in historical and cultural
contexts. He was a founder of the school’s Glushko-Samuelson
Intellectual Property Law Clinic and its Program on Intellectual Property
and Information Justice. Having served as a Trustee of the Copyright
Society of the U.S.A., Professor Jaszi remains a member of its journal’s
editorial board. During 1993, Professor Jaszi served as a member of the
Librarian of Congress’s Committee on Copyright Registration and
Deposit, and from 1994 to 2000, he was a principle organizer of the
Digital Future Coalition. Since 2005, he has been working with Prof.
Patricia Aufderheide to help creative communities develop fair use
guidance documents that reflect their particular problems and
practices. A new edition of their book, Reclaiming Copyright, was
published in 2018 by the University of Chicago Press. In 2007,
Professor Jaszi received the American Library Association’s L. Ray
Patterson Copyright Award.

iii

Jessica Litman is the John F. Nickoll Professor of Law, at the
University of Michigan. She is the author of the book Digital Copyright
and many law review articles, and is the coauthor, with Jane Ginsburg
and Mary Lou Kevlin, of the casebook Trademarks and Unfair
Competition Law: Cases and Materials, currently in its 6th edition. She
graduated from Reed College, earned an MFA in theatre at Southern
Methodist University, and holds a JD from Columbia Law School.
Charles R. Nesson is the founder of the Berkman/Klein Center for
Internet & Society at Harvard University and the Weld Professor of Law
at Harvard Law School.
Pamela Samuelson is Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of
Law and co-director of the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology at
the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Professor
Samuelson is recognized as a pioneer in digital copyright law,
intellectual property, cyberlaw, and information policy. She serves on the
board of directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (since 2000) and
on advisory boards for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, Public
Knowledge, and the Center for Democracy & Technology. She is a cofounder and executive officer of Authors Alliance, a not-for-profit
organization for authors in the digital age. Professor Samuelson is a
fellow of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), a
contributing editor of Communications of the ACM, a past fellow of the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, an honorary professor
at the University of Amsterdam, and received the Woman of Vision
Award for Social Impact in 2005 from the Anita Borg Institute. In 2013
she was elected to the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.
Madhavi Sunder is Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law
Center and a leading scholar of law and culture. She was named a
Carnegie Scholar in 2006 and has been a Visiting Professor of Law at the
Yale Law School, the University of Chicago Law School, and Cornell
Law School. Her work traverses numerous legal fields, from intellectual
property to human rights law and the First Amendment. Professor Sunder
has published articles in the Yale Law Journal, the Stanford Law Review,
the California Law Review, the Texas Law Review, and Law and
Contemporary Problems, among others. Her book, From Goods to a
Good Life: Intellectual Property and Global Justice, was published by
Yale University Press in 2012.
Jonathan L. Zittrain is the George Bemis Professor of International
Law at Harvard Law School and Professor at the Harvard Kennedy
School of Government, Professor of Computer Science at the Harvard

iv

School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Director of the Harvard
Law School Library, and co-founder of the Berkman Klein Center for
Internet & Society. His research interests include battles for control of
digital property and content, electronic privacy, and the roles of
intermediaries within Internet architecture. He is currently focused on the
ethics and governance of artificial intelligence, jointly teaching a course
on the topic with the MIT Media Lab. His book, The Future of the
Internet—And How to Stop It, predicted the end of general purpose client
computing and the corresponding rise of new gatekeepers. That and
other works may be found at http://www.jz.org.

v

1

John Perry Barlow
1947–2018

1

Picture by Joi Ito. See Joi Ito, John Perry Barlow, FLICKR (July 17, 2007),
https://www.flickr.com/photos/joi/835393447 (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). Available under a Creative Commons
Attribution 2.0 Generic, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.

vi

THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE INTERNET:
A SYMPOSIUM FOR JOHN PERRY BARLOW1
JAMES BOYLE†

John Perry Barlow passed away on Feb 7th, 2018. John Perry’s
name is generally followed by a long list of qualities: poet, lyricist,
rancher, civil libertarian, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, teller-of-stories, organizer of parties, bringer of light. Good
friend. Certainly he was all of these. The picture above gives you some
sense of his personality. But he was also the author of two influential
essays in the very early days of the World Wide Web—A Declaration of
the Independence of Cyberspace2 and Selling Wine Without Bottles: The
Economy of Mind on the Global Net.3
Written in 1996, A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace declared the moral and legal independence of the online
world. Its tone, both hopeful and defiant, can be captured from this brief
excerpt:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are
not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one,
so I address you with no greater authority than that with which
liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to
impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess
any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.
1

This article is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution, Non
Commercial, Sharealike license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ncsa/3.0/.
†
William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law, Duke Law School
2
Originally published as John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER. FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence. The essay can also be found in
this volume at 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5 (2019).
3
Originally published as John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED
(Mar. 1, 1994), https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/. The essay can
also be found in this volume at 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019) (reprinted
from John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on
the Global Net, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/sellingwine-without-bottles-economy-mind-global-net).
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....
You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation,
nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know
our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide
our society more order than could be obtained by any of your
impositions.
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve.
You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of
these problems don’t exist. Where there are real conflicts, where
there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our
means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance
will arise according to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our
world is different.
....
We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or
prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or
station of birth.
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express
his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being
coerced into silence or conformity.
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity,
movement, and context do not apply to us. They are all based on
matter, and there is no matter here.4

Selling Wine Without Bottles had been written for WIRED in
1994 under the title The Economy of Ideas. It asked how the creative
economy and its legal and ethical superstructure—particularly
intellectual property—would fare in this new context. Barlow makes
many predictions—including the rise of encryption as a central feature of
the economy, an increased primacy of viewpoint, voice and timeliness to
online experience, and the difficulties of creative people getting paid in
the digital world. But he also makes bold claims about what will happen
to intellectual property.
The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced
and instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost,
without our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession,
how can we protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work
we do with our minds? And, if we can’t get paid, what will assure
the continued creation and distribution of such work?

4

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 5–6 (2019).

3

THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE INTERNET:
A SYMPOSIUM FOR JOHN PERRY BARLOW

[Vol. 18

Since we don’t have a solution to what is a profoundly new
kind of challenge, and are apparently unable to delay the galloping
digitization of everything not obstinately physical, we are sailing
into the future on a sinking ship.
This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law,
was developed to convey forms and methods of expression entirely
different from the vaporous cargo it is now being asked to carry. It
is leaking as much from within as without.
Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three
forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings to the
passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal
penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial.5

Versions of the Internet date back to the 1950’s but the World
Wide Web is of much more recent provenance. Histories date its
“invention” by Tim Berners-Lee to 1989, but the network as we know it
did not have any real public manifestation until late 1991 or 1992. These
essays, in other words, are from its very first days. How do they stand up
today, more than 20 years later? To be sure, John Perry was far from the
only internet visionary. Others, including some of the people writing in
this volume, tried their own hand at it and offered perspectives that
brought in academic rigor, interdisciplinary insight and complex legal
analysis. But for many of us, these essays started a conversation. Where
is that conversation now? Are Barlow’s visions hopelessly outdated or,
worse still, discredited by the digital evils we now know so well—from
YouTube comment trolls to privacy-invading social networks to hackers
attempting to subvert elections? There are arguments both ways. To
quote from Cindy Cohn, who also writes in this volume:
Barlow was sometimes held up as a straw man for a kind of naive
techno-utopianism that believed that the Internet could solve all of
humanity’s problems without causing any more. As someone who
spent the past 27 years working with him at EFF, I can say that
nothing could be further from the truth. Barlow knew that new
technology could create and empower evil as much as it could
create and empower good. He made a conscious decision to focus
on the latter: “I knew it’s also true that a good way to invent the
future is to predict it. So I predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a

5

John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 8–9 (2019).
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running start before the laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up
what Ed Snowden now correctly calls ‘turn-key totalitarianism.’”6

Rather than offer a simple Festschrift for Barlow, this
symposium uses those two essays as the jumping off point for a
reflection on the current state of the digital world. They marked a
particular moment in time and space. How far from that moment, from
those hopes and fears, are we now? What mistakes did we make? What
opportunities did we grasp or miss? In an online environment dominated
by closed and controlled apps rather than the open web, on a web without
a guarantee of net neutrality, with many global citizens having their
experiences defined by a monopolistic telecom, or a governmentimposed Great Firewall of China, is it even worth our breath to talk about
a “World Wide Web” anymore? What will we wish we had worried
about, or hoped for, in our digital environment when another 20 years
has passed? The distinguished contributors—and it is not going too far
to say their work has set the terms of the legal and policy debate we are
now in—have each agreed to write a short essay offering their own
answers.
The articles gathered here do not seek to canonize John Perry or
praise his ideas where our contributors believe they were simplistic or
flawed: he would have found that offensive. Worse, he would have
found it boring. There is criticism here as well as praise. But, in their
own way, these remarkable essays offer a memorial to his work, insight
and humor, to his contribution to our world.
We are all the poorer for losing him. I miss him.

6

Cindy Cohn, John Perry Barlow, Internet Pioneer, 1947–2018, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/johnperry-barlow-internet-pioneer-1947-2018.

A DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF
CYBERSPACE1
JOHN PERRY BARLOW

Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of
the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome
among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.
We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one,
so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty
itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to
be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You
have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of
enforcement we have true reason to fear.
Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed. You have neither solicited nor received ours. We did not invite
you. You do not know us, nor do you know our world. Cyberspace does
not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though
it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature
and it grows itself through our collective actions.
You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation,
nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our
culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our
society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions.
You claim there are problems among us that you need to solve.
You use this claim as an excuse to invade our precincts. Many of these
problems don’t exist. Where there are real conflicts, where there are
wrongs, we will identify them and address them by our means. We are
forming our own Social Contract. This governance will arise according
to the conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different.
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought
itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications.
Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where
bodies live.

1

Reprinted from John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
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We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or
prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of
birth.
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express
his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced
into silence or conformity.
Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement,
and context do not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is
no matter here.
Our identities have no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain
order by physical coercion. We believe that from ethics, enlightened selfinterest, and the commonweal, our governance will emerge. Our
identities may be distributed across many of your jurisdictions. The only
law that all our constituent cultures would generally recognize is the
Golden Rule. We hope we will be able to build our particular solutions
on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are attempting to
impose.
In the United States, you have today created a law, the
Telecommunications Reform Act, which repudiates your own
Constitution and insults the dreams of Jefferson, Washington, Mill,
Madison, DeToqueville, and Brandeis. These dreams must now be born
anew in us.
You are terrified of your own children, since they are natives in a
world where you will always be immigrants. Because you fear them, you
entrust your bureaucracies with the parental responsibilities you are too
cowardly to confront yourselves. In our world, all the sentiments and
expressions of humanity, from the debasing to the angelic, are parts of a
seamless whole, the global conversation of bits. We cannot separate the
air that chokes from the air upon which wings beat.
In China, Germany, France, Russia, Singapore, Italy and the
United States, you are trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting
guard posts at the frontiers of Cyberspace. These may keep out the
contagion for a small time, but they will not work in a world that will
soon be blanketed in bit-bearing media.
Your increasingly obsolete information industries would
perpetuate themselves by proposing laws, in America and elsewhere, that
claim to own speech itself throughout the world. These laws would
declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble than pig
iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may create can be
reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global conveyance
of thought no longer requires your factories to accomplish.

7
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These increasingly hostile and colonial measures place us in the
same position as those previous lovers of freedom and self-determination
who had to reject the authorities of distant, uninformed powers. We must
declare our virtual selves immune to your sovereignty, even as we
continue to consent to your rule over our bodies. We will spread
ourselves across the Planet so that no one can arrest our thoughts.
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it
be more humane and fair than the world your governments have made
before.

SELLING WINE WITHOUT BOTTLES: THE
ECONOMY OF MIND ON THE GLOBAL NET1
JOHN PERRY BARLOW

If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of
exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an
idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into
the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the
less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives
an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening
mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to another
over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and
benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any
point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our
physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive
appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of
property.
–Thomas Jefferson

Throughout the time I’ve been groping around Cyberspace, there
has remained unsolved an immense conundrum which seems to be at the
root of nearly every legal, ethical, governmental, and social vexation to
be found in the Virtual World. I refer to the problem of digitized
property.
The riddle is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced
and instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can we
protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work we do with our
minds? And, if we can’t get paid, what will assure the continued creation
and distribution of such work?
Since we don’t have a solution to what is a profoundly new kind
of challenge, and are apparently unable to delay the galloping

1

Reprinted from John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The
Economy of the Mind on the Global Net, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/selling-wine-without-bottles-economy-mind-globalnet.
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digitization of everything not obstinately physical, we are sailing into the
future on a sinking ship.
This vessel, the accumulated canon of copyright and patent law,
was developed to convey forms and methods of expression entirely
different from the vaporous cargo it is now being asked to carry. It is
leaking as much from within as without.
Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are taking three forms:
a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings to the passengers
that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal penalties, and serene,
glassy-eyed denial.
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or
expanded to contain the gasses of digitized expression any more than real
estate law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting
spectrum. (Which, in fact, rather resembles what is being attempted
here.) We will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as befits
this entirely new set of circumstances.
Most of the people who actually create soft property––the
programmers, hackers, and Net surfers––already know this.
Unfortunately, neither the companies they work for nor the lawyers these
companies hire have enough direct experience with immaterial goods to
understand why they are so problematic. They are proceeding as though
the old laws can somehow be made to work, either by grotesque
expansion or by force. They are wrong.
The source of this conundrum is as simple as its solution is
complex. Digital technology is detaching information from the physical
plane, where property law of all sorts has always found definition.
Throughout the history of copyrights and patents, the proprietary
assertions of thinkers have been focused not on their ideas but on the
expression of those ideas. The ideas themselves, as well as facts about
the phenomena of the world, were considered to be the collective
property of humanity. One could claim franchise, in the case of
copyright, on the precise turn of phrase used to convey a particular idea
or the order in which facts were presented.
The point at which this franchise was imposed was that moment
when the “word became flesh” by departing the mind of its originator
and entering some physical object, whether book or widget. The
subsequent arrival of other commercial media besides books didn’t alter
the legal importance of this moment. Law protected expression and, with
few (and recent) exceptions, to express was to make physical.
Protecting physical expression had the force of convenience on
its side. Copyright worked well because, Gutenberg notwithstanding, it
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was hard to make a book. Furthermore, books froze their contents into a
condition which was as challenging to alter as it was to reproduce.
Counterfeiting or distributing counterfeit volumes were obvious and
visible activities, easy enough to catch somebody in the act of doing.
Finally, unlike unbounded words or images, books had material surfaces
to which one could attach copyright notices, publisher’s marques, and
price tags.
Mental to physical conversion was even more central to patent.
A patent, until recently, was either a description of the form into which
materials were to be rendered in the service of some purpose or a
description of the process by which rendition occurred. In either case, the
conceptual heart of patent was the material result. If no purposeful object
could be rendered due to some material limitation, the patent was
rejected. Neither a Klein bottle nor a shovel made of silk could be
patented. It had to be a thing and the thing had to work.
Thus the rights of invention and authorship adhered to activities
in the physical world. One didn’t get paid for ideas but for the ability to
deliver them into reality. For all practical purposes, the value was in the
conveyance and not the thought conveyed.
In other words, the bottle was protected, not the wine.
Now, as information enters Cyberspace, the native home of
Mind, these bottles are vanishing. With the advent of digitization, it is
now possible to replace all previous information storage forms with one
meta-bottle: complex––and highly liquid––patterns of ones and zeros.
Even the physical/digital bottles to which we’ve become
accustomed, floppy disks, CD-ROM’s, and other discrete, shrinkwrappable bit-packages, will disappear as all computers jack into the
global Net. While the Internet may never include every single CPU on
the planet, it is more than doubling every year and can be expected to
become the principal medium of information conveyance if, eventually,
the only one.
Once that has happened, all the goods of the Information Age––
all of the expressions once contained in books or film strips or records or
newsletters––will exist either as pure thought or something very much
like thought: voltage conditions darting around the Net at the speed of
light, in conditions which one might behold in effect, as glowing pixels
or transmitted sounds, but never touch or claim to “own” in the old sense
of the word.
Some might argue that information will still require some
physical manifestation, such as its magnetic existence on the titanic hard
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disks of distant servers, but these are bottles which have no
macroscopically discrete or personally meaningful form.
Some will also argue that we have been dealing with unbottled
expression since the advent of radio, and they would be right. But for
most of the history of broadcast, there was no convenient way to capture
soft goods from the electromagnetic ether and reproduce them in
anything like the quality available in commercial packages. Only
recently has this changed and little has been done legally or technically
to address the change.
Generally, the issue of consumer payment for broadcast products
was irrelevant. The consumers themselves were the product. Broadcast
media were supported either by selling the attention of their audience to
advertisers, using government to assess payment through taxes, or the
whining mendicancy of annual donor drives.
All of the broadcast support models are flawed. Support either
by advertisers or government has almost invariably tainted the purity of
the goods delivered. Besides, direct marketing is gradually killing the
advertiser support model anyway.
Broadcast media gave us another payment method for a virtual
product in the royalties which broadcasters pay songwriters through such
organizations as ASCAP and BMI. But, as a member of ASCAP, I can
assure you this is not a model which we should emulate. The monitoring
methods are wildly approximate. There is no parallel system of
accounting in the revenue stream. It doesn’t really work. Honest.
In any case, without our old methods of physically defining the
expression of ideas, and in the absence of successful new models for
non-physical transaction, we simply don’t know how to assure reliable
payment for mental works. To make matters worse, this comes at a time
when the human mind is replacing sunlight and mineral deposits as the
principal source of new wealth.
Furthermore, the increasing difficulty of enforcing existing
copyright and patent laws is already placing in peril the ultimate source
of intellectual property, the free exchange of ideas.
That is, when the primary articles of commerce in a society look
so much like speech as to be indistinguishable from it, and when the
traditional methods of protecting their ownership have become
ineffectual, attempting to fix the problem with broader and more
vigorous enforcement will inevitably threaten freedom of speech.
The greatest constraint on your future liberties may come not
from government but from corporate legal departments laboring to
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protect by force what can no longer be protected by practical efficiency
or general social consent.
Furthermore, when Jefferson and his fellow creatures of The
Enlightenment designed the system which became American copyright
law, their primary objective was assuring the widespread distribution of
thought, not profit. Profit was the fuel which would carry ideas into the
libraries and minds of their new republic. Libraries would purchase
books, thus rewarding the authors for their work in assembling ideas,
which otherwise “incapable of confinement” would then become freely
available to the public. But what is the role of libraries in the absence of
books? How does society now pay for the distribution of ideas if not by
charging for the ideas themselves?
Additionally complicating the matter is the fact that along with
the physical bottles in which intellectual property protection has resided,
digital technology is also erasing the legal jurisdictions of the physical
world, and replacing them with the unbounded and perhaps permanently
lawless seas of Cyberspace.
In Cyberspace, there are not only no national or local boundaries
to contain the scene of a crime and determine the method of its
prosecution, there are no clear cultural agreements on what a crime might
be. Unresolved and basic differences between European and Asian
cultural assumptions about intellectual property can only be exacerbated
in a region where many transactions are taking place in both hemispheres
and yet, somehow, in neither.
Even in the most local of digital conditions, jurisdiction and
responsibility are hard to assess. A group of music publishers filed suit
against Compuserve this fall for it having allowed its users to upload
musical compositions into areas where other users might get them. But
since Compuserve cannot practically exercise much control over the
flood of bits which pass between its subscribers, it probably shouldn’t be
held responsible for unlawfully “publishing” these works.
Notions of property, value, ownership, and the nature of wealth
itself are changing more fundamentally than at any time since the
Sumerians first poked cuneiform into wet clay and called it stored grain.
Only a very few people are aware of the enormity of this shift and fewer
of them are lawyers or public officials.
Those who do see these changes must prepare responses for the
legal and social confusion which will erupt as efforts to protect new
forms of property with old methods become more obviously futile, and,
as a consequence, more adamant.
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I. FROM SWORDS TO WRITS TO BITS
Humanity now seems bent on creating a world economy
primarily based on goods which take no material form. In doing so, we
may be eliminating any predictable connection between creators and a
fair reward for the utility or pleasure others may find in their works.
Without that connection, and without a fundamental change in
consciousness to accommodate its loss, we are building our future on
furor, litigation, and institutionalized evasion of payment except in
response to raw force. We may return to the Bad Old Days of property.
Throughout the darker parts of human history, the possession
and distribution of property was a largely military matter. “Ownership”
was assured those with the nastiest tools, whether fists or armies, and the
most resolute will to use them. Property was the divine right of thugs.
By the turn of the First Millennium A.D., the emergence of
merchant classes and landed gentry forced the development of ethical
understandings for the resolution of property disputes. In the late Middle
Ages, enlightened rulers like England’s Henry II began to codify this
unwritten “common law” into recorded canons. These laws were local,
but this didn’t matter much as they were primarily directed at real estate,
a form of property which is local by definition. And which, as the name
implied, was very real.
This continued to be the case as long as the origin of wealth was
agricultural, but with dawning of the Industrial Revolution, humanity
began to focus as much on means as ends. Tools acquired a new social
value and, thanks to their own development, it became possible to
duplicate and distribute them in quantity.
To encourage their invention, copyright and patent law were
developed in most western countries. These laws were devoted to the
delicate task of getting mental creations into the world where they could
be used––and enter the minds of others––while assuring their inventors
compensation for the value of their use. And, as previously stated, the
systems of both law and practice which grew up around that task were
based on physical expression.
Since it is now possible to convey ideas from one mind to
another without ever making them physical, we are now claiming to own
ideas themselves and not merely their expression. And since it is likewise
now possible to create useful tools which never take physical form, we
have taken to patenting abstractions, sequences of virtual events, and
mathematical formulae––the most un-real estate imaginable.
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In certain areas, this leaves rights of ownership in such an
ambiguous condition that once again property adheres to those who can
muster the largest armies. The only difference is that this time the armies
consist of lawyers.
Threatening their opponents with the endless Purgatory of
litigation, over which some might prefer death itself, they assert claim to
any thought which might have entered another cranium within the
collective body of the corporations they serve. They act as though these
ideas appeared in splendid detachment from all previous human thought.
And they pretend that thinking about a product is somehow as good as
manufacturing, distributing, and selling it.
What was previously considered a common human resource,
distributed among the minds and libraries of the world, as well as the
phenomena of nature herself, is now being fenced and deeded. It is as
though a new class of enterprise had arisen which claimed to own air and
water.
What is to be done? While there is a certain grim fun to be had in
it, dancing on the grave of copyright and patent will solve little,
especially when so few are willing to admit that the occupant of this
grave is even deceased and are trying to up by force what can no longer
be upheld by popular consent.
The legalists, desperate over their slipping grip, are vigorously
trying to extend it. Indeed, the United States and other proponents of
GATT are making adherence to our moribund systems of intellectual
property protection a condition of membership in the marketplace of
nations. For example, China will be denied Most Favored nation trading
status unless they agree to uphold a set of culturally alien principles
which are no longer even sensibly applicable in their country of origin.
In a more perfect world, we’d be wise to declare a moratorium
on litigation, legislation, and international treaties in this area until we
had a clearer sense of the terms and conditions of enterprise in
Cyberspace. Ideally, laws ratify already developed social consensus.
They are less the Social Contract itself than a series of memoranda
expressing a collective intent which has emerged out of many millions of
human interactions.
Humans have not inhabited Cyberspace long enough or in
sufficient diversity to have developed a Social Contract which conforms
to the strange new conditions of that world. Laws developed prior to
consensus usually serve the already established few who can get them
passed and not society as a whole.
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To the extent that either law or established social practice exists
in this area, they are already in dangerous disagreement. The laws
regarding unlicensed reproduction of commercial software are clear and
stern . . . and rarely observed. Software piracy laws are so practically
unenforceable and breaking them has become so socially acceptable that
only a thin minority appears compelled, either by fear or conscience, to
obey them.
I sometimes give speeches on this subject, and I always ask how
many people in the audience can honestly claim to have no unauthorized
software on their hard disks. I’ve never seen more than ten percent of the
hands go up.
Whenever there is such profound divergence between the law
and social practice, it is not society that adapts. And, against the swift
tide of custom, the Software Publishers’ current practice of hanging a
few visible scapegoats is so obviously capricious as to only further
diminish respect for the law.
Part of the widespread popular disregard for commercial
software copyrights stems from a legislative failure to understand the
conditions into which it was inserted. To assume that systems of law
based in the physical world will serve in an environment which is as
fundamentally different as Cyberspace is a folly for which everyone
doing business in the future will pay.
As I will discuss in the next segment, unbounded intellectual
property is very different from physical property and can no longer be
protected as though these differences did not exist. For example, if we
continue to assume that value is based on scarcity, as it is with regard to
physical objects, we will create laws which are precisely contrary to the
nature of information, which may, in many cases, increase in value with
distribution.
The large, legally risk-averse institutions most likely to play by
the old rules will suffer for their compliance. The more lawyers, guns,
and money they invest in either protecting their rights or subverting those
of their opponents, the more commercial competition will resemble the
Kwakiutl Potlatch Ceremony, in which adversaries competed by
destroying their own possessions. Their ability to produce new
technology will simply grind to a halt as every move they make drives
them deeper into a tar pit of courtroom warfare.
Faith in law will not be an effective strategy for high tech
companies. Law adapts by continuous increments and at a pace second
only to geology in its stateliness. Technology advances in the lunging
jerks, like the punctuation of biological evolution grotesquely
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accelerated. Real world conditions will continue to change at a blinding
pace, and the law will get further behind, more profoundly confused.
This mismatch is permanent.
Promising economies based on purely digital products will either
be born in a state of paralysis, as appears to be the case with multimedia,
or continue in a brave and willful refusal by their owners to play the
ownership game at all.
In the United States one can already see a parallel economy
developing, mostly among small fast moving enterprises who protect
their ideas by getting into the marketplace quicker than their larger
competitors who base their protection on fear and litigation.
Perhaps those who are part of the problem will simply quarantine
themselves in court while those who are part of the solution will create a
new society based, at first, on piracy and freebooting. It may well be that
when the current system of intellectual property law has collapsed, as
seems inevitable, that no new legal structure will arise in its place.
But something will happen. After all, people do business. When
a currency becomes meaningless, business is done in barter. When
societies develop outside the law, they develop their own unwritten
codes, practices, and ethical systems. While technology may undo law,
technology offers methods for restoring creative rights.

II. A TAXONOMY OF INFORMATION
It seems to me that the most productive thing to do now is to
look hard into the true nature of what we’re trying to protect. How much
do we really know about information and its natural behaviors?
What are the essential characteristics of unbounded creation?
How does it differ from previous forms of property? How many of our
assumptions about it have actually been about its containers rather than
their mysterious contents? What are its different species and how does
each of them lend itself to control? What technologies will be useful in
creating new virtual bottles to replace the old physical ones?
Of course, information is, by its nature, intangible and hard to
define. Like other such deep phenomena as light or matter, it is a natural
host to paradox. And as it is most helpful to understand light as being
both a particle and a wave, an understanding of information may emerge
in the abstract congruence of its several different properties which might
be described by the following three statements:
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Information is an activity.
Information is a life form.
Information is a relationship.

In the following section, I will examine each of these.

A. INFORMATION IS AN ACTIVITY
1. Information Is a Verb, Not a Noun
Freed of its containers, information is obviously not a thing. In
fact, it is something which happens in the field of interaction between
minds or objects or other pieces of information.
Gregory Bateson, expanding on the information theory of Claude
Shannon, said, “Information is a difference which makes a difference.”
Thus, information only really exists in the Δ [delta]. The making of that
difference is an activity within a relationship. Information is an action
which occupies time rather than a state of being which occupies physical
space, as is the case with hard goods. It is the pitch, not the baseball, the
dance, not the dancer.
2. Information Is Experienced, Not Possessed
Even when it has been encapsulated in some static form like a
book or a hard disk, information is still something which happens to you
as you mentally decompress it from its storage code. But, whether it’s
running at gigabits per second or words per minute, the actual decoding
is a process which must be performed by and upon a mind, a process
which must take place in time.
There was a cartoon in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists a few
years ago which illustrated this point beautifully. In the drawing, a
holdup man trains his gun on the sort of bespectacled fellow you’d figure
might have a lot of information stored in his head. “Quick,” orders the
bandit, “Give me all your ideas.”
3. Information Has to Move
Sharks are said to die of suffocation if they stop swimming, and
the same is nearly true of information. Information which isn’t moving
ceases to exist as anything but potential . . . at least until it is allowed to
move again. For this reason, the practice of information hoarding,
common in bureaucracies, is an especially wrong-headed artifact of
physically-based value systems.
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4. Information Is Conveyed by Propagation, Not Distribution
The way in which information spreads is also very different from
the distribution of physical goods. It moves more like something from
nature than from a factory. It can concatenate like falling dominos or
grow in the usual fractal lattice, like frost spreading on a window, but it
cannot be shipped around like widgets, except to the extent that it can be
contained in them. It doesn’t simply move on. It leaves a trail of itself
everywhere it’s been.
The central economic distinction between information and
physical property is the ability of information to be transferred without
leaving the possession of the original owner. If I sell you my horse, I
can’t ride him after that. If I sell you what I know, we both know it.

B. INFORMATION IS A LIFE FORM
1. Information Wants to Be Free
Stewart Brand is generally credited with this elegant statement of
the obvious, recognizing both the natural desire of secrets to be told and
the fact that they might be capable of possessing something like a
“desire” in the first place.
English Biologist and Philosopher Richard Dawkins proposed
the idea of “memes,” self-replicating, patterns of information which
propagate themselves across the ecologies of mind, saying they were like
life forms.
I believe they are life forms in every respect but a basis in the
carbon atom. They self-reproduce, they interact with their surroundings
and adapt to them, they mutate, they persist. Like any other life form
they evolve to fill the possibility spaces of their local environments,
which are, in this case the surrounding belief systems and cultures of
their hosts, namely, us.
Indeed, the sociobiologists like Dawkins make a plausible case
that carbon-based life forms are information as well, that, as the chicken
is an egg’s way of making another egg, the entire biological spectacle is
just the DNA molecule’s means of copying out more information strings
exactly like itself.
2. Information Replicates into the Cracks of Possibility
Like DNA helices, ideas are relentless expansionists, always
seeking new opportunities for lebensraum. And, as in carbon-based
nature, the more robust organisms are extremely adept at finding new
places to live. Thus, just as the common housefly has insinuated itself
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into practically every ecosystem on the planet, so has the meme of “life
after death” found a niche in most minds, or psycho-ecologies.
The more universally resonant an idea or image or song, the
more minds it will enter and remain within. Trying to stop the spread of a
really robust piece of information is about as easy as keeping killer bees
South of the Border. The stuff just leaks.
3. Information Wants to Change
If ideas and other interactive patterns of information are indeed
life forms, they can be expected to evolve constantly into forms which
will be more perfectly adapted to their surroundings. And, as we see,
they are doing this all the time.
But for a long time, our static media, whether carvings in stone,
ink on paper, or dye on celluloid, have strongly resisted the evolutionary
impulse, exalting as a consequence the author’s ability to determine the
finished product. But, as in an oral tradition, digitized information has no
“final cut.”
Digital information, unconstrained by packaging, is a continuing
process more like the metamorphosing tales of prehistory than anything
which will fit in shrink wrap. From the Neolithic to Gutenberg,
information was passed on, mouth to ear, changing with every re-telling
(or re-singing). The stories which once shaped our sense of the world
didn’t have authoritative versions. They adapted to each culture in which
they found themselves being told.
Because there was never a moment when the story was frozen in
print, the so-called “moral” right of storytellers to keep the tale their own
was neither protected nor recognized. The story simply passed through
each of them on its way to the next, where it would assume a different
form. As we return to continuous information, we can expect the
importance of authorship to diminish. Creative people may have to
renew their acquaintance with humility.
But our system of copyright makes no accommodation whatever
for expressions which don’t at some point become “fixed” nor for
cultural expressions which lack a specific author or inventor.
Jazz improvisation, standup comedy routines, mime
performances, developing monologues, and unrecorded broadcast
transmissions all lack the Constitutional requirement of fixation as a
“writing.” Without being fixed by a point of publication the liquid works
of the future will all look more like these continuously adapting and
changing forms and will therefore exist beyond the reach of copyright.
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Copyright expert Pamela Samuelson tells of having attended a
conference last year convened around the fact that Western countries
may legally appropriate the music, designs, and biomedical lore of
aboriginal people without compensation to their tribe of origin since that
tribe is not an “author” or “inventor.”
But soon most information will be generated collaboratively by
the cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace. Our arrogant legal
dismissal of the rights of “primitives” will be back to haunt us soon.
4. Information Is Perishable
With the exception of the rare classic, most information is like
farm produce. Its quality degrades rapidly both over time and in distance
from the source of production. But even here, value is highly subjective
and conditional. Yesterday’s papers are quite valuable to the historian. In
fact, the older they are, the more valuable they become. On the other
hand, a commodities broker might consider news of an event which is
more than an hour old to have lost any relevance.

C. INFORMATION IS A RELATIONSHIP
1. Meaning Has Value and Is Unique to Each Case
In most cases, we assign value to information based on its
meaningfulness. The place where information dwells, the holy moment
where transmission becomes reception, is a region which has many
shifting characteristics and flavors depending on the relationship of
sender and receiver, the depth of their interactivity.
Each such relationship is unique. Even in cases where the sender
is a broadcast medium, and no response is returned, the receiver is hardly
passive. Receiving information is often as creative an act as generating it.
The value of what is sent depends entirely on the extent to which
each individual receiver has the receptors . . . shared terminology,
attention, interest, language, paradigm . . . necessary to render what is
received meaningful.
Understanding is a critical element increasingly overlooked in
the effort to turn information into a commodity. Data may be any set of
facts, useful or not, intelligible or inscrutable, germane or irrelevant.
Computers can crank out new data all night long without human help,
and the results may be offered for sale as information. They may or may
not actually be so. Only a human being can recognize the meaning which
separates information from data.
In fact, information, in the economic sense of the word, consists
of data which have been passed through a particular human mind and
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found meaningful within that mental context. One fella’s information is
all just data to someone else. If you’re an anthropologist, my detailed
charts of Tasaday kinship patterns might be critical information to you. If
you’re a banker from Hong Kong, they might barely seem to be data.
2. Familiarity Has More Value Than Scarcity
With physical goods, there is a direct correlation between
scarcity and value. Gold is more valuable than wheat, even though you
can’t eat it. While this is not always the case, the situation with
information is usually precisely the reverse. Most soft goods increase in
value as they become more common. Familiarity is an important asset in
the world of information. It may often be the case that the best thing you
can do to raise the demand for your product is to give it away.
While this has not always worked with shareware, it could be
argued that there is a connection between the extent to which commercial
software is pirated and the amount which gets sold. Broadly pirated
software, such as Lotus 1-2-3 or WordPerfect, becomes a standard and
benefits from Law of Increasing Returns based on familiarity.
In regard to my own soft product, rock and roll songs, there is no
question that the band I write them for, the Grateful Dead, has increased
its popularity enormously by giving them away. We have been letting
people tape our concerts since the early seventies, but instead of reducing
the demand for our product, we are now the largest concert draw in
America, a fact which is at least in part attributable to the popularity
generated by those tapes.
True, I don’t get any royalties on the millions of copies of my
songs which have been extracted from concerts, but I see no reason to
complain. The fact is, no one but the Grateful Dead can perform a
Grateful Dead song, so if you want the experience and not its thin
projection, you have to buy a ticket from us. In other words, our
intellectual property protection derives from our being the only real-time
source of it.
3. Exclusivity Has Value
The problem with a model which turns the physical
scarcity/value ratio on its head is that sometimes the value of information
is very much based on its scarcity. Exclusive possession of certain facts
makes them more useful. If everyone knows about conditions which
might drive a stock price up, the information is valueless.
But again, the critical factor is usually time. It doesn’t matter if
this kind of information eventually becomes ubiquitous. What matters is
being among the first who possess it and act on it. While potent secrets
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usually don’t stay secret, they may remain so long enough to advance the
cause of their original holders.
4. Point of View and Authority Have Value
In a world of floating realities and contradictory maps, rewards
will accrue to those commentators whose maps seem to fit their territory
snugly, based on their ability to yield predictable results for those who
use them.
In aesthetic information, whether poetry or rock ‘n’ roll, people
are willing to buy the new product of an artist, sight-unseen, based on
their having been delivered a pleasurable experience by previous work.
Reality is an edit. People are willing to pay for the authority of
those editors whose filtering point of view seems to fit best. And again,
point of view is an asset which cannot be stolen or duplicated. No one
but Esther Dyson sees the world as she does and the handsome fee she
charges for her newsletter is actually for the privilege of looking at the
world through her unique eyes.
5. Time Replaces Space
In the physical world, value depends heavily on possession, or
proximity in space. One owns that material which falls inside certain
dimensional boundaries and the ability to act directly, exclusively, and as
one wishes upon what falls inside those boundaries is the principal right
of ownership. And of course there is the relationship between value and
scarcity, a limitation in space.
In the virtual world, proximity in time is a value determinant. An
informational product is generally more valuable the closer the purchaser
can place himself to the moment of its expression, a limitation in time.
Many kinds of information degrade rapidly with either time or
reproduction. Relevance fades as the territory they map changes. Noise is
introduced and bandwidth lost with passage away from the point where
the information is first produced. Thus, listening to a Grateful Dead tape
is hardly the same experience as attending a Grateful Dead concert. The
closer one can get to the headwaters of an informational stream, the
better his chances of finding an accurate picture of reality in it. In an era
of easy reproduction, the informational abstractions of popular
experiences will propagate out from their source moments to reach
anyone who’s interested. But it’s easy enough to restrict the real
experience of the desirable event, whether knock-out punch or guitar
lick, to those willing to pay for being there.
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6. The Protection of Execution
In the hick town I come from, they don’t give you much credit
for just having ideas. You are judged by what you can make of them. As
things continue to speed up, I think we see that execution is the best
protection for those designs which become physical products. Or, as
Steve Jobs once put it, “Real artists ship.” The big winner is usually the
one who gets to the market first (and with enough organizational force to
keep the lead).
But, as we become fixated upon information commerce, many of
us seem to think that originality alone is sufficient to convey value,
deserving, with the right legal assurances, of a steady wage. In fact, the
best way to protect intellectual property is to act on it. It’s not enough to
invent and patent, one has to innovate as well. Someone claims to have
patented the microprocessor before Intel. Maybe so. If he’d actually
started shipping microprocessors before Intel, his claim would seem far
less spurious.
7. Information as Its Own Reward
It is now a commonplace to say that money is information. With
the exception of Krugerands, crumpled cab-fare, and the contents of
those suit-cases which drug lords are reputed to carry, most of the money
in the informatized world is in ones and zeros. The global money supply
sloshes around the Net, as fluid as weather. It is also obvious, as I have
discussed, that information has become as fundamental to the creation of
modern wealth as land and sunlight once were.
What is less obvious is the extent to which information is
acquiring intrinsic value, not as a means to acquisition but as the object
to be acquired. I suppose this has always been less explicitly the case. In
politics and academia, potency and information have always been closely
related.
However, as we increasingly buy information with money, we
begin to see that buying information with other information is simple
economic exchange without the necessity of converting the product into
and out of currency. This is somewhat challenging for those who like
clean accounting, since, information theory aside, informational
exchange rates are too squishy to quantify to the decimal point.
Nevertheless, most of what a middle class American purchases
has little to do with survival. We buy beauty, prestige, experience,
education, and all the obscure pleasures of owning. Many of these things
can not only be expressed in non-material terms, they can be acquired by
non-material means.
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And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with ideas
is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for, given the
market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely spend even more
money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many opportunities to pay
for ideas with other ideas.
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its denizens
are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed. Rather they are
getting paid in something besides money. It is an economy which
consists almost entirely of information.
This may become the dominant form of human trade, and if we
persist in modeling economics on a strictly monetary basis, we may be
gravely misled.
8. Getting Paid in Cyberspace
How all the foregoing relates to solutions to the crisis in
intellectual property is something I’ve barely started to wrap my mind
around. It’s fairly paradigm-warping to look at information through fresh
eyes––to see how very little it is like pig iron or pork bellies, to imagine
the tottering travesties of case law we will stack up if we go on treating it
legally as though it were.
As I’ve said, I believe these towers of outmoded boilerplate will
be a smoking heap sometime in the next decade and we mind miners will
have no choice but to cast our lot with new systems that work.
I’m not really so gloomy about our prospects as readers of this
jeremiad so far might conclude. Solutions will emerge. Nature abhors a
vacuum and so does commerce.
Indeed, one of the aspects of the electronic frontier which I have
always found most appealing––and the reason Mitch Kapor and I used
that phrase in naming our foundation––is the degree to which it
resembles the 19th Century American West in its natural preference for
social devices which emerge from it conditions rather than those which
are imposed from the outside.
Until the west was fully settled and “civilized” in this century,
order was established according to an unwritten Code of the West which
had the fluidity of etiquette rather than the rigidity of law. Ethics were
more important than rules. Understandings were preferred over laws,
which were, in any event, largely unenforceable.
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I believe that law, as we understand it, was developed to protect
the interests which arose in the two economic “waves” which Alvin
Toffler accurately identified in The Third Wave. The First Wave was
agriculturally based and required law to order ownership of the principal
source of production, land. In the Second Wave, manufacturing became
the economic mainspring, and the structure of modern law grew around
the centralized institutions which needed protection for their reserves of
capital, manpower, and hardware.
Both of these economic systems required stability. Their laws
were designed to resist change and to assure some equability of
distribution within a fairly static social framework. The possibility spaces
had to be constrained to preserve the predictability necessary to either
land stewardship or capital formation.
In the Third Wave we have now entered, information to a large
extent replaces land, capital, and hardware, and as I have detailed in the
preceding section, information is most at home in a much more fluid and
adaptable environment. The Third Wave is likely to bring a fundamental
shift in the purposes and methods of law which will affect far more than
simply those statutes which govern intellectual property.
The “terrain” itself––the architecture of the Net––may come to
serve many of the purposes which could only be maintained in the past
by legal imposition. For example, it may be unnecessary to
constitutionally assure freedom of expression in an environment which,
in the words of my fellow EFF co-founder John Gilmore, “treats
censorship as a malfunction” and re-routes proscribed ideas around it.
Similar natural balancing mechanisms may arise to smooth over
the social discontinuities which previously required legal intercession to
set right. On the Net, these differences are more likely to be spanned by a
continuous spectrum which connects as much as it separates.
And, despite their fierce grip on the old legal structure,
companies which trade in information are likely to find that in their
increasing inability to deal sensibly with technological issues, the courts
will not produce results which are predictable enough to be supportive of
long-term enterprise. Every litigation becomes like a game of Russian
roulette, depending on the depth the presiding judge’s clue-impairment.
Uncodified or adaptive “law,” while as “fast, loose, and out of
control” as other emergent forms, is probably more likely to yield
something like justice at this point. In fact, one can already see in
development new practices to suit the conditions of virtual commerce.
The life forms of information are evolving methods to protect their
continued reproduction.
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For example, while all the tiny print on a commercial diskette
envelope punctiliously requires much of those who would open it, there
are, as I say, few who read those provisos, let alone follow them to the
letter. And yet, the software business remains a very healthy sector of the
American economy.
Why is this? Because people seem to eventually buy the software
they really use. Once a program becomes central to your work, you want
the latest version of it, the best support, the actual manuals, all privileges
which are attached to ownership. Such practical considerations will, in
the absence of working law, become more and more important in getting
paid for what might easily be obtained for nothing.
I do think that some software is being purchased in the service of
ethics or the abstract awareness that the failure to buy it will result in its
not being produced any longer, but I’m going to leave those motivators
aside. While I believe that the failure of law will almost certainly result
in a compensating re-emergence of ethics as the ordering template of
society, this is a belief I don’t have room to support here.
Instead, I think that, as in the case cited above, compensation for
soft products will be driven primarily by practical considerations, all of
them consistent with the true properties of digital information, where the
value lies in it, and how it can be both manipulated and protected by
technology.
While the conundrum remains a conundrum, I can begin to see
the directions from which solutions may emerge, based in part on
broadening those practical solutions which are already in practice.
9. Relationship and Its Tools
I believe one idea is central to understanding liquid commerce:
Information economics, in the absence of objects, will be based more on
relationship than possession.
One existing model for the future conveyance of intellectual
property is real time performance, a medium currently used only in
theater, music, lectures, stand-up comedy and pedagogy. I believe the
concept of performance will expand to include most of the information
economy from multi-casted soap operas to stock analysis. In these
instances, commercial exchange will be more like ticket sales to a
continuous show than the purchase of discrete bundles of that which is
being shown.
The other model, of course, is service. The entire professional
class––doctors, lawyers, consultants, architects, etc.––are already being
paid directly for their intellectual property. Who needs copyright when
you’re on a retainer?
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In fact, this model was applied to much of what is now
copyrighted until the late 18th Century. Before the industrialization of
creation, writers, composers, artists, and the like produced their products
in the private service of patrons. Without objects to distribute in a mass
market, creative people will return to a condition somewhat like this,
except that they will serve many patrons, rather than one.
We can already see the emergence of companies which base
their existence on supporting and enhancing the soft property they create
rather than selling it by the shrink-wrapped piece or embedding it in
widgets.
Trip Hawkins’ new company for creating and licensing
multimedia tools, 3DO, is an example of what I’m talking about. 3DO
doesn’t intend to produce any commercial software or consumer devices.
Instead, they will act as a kind of private standards setting body,
mediating among software and device creators who will be their
licensees. They will provide a point of commonalty for relationships
between a broad spectrum of entities.
In any case, whether you think of yourself as a service provider
or a performer, the future protection of your intellectual property will
depend on your ability to control your relationship to the market––a
relationship which will most likely live and grow over a period of time.
The value of that relationship will reside in the quality of
performance, the uniqueness of your point of view, the validity of your
expertise, its relevance to your market, and, underlying everything, the
ability of that market to access your creative services swiftly,
conveniently, and interactively.
10. Interaction and Protection
Direct interaction will provide a lot of intellectual property
protection in the future, and, indeed, it already has. No one knows how
many software pirates have bought legitimate copies of a program after
calling its publisher for technical support and being asked for some proof
of purchase, but I would guess the number is very high.
The same kind of controls will be applicable to “question and
answer” relationships between authorities (or artists) and those who seek
their expertise. Newsletters, magazines, and books will be supplemented
by the ability of their subscribers to ask direct questions of authors.
Interactivity will be a billable commodity even in the absence of
authorship. As people move into the Net and increasingly get their
information directly from its point of production, unfiltered by
centralized media, they will attempt to develop the same interactive
ability to probe reality which only experience has provided them in the
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past. Live access to these distant “eyes and ears” will be much easier to
cordon than access to static bundles of stored but easily reproducible
information.
In most cases, control will be based on restricting access to the
freshest, highest bandwidth information. It will be a matter of defining
the ticket, the venue, the performer, and the identity of the ticket holder,
definitions which I believe will take their forms from technology, not
law.
In most cases, the defining technology will be cryptography.
11. Crypto Bottling
Cryptography, as I’ve said perhaps too many times, is the
“material” from which the walls, boundaries––and bottles––of
Cyberspace will be fashioned.
Of course there are problems with cryptography or any other
purely technical method of property protection. It has always appeared to
me that the more security you hide your goods behind, the more likely
you are to turn your sanctuary into a target. Having come from a place
where people leave their keys in their cars and don’t even have keys to
their houses, I remain convinced that the best obstacle to crime is a
society with its ethics intact.
While I admit that this is not the kind of society most of us live
in, I also believe that a social over-reliance on protection by barricades
rather than conscience will eventually wither the latter by turning
intrusion and theft into a sport, rather than a crime. This is already
occurring in the digital domain as is evident in the activities of computer
crackers.
Furthermore, I would argue that initial efforts to protect digital
copyright by copy protection contributed to the current condition in
which most otherwise ethical computer users seem morally untroubled
by their possession of pirated software.
Instead of cultivating among the newly computerized a sense of
respect for the work of their fellows, early reliance on copy protection
led to the subliminal notion that cracking into a software package
somehow “earned” one the right to use it. Limited not by conscience but
by technical skill, many soon felt free to do whatever they could get
away with. This will continue to be a potential liability of the encryption
of digitized commerce.
Furthermore, it’s cautionary to remember that copy protection
was rejected by the market in most areas. Many of the upcoming efforts
to use cryptography-based protection schemes will probably suffer the
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same fate. People are not going to tolerate much which makes computers
harder to use than they already are without any benefit to the user.
Nevertheless, encryption has already demonstrated a certain
blunt utility. New subscriptions to various commercial satellite TV
services sky-rocketed recently after their deployment of more robust
encryption of their feeds. This, despite a booming backwoods trade in
black decoder chips conducted by folks who’d look more at home
running moonshine than cracking code.
Another obvious problem with encryption as a global solution is
that once something has been unscrambled by a legitimate licensee, it
may be openly available to massive reproduction.
In some instances, reproduction following decryption may not be
a problem. Many soft products degrade sharply in value with time. It
may be that the only real interest in some such products will be among
those who have purchased the keys to immediacy.
Furthermore, as software becomes more modular and
distribution moves online, it will begin to metamorphose in direct
interaction with its user base. Discontinuous upgrades will smooth into a
constant process of incremental improvement and adaptation, some of it
man-made and some of it arising through genetic algorithms. Pirated
copies of software may become too static to have much value to anyone.
Even in cases such as images, where the information is expected
to remain fixed, the unencrypted file could still be interwoven with code
which could continue to protect it by a wide variety of means.
In most of the schemes I can project, the file would be “alive”
with permanently embedded software which could “sense” the
surrounding conditions and interact with them. For example, it might
contain code which could detect the process of duplication and cause it to
self-destruct.
Other methods might give the file the ability to “phone home”
through the Net to its original owner. The continued integrity of some
files might require periodic “feeding” with digital cash from their host,
which they would then relay back to their authors.
Of course files which possess the independent ability to
communicate upstream sound uncomfortably like the Morris Internet
Worm. “Live” files do have a certain viral quality. And serious privacy
issues would arise if everyone’s computer were packed with digital spies.
The point is that cryptography will enable a lot of protection
technologies which will develop rapidly in the obsessive competition
which has always existed between lock-makers and lock-breakers.
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But cryptography will not be used simply for making locks. It is
also at the heart of both digital signatures and the aforementioned digital
cash, both of which I believe will be central to the future protection of
intellectual property.
I believe that the generally acknowledged failure of the
shareware model in software had less to do with dishonesty than with the
simple inconvenience of paying for shareware. If the payment process
can be automated, as digital cash and signature will make possible, I
believe that soft product creators will reap a much higher return from the
bread they cast upon the waters of Cyberspace.
Moreover, they will be spared much of the overhead which
presently adheres to the marketing, manufacture, sales, and distribution
of information products, whether those products are computer programs,
books, CD’s, or motion pictures. This will reduce prices and further
increase the likelihood of non-compulsory payment.
But of course there is a fundamental problem with a system
which requires, through technology, payment for every access to a
particular expression. It defeats the original Jeffersonian purpose of
seeing that ideas were available to everyone regardless of their economic
station. I am not comfortable with a model which will restrict inquiry to
the wealthy.
12. An Economy of Verbs
The future forms and protections of intellectual property are
densely obscured from the entrance to the Virtual Age. Nevertheless, I
can make (or reiterate) a few flat statements which I earnestly believe
won’t look too silly in fifty years.
•

In the absence of the old containers, almost everything we
think we know about intellectual property is wrong. We are
going to have to unlearn it. We are going to have to look at
information as though we’d never seen the stuff before.

•

The protections which we will develop will rely far more
on ethics and technology than on law.

•

Encryption will be the technical basis for most intellectual
property protection. (And should, for this and other
reasons, be made more widely available.)

•

The economy of the future will be based on relationship
rather than possession. It will be continuous rather than
sequential.
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And finally, in the years to come, most human exchange
will be virtual rather than physical, consisting not of stuff
but the stuff of which dreams are made. Our future
business will be conducted in a world made more of verbs
than nouns.

Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, October 1, 1992
New York, New York, November 6, 1992
Brookline, Massachusetts, November 8, 1992
New York, New York, November 15, 1993
San Francisco, California, November 20, 1993
Pinedale, Wyoming, November 24–30, 1993
New York, New York, December 13–14, 1993
This expression has lived and grown to this point over the time
period and in the places detailed above. Despite its print publication here,
I expect it will continue to evolve in liquid form, possibly for years.
The thoughts in it have not been “mine” alone but have
assembled themselves in a field of interaction which has existed between
myself and numerous others, to whom I am grateful. They particularly
include: Pamela Samuelson, Kevin Kelly, Mitch Kapor, Mike Godwin,
Stewart Brand, Mike Holderness, Miram Barlow, Danny Hillis, Trip
Hawkins, and Alvin Toffler.
However, I should note in honesty that when WIRED sends me a
check for having temporarily “fixed” it on their pages, I alone will cash it
...

IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)1
JAMES BOYLE†

About 30 years ago, in March of 1989, a British man wrote a
memo to his boss. The memo had the remarkably boring title,
Information Management: A Proposal. It looked like this2:

1

This article is made available under a Creative Commons Attribution, Non
Commercial, Sharealike license. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-ncsa/3.0/.
†
William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
2
Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A Proposal, CERN (Mar. 1989),
http://info.cern.ch/Proposal.html.
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The memo came back with his boss’s annotation on it. “Vague
but exciting…”
Both adjectives were well-chosen. The man was Tim BernersLee. Now Sir Tim Berners-Lee. The proposal? Oh, nothing big. Just the
World Wide Web. Berners-Lee’s memo was something that started as a
proposal for information management inside of CERN, the European
Nuclear Research organization, and became the framework for the World
Wide Web. You know, those three little letters in your browser bar?
WWW?
Dispensing with the cumbersome protocols of the time, BernersLee envisioned a web of information, linked together by a language
called html (hypertext markup language), a precise geography provided
by Uniform Resource Identifiers (think the URL’s of web addresses) and
finally a method of transfer, http (the hypertext transfer protocol that you
can still see in the address of the sites in your web browser). By 1990 he
had written each of these protocols.
I teach at a law school that has world-class faculty and brilliant
students. Their breadth of learning humbles me on a daily basis. But
many of them do not understand the network architecture that is so
central to their lives. Of course, it is not their specialty. Yet they
understand the basic explanation of anthropogenic climate-change, the
idea of externalities in economics, the broad strokes of the history of
civil rights in the United States, the debate about whether minimum
wages are good for poor workers and the issues raised by the use of
drones in armed conflict. They fluently invoke the concept of noir
cinema and make jokes about magical realist fiction when a faculty
meeting turns bizarre. They are, in short, profoundly well-rounded,
educated people, knowledgeable beyond their own specialties. But they
do not really understand the internet or the world wide web. That is a
shame.
It is a shame because understanding the most important
communications network of our time, the network for our culture and
news and search and flirting and shopping and politics, is central to
knowing how—or whether—to regulate it. To build on it. To use it. As I
will try to explain, some of the features of the internet that its critics view
as its main problems—anonymity, the fact that anyone can connect to the
internet and say anything, the difficulty of filtering it or managing it, its
decentralized anarchic governance—are also among its transformative
and engaging features. It is a shame for us not to understand all this
because the network that shapes our cognitive world, defines our
markets, and runs our infrastructure is as important as the rest of the
things a “well-rounded person” knows about. But it is also a shame
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because Berners-Lee’s idea was beautiful. It was an idea that a scholar
would come up with and that a scholar would love. Now it is central to
our world. Yet somehow it progressed from bizarre novelty to essential
utility without ever passing through the intermediate stage of public
comprehension.
Berners-Lee imagined a republic of ideas built on a vision of
language. The whole thing had a whiff of Harry Potter magic. To click
on the hyperlink was to summon its referent. The name was the magical
command for the presence of the resource, as though every footnote
animated itself, went to the library and brought you back the relevant
book. To write a web page was to build a transporter of the mind. The
link was a reference to the resource, a map to the place where the
resource was held and a vehicle to take you there. Each new document
wove the network a little wider and tighter. That’s why they called it the
world wide web. And its architecture was “distributed.” Anyone could
build the web—as if we could all wander outside our houses and build
the Eisenhower freeways of the mind ourselves, draw the maps that
chronicled those freeways, assemble the cars that traveled along them
and then construct the libraries, bookstores, shops, coffee houses and red
light districts to which they journeyed. All done through a decentralized
process that required neither governmental permission, nor
authentication of your content—for better or worse. Better and worse.
The network had no central controller, no authority that must
authenticate or vet, no central node through which all connections
passed. Writing back in 1997, I tried to summarize the attraction of this
architecture to libertarians, starting with the famous quotation “The Net
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”
This quote from John Gilmore, one of the founders of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, has the twin advantages of being pithy and
technologically accurate. The Internet[’s] . . . distributed
architecture and its technique of packet switching were designed to
get messages delivered despite blockages, holes, and malfunctions.
Imagine the poor censor faced with such a system. There is no
central exchange to seize and hold; messages actively “seek out”
alternative routes so that even if one path is blocked another may
open up. Here was the civil libertarian’s dream: a technology with a
comparatively low cost of entry to speakers and listeners alike,
technologically resistant to censorship, yet politically and
economically important enough that it cannot easily be ignored. The
Internet offers obvious advantages to the countries, research
communities, cultures, and companies that use it, but it is extremely
hard to control the amount and type of information available; access
is like a tap that only has two settings–“off” and “full.” For
governments, this has been seen as one of the biggest problems
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posed by the Internet. To the Internet’s devotees, most of whom
embrace some variety of libertarianism, the Internet’s structural
resistance to censorship, or any externally imposed filtration, is “not
a bug but a feature.”3

It was not merely the network’s distributed nature or its
resistance to censorship that attracted attention. It was the degree of
freedom it gave its users. The network imposed no barriers to what could
pass over its fibers, so long as that content could be broken down into
packets. It was based on an “end-to-end architecture.” It imposed no
judgment about what would be done at either end of its connections. This
was not just a network of terminals, like many of its earlier digital
antecedents such as Ceefax or Minitel. It did not limit connection to
devices hardwired to perform only a few defined functions, such as an
ATM or an airline check-in kiosk. The ATM will not give you the
weather and the check-in kiosk cannot produce pictures of your
grandchildren.4 Terminal design = control of user. This is the genius of
Larry Lessig’s focus on architecture as regulation. But this was not a
network of terminals. If you plugged in a general purpose computer at
either end of this network, you could do whatever software on a general
purpose computer could do. Chat? Music? Video remix? Flirting?
Arranging calendars? Generating knitting patterns? Doing facial
recognition or portfolio analysis? Making a tribute to a departed loved
one? Looking in on your babysitter while you are on a date? Managing
just-in-time inventory through the same system that handled your
customer orders? Generating encrypted communications that your
despotic government could not read? Creating a message board on which
you discovered that you were not in fact the only gay teenager in the
world, it just seemed that way? So long as the software could be written

3

James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
To be fair, all of this was in the context of criticizing the naivete of hardcore
digital libertarianism. Even back then academic commentators, including me,
stressed that such claims relied on a form of technological essentialism—
assuming that the current form of the network was in some sense canonical—
and stressed the possibility of “hard wired censors” which could in fact tame the
supposedly unregulable internet. The best example of those hard wired censors
was to be the Great Firewall of China. Id.; More importantly, see LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Since we were among
naïve libertarianism’s principal critics, it is mildly annoying to have the views
we criticized attributed to us.
4
Just to clarify: “The grandchildren are in the Facebook. The Facebook lives in
the Google.” The advanced class deals with how one gets to the Google by
rebooting the router.
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and the information broken into packets, those packets could be sent and
received anywhere in the world.
It was a world-changing technology, a world-changing idea. Yes,
of course, we immediately used it for porn, copyright infringement, spam
and videos of cats. We are human. We build glorious cathedrals and then
scribble illiterate graffiti on their walls. But it could do so much more,
and it did. And thirty years ago, it did not exist. In 1991, people outside
of CERN were invited to use this new network. Think about that for a
moment. For all intents and purposes, the web that is so central to every
aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until 1991. Maybe 1994, if
you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It is as if I told you that
no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until 25 years ago.
There had been “an internet,” true. There had been packetswitched network precursors or ancestors, depending on how one does
one’s digital zoological classification. The first message was sent over
ARPANET in 1969. TCP/IP—the protocols that collectively allow data
to be broken into packets, addressed, transmitted and reassembled—had
been written for ARPANET under the auspices of DARPA in the 70’s.
Berners-Lee’s genius was to come up with the idea—and it was as much
an idea or a language as it was a technology—that made all of the
(brilliant, visionary) earlier development something that now everyone
was going to want to use, dispute, monetize, subvert, romanticize and
demonize.
There was one more vital thing about the web that the digerati
found noteworthy. It was built on a commons. Actually, it was built on a
series of layers, each a commons or semi-commons, in which key aspects
of the layer were free from the kind of control that proprietary ownership
would have conveyed.
First, the network. With a proprietary network like AOL
(America OnLine) or CompuServe, the owner controls what and who can
become part of the network. There is a right to exclude. With the web
and the internet, the reverse was true. So long as you had the money to
purchase a domain name, so long as you could create or rent a presence
on a server connected to the internet, you were online, with control over
your own site and your own content. In that sense, access was a
commons—regulated, if at all, by the strictures and guidelines of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)5 or the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). But those strictures were largely
technical in nature, setting up the federated set of internet domain name
registrars, and a process for resolving trademark disputes over domain
5

See generally James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50
DUKE L.J. 5 (2000).
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names, or specifying the common metadata language through which web
pages were to express themselves. True, you had to pay a minimal fee to
get a domain name and if you coded your webpage in non-standard html
then it would not display properly. In that sense, there was control. But
there was no proprietary network owner to grant or deny access.
Second, the protocols by which the network operated were also a
commons. For example, TCP/IP tries to make sure that the packets you
are sending end up at the right place, in the right order. If packets are
missed or dropped, it retransmits. But no one owns or controls TCP/IP. It
achieved dominance precisely because it was not a proprietary system
subject to intellectual property rights, but rather a commons that was
open to all. And Berners-Lee’s protocols—the suite that included html,
http and URLs—were left open as well, by explicit choice. Partly that
was because he believed he was building on the work of those who went
before him. Partly it was because he wanted this to be a resource held in
common-like language. And that openness enabled others to standardize
around its protocols without fear of holdup or control at a later stage.
After describing how Berners-Lee worked at CERN in Switzerland
back in the 1980s, Doan moved on to the web. When Berners-Lee
invented the web, did he apply for a patent on it, Doan asked.
“No,” said Berners-Lee.
“Why not?” asked Doan.
“The internet was already around. I was taking hypertext, and it was
around a long time too. I was taking stuff we knew how to do…. All
I was doing was putting together bits that had been around for years
in a particular combination to meet the needs that I have.”
Doan: “And who owns the web?”
Berners-Lee: “We do.”
....
“. . . The reason the Web took off is not because it was a magic
idea, but because I persuaded everyone to use HTML and HTTP.”6

Finally, by custom, nudge and occasional resort to administrative
fiat, it was assumed that the network was and should be ‘neutral.’
Operators of one layer, for example your internet service provider,
should be forbidden from discriminating between different sources of
content of the same digital type. Video and audio streams can be treated
differently than text, of course, because simultaneity, synching and speed
6

Joe Mullin, Tim Berners-Lee Takes the Stand to Keep the Web Free, WIRED
(Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/tim-berners-lee-patent/.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

38

are more important there. But my ISP should not be able to prioritize
different sources of content, sending me Youtube videos twice as fast as
to its competitors for example, or streaming Amazon Prime videos at a
higher rate than Netflix. The fear here was that network effects could be
used to create dominant positions and thus to solidify incumbents, or to
give priority to the content provided by large, vertically integrated
communications companies with extensive portfolios of content. Imagine
the process of Facebook trying to unseat Myspace as the dominant social
network, for example, if Myspace could pay all service-providers to
throttle Facebook’s content or boost its own. Imagine if only TimeWarner’s videos played on the cable networks their parent company
owned. The idea here was profoundly anti-incumbent, against barriers to
entry.
The effects were cumulative. Together, the end-to-end principle
of network design, the censorship-resistant architecture of a packetswitched system, the open access provided by its layers of commons, and
the traffic-equality mandate of net-neutrality7 seemed to offer an opening
for both anti-authoritarian politics and disruptive commerce: If one could
“think as one wished, and speak as one thought,” to quote our colleague
David Lange, and if a disruptive business idea could instantly reach
world-wide without being squashed by the incumbent dinosaurs, then
both economic and political liberty would have gained a powerful ally.
The cheering was not only from the civil libertarian or the Ayn
Rand sectors of the arena. By lowering the barriers to collaboration, the
web promised to allow new forms of creativity—from Wikipedia to open
source software. Many of these new forms of creativity were themselves
built on a network composed of layers of commons and yielded a
resource that itself was a commons; think of Linux or Wikipedia, articles
or software created by strangers and released under a license that
permitted copying and remix. And these forms of creation could take
place outside or beside the dominant forms of commodified creativity,
perhaps challenging our ideas about where intellectual property rights
were necessary to incentivize innovation, perhaps sometimes adding a
tertium quid between work and play, between homo economicus and
homo ludens. The central reference here is Yochai Benkler’s work on the
way in which the network should change our economic assumptions, and
particularly our assumptions about the possibility of commons-based
creativity.8

7

Hat tip, Tim Wu, the inventor of the phrase.
See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Yochai Benkler,
8
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It was in the context of all of this, that John Perry Barlow wrote
the essays that are the subject of this symposium. How should we grade
his prognostications today? Selling Wine Without Bottles probably stands
up best to the test of time. Barlow was right that the internet would pose
a challenge to the current forms of distribution of copyrighted content.
He was right that encryption would eventually provide the “bottles”
around the content we receive; every Pandora stream or Netflix video
comes to you wrapped in walls made of code. He was right that the
network would bring a focus on timeliness, on personal and
uncommodifiable perspective, on relationships other than those of buyer
and seller. This is an insight that affects every influencer on social media,
every columnist who draws you to the New York Times rather than the
Huffington Post, every band that builds a cadre of loyal fans who come
to its concerts and buy its merchandise and vinyl releases. He was right
to say that the availability of perfect digital copies on demand would
actually make the original live experience seem more valuable, not less.9
One can see this both from the growing proportion of musical revenues
generated by live performances and by the increasing number of those
performances over time. He was at least partially right that ethics and
law were becoming increasingly out of joint.
Widespread file-sharing of copyrighted works without
authorization is illegal in the United States and breaking the law is a bad
thing. Yet to the Napster generation it did not seem as if that were true.
In our law school parking lot it is equally illegal to park in the fire lanes
and, if one is not entitled to do so, in the handicapped spaces. My lawabiding, law professor colleagues freely park in the first when the lot is
full. I’ve never seen them park in the second. For a while, file-sharing
was seen like parking illegally to run a quick errand10—running some
risk of sanction but carrying no negative moral force. If illicit
downloading were an exercise in bold civil disobedience that would be
one thing, but this was—for the most part—just wanting to get away
with getting the music without paying. That seems like a bad thing both
for the legitimacy of law and for the backlash it would reliably generate:
massive overreactions in attempting to regulate the network to make it

Coase’s Penguin: or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369
(2002).
9
Cf. WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (1968). This is a much-cited essay which
is deep, insightful and completely wrong on this specific point.
10
To defend my colleagues, the fire-lanes are large enough for the Starship
Enterprise to land on them. Still, the disparity is remarkable.
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more tractable, running the risk of destroying many of its most attractive
attributes in the process.11
Barlow was also right about one cure for lawlessness. People
will pay for convenient, cheap, legal access. Ten years ago, file sharing
was a principal source of music for the student demographic. Today
almost all of my students got their music from legal streaming services.
He was also right that it would take a long time for the music industry to
accept that the old model was dead and that the intellectual property law
would actually make it quite hard to create a multijurisdictional, legal,
music streaming service. “Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are
taking three forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings
to the passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal
penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial.”12 The long delay in the rollout
of reasonably priced legal sources of digital music can indeed be
attributed both to industry denial, and to the barriers that 100 years of
copyright law, built up technology by technology and licensing stream
by licensing stream, put in the way of the one-stop-shop service.
Barlow was not right everywhere. He underestimated the ability
of law to adapt, and to incentivize private actors to make compliance
more profitable than illegality. His vision of property law lacks some of
the Hohfeldian, bundle-of-rights, complexity the legal system actually
has. He overestimated the idea that the web would be a community with
its own ethics—something that might be true for a small group of first
adopters, but is harder to sustain when the network contains most of the
population of the world.
What about A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace?
This document—a deliberate provocation of the global elite at Davos13—
invites pushback. The full-throated claim that “cyberspace” could and
should be a self-governing entity, free from state power, organized only
by the dictates of custom and the Golden Rule is an easy, and
appropriate, target for critique. When linked to the techno-libertarian
slogans I quoted earlier such as “the Net interprets censorship as damage
and routes around it,” it seems to substantiate the idea that these were a
group of people who thought that the technology would automatically
provide freedom, which would thereafter self-regulate.
11

This is a theme that Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto explore at length
in their contribution to this volume, The Enigma of Digitized Property: A
Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019).
12
John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8
(2019).
13
Written while tipsy, according to the backstory provided by Cindy Cohn,
Inventing the Future: Barlow and Beyond, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 69 (2019).
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In the first essay in this volume, though, a moving, personal
reflection on Barlow’s ideas, Cory Doctorow argues for a different
interpretation.
[C]ontext is everything: “The Net interprets censorship as damage
and routes around it” was a prescription as much as an observation.
It was uttered in the context of a nascent internet whose technical
caretakers disagreed on many ethical and technical points, but were
united in a sense of civic duty to keep the technology open and
universal and “free as in freedom.” Gilmore didn’t mean, “Stand
down everyone, we’ve built a censorship-proof internet that will
automatically maintain its integrity.” He meant, “To you, my
comrades-in-arms who toil endlessly to make our balky, wonderful
invention run, I say: the same measures that we take to re-knit our
network when a technical failure tears holes in its fabric can be
repurposed to resist censorship, to route around the nodes that have
fallen under a censor’s thrall. Our shared civic mission, heretofore
dedicated primarily to the technical task of preserving a forum for
discourse, can and should be expanded to the political task of
preserving that forum, and what’s more, the tactics that we have
mastered so thoroughly for the former will serve us in the latter.”14

The notion here is that people like Barlow and Gilmore and Brand were
writing in the context of something greater than a mere technology—a
community of technologists and activists who wanted to preserve the
aspects of the technology that promoted human flourishing and were
working to minimize those that subverted that goal.
When Barlow advocated for a free internet—“free” in all the
usefully overlapping and ambiguous senses of that word—he wasn’t
doing so because he lacked an appreciation of the risks of a
monopolized internet, or an internet that was under the thumb of a
repressive state. Rather, he did so precisely because he feared that a
globe-spanning network of ubiquitous, sensor-studded, actuating
devices that were designed and governed without some kind of
ethical commitment, without the pioneering spirit of the early
internet and its yeoman smallholders who defended it from those
who sought to dominate or pervert it, that we would arrive at a
dystopian future where the entertainment industry’s Huxleyism was
the means for realizing the nightmares of Orwell.15

In Doctorow’s view, Barlow’s repeated invocation of hope was, in the
end, a response to “peak indifference”—the moment when problems
seem so overwhelming that it is easy to give up. But he then adds a point
often missed by those who think Barlow was a naïve utopian. “You don't
14
15

Cory Doctorow, Barlow’s Legacy, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 61, 62 (2019).
Id.
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found an organization like the Electronic Frontier Foundation because
you are sanguine about the future of the internet: you do so because your
hope for an amazing, open future is haunted by terror of a network
suborned for the purposes of spying and control.”16 Those among us, like
me, who are not one of the founders of the nation’s premier digital civil
liberties organization, please raise your hands. Collectively, we may need
to work on our definition of “naïve.”
That theme is picked up by Cindy Cohn, the Executive Director
of that very organization.
Since Barlow’s death, I’ve spent a lot of time trying to ensure
that the straw men who have Barlow’s face taped to them don’t
overshadow the actual man . . . .
To be fair, the real Barlow definitely was an optimist and he
loved all attention, positive or negative. You could argue that he
sometimes pasted his own face on that straw man. Especially in the
Declaration, his language was expansive and visionary. You don’t
start a legal or policy argument with: “you weary giants of flesh and
steel.” You don’t seek nuance with: “I declare the global social
space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies
you seek to impose on us.” In talking about the Declaration at
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) many years later, Barlow
admitted that when he stepped out of a party at Davos to write it, he
was both a little drunk and trying desperately to channel Thomas
Jefferson. So maybe some of the sweeping rebukes are just trying to
match his original bravado.17

But Cohn believes that this misses Barlow’s true project. She quotes a
2015 letter of his to the Washington Post.
I [] knew that we were building the most penetrating and total
surveillance system that could be imagined, and I was no more
comfortable with the Googles (which didn’t exist but predictably
would) who would peer out through those All-Seeing Eyes than I
was with an equally enhanced NSA, Chinese Government, or
United States Cyber Command. However, just as Alan Kay said,
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it,” I knew it’s also
true that a good way to invent the future is to predict it. So I
predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a running start before the
laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up what Ed Snowden now
correctly calls “turn-key totalitarianism.” Which is now available to

16
17

Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
Cohn, supra note 13, at 69–70 (footnotes omitted).
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a number of secretive institutions, public and private (not that
there’s a useful distinction).18

We should have two Barlow’s. One useful for viewpointtaxonomies, the naïve libertarian set of claims that is reasonably
attributed to his own most famous essays. He did say those things, after
all, and those essays were the assigned starting point for the symposium.
The second Barlow would reflect his less famous, though more
numerous, statements that he was as afraid of private power as public,
that he was as skeptical of corporations as he was of the state.
As for his tone, Cohn describes Barlow’s utopianism as the
counterpart to EFF’s own careful, analogy-packed, legal reasoning.
I would then proceed, like a good American litigator, to tie the
liberties of the future Internet to the precedents in the founding of
the country. I would tie anonymous online speakers to Publius of
the Federalist Papers. I would tie the need for digital encryption to
the physical encryption systems used by Madison and Jefferson.
Later I would tie the fight against mass surveillance to John Otis’
fight against general warrants. Since Barlow’s assertions were
factually wrong—of course people could be held accountable for
what they did online as long as their feet touched down in the
jurisdiction of some government somewhere—I worried that he
risked us losing the civil liberties and human rights online that so
many had worked so hard to win offline.
In retrospect, we both had useful strategies for convincing
different audiences to protect freedom online. It’s just that I aimed
for the Supreme Court while Barlow aimed for the sky . . . .19

Cohn takes seriously the invitation of the symposium to look forward 20
years as well as backwards. After brainstorming with her colleagues at
EFF she tries to answer the question, ‘what do we need to do or say
today to invent the future we want?’ “[A] short answer could be that we
want to win our current fights: rein in government surveillance, protect
coders, privacy and freedom of expression, ensure neither copyright nor
overbroad criminal laws cannot squelch freedom of expression, freedom
to tinker or innovation online, and more . . . . But Barlow would want us
to go further.”20 Her answer, presented “with a light touch of Barlowstyle rhetoric,” focuses both on the dangers of state power and corporate
power, and resonates much more with the ideals of “human flourishing.”
18

Letter to the Editor from John P. Barlow to the Wash. Post (sent in response to
J. Silverman, The Internet’s First Anarchist, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2015
(evening edition)).
19
Cohn, supra note 13, at 70–71 (footnotes omitted).
20
Id. at 75.
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We are building a civilization that empowers humans as the
users, builders and beneficiaries of technologies. Governments,
businesses, religions, cultures, communities and robots all matter,
but they all work under, and are transparent to, the bright light of
the humans they serve. We’re building a society that gives power
back to people, especially those who have been robbed of it for too
long. We unflinchingly recognize the bias and prejudices that have
forestalled equity and caused our visions of a just society to fall
short, and we use the power of technology and law to ensure those
wrongs cannot invade further into our digital societies.
We are building a world where the users have primary control
over their tools, devices and networks. Technology serves us, not
the other way around, and it treats efforts to surveil, track or profile
us as hostile measures that should be blocked. Where it cannot, we
have protected pathways—legal, technological, policy and
cultural—so that we can leave those walled gardens, panopticons
and crystal prisons to build our own new worlds.21

In his essay for this volume, A Political Economy of Utopia?,22
Yochai Benkler notes something that most commentators miss; that
Barlow’s work was not just skeptical of the state, but also of a world of
creativity defined around the commodity form.
John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape
the oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional
forms in modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of
the Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern
state. One might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the
medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh
water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done
for us?” The Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that
assumed that if only the state were to back off markets will take
care of it all, but also a left-anchored critique of the state as a
critical site of protecting the power and privilege of elites, insistence
that individual self-actualization demanded a state contained within
narrow boundaries, and a deep skepticism of all forms of authority,
as Fred Turner showed in From Counterculture to Cyberculture.
Selling Wine Without Bottles is not against markets or payment as
such, but rather a resistance to the totalizing vision of commodity
exchange as all there is . . . .23

21

Id. at 76.
Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of Utopia, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 78
(2019).
23
Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).
22
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Benkler points out that Barlow was at least as excited about what the
network might mean for non-commodified forms of human flourishing,
quoting these lines from Selling Wine:
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for,
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed.
Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an
economy which consists almost entirely of information.24

Adding this dimension to Barlow’s ideas shows that they cannot be
reduced to simple libertarianism. Ayn Rand was not a noted skeptic of
the commodity form. Benkler’s own magisterial body of scholarship,
which defined and tried to systematize the potential, limitations and
political economy of “commons-based peer production” has followed
exactly this line. Yet he uses this symposium to muse about the humilityinducing lessons the last twenty years have taught us. Earlier, I pointed
out that one of the most fascinating characteristics of the network was
that it was built on multiple layers and that each layer depended, in part,
on a commons. Benkler adds a note of caution, however, about assuming
that the status of something as a commons is in any way determinative of
how that resource ends up being used.
[T]he kind of optimism that typified Barlow’s writing, as well as at
least some of my own, is much harder to sustain now that we’ve
seen how the successes of the first generation of battles over the
commons have turned out.
Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi. The fact that the
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open
access commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve
people’s freedom from the power of a small number of
corporations. Both on the consumer end, like Roku, and on the
cloud services side, Linux is everywhere. The Internet of Things
could not run on anything other than FOSS and spectrum commons.
And yet, these devices are all centrally controlled, and many
function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance systems. Just as
industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants and effluents
24

Barlow, supra note 12, at 24.
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into the commons of the air and water to externalize some of their
costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open
layers, creating new toll booths and points of observation, and using
the “free” nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost
input from which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as
Julie Cohen puts it. 25

Benkler also notes that current events seem to call for a much larger role
for the state and do so in a way that calls into doubt the contemporary
equivalent of Barlow’s ideas, the breathless, chiliastic wittering about the
transformative power of the blockchain.26
A resurgent progressive movement is fighting hard to change the
basic narrative on how important it is to harness the state,
accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.
So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on
social relations. We need a clearer, and more fully articulated
political economy of technology. We need a better understanding of
what the state and the market are for, in the context of a genuine
three-way interaction between state, market, and commons-based
production specifically or social, nonmarket production more
generally. And we to internalize the limits of anarchism, whether of
the right or left spin. I see present debates over blockchain,
cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net, and I see in them a
rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so poetically. The
words are still there, but the music seems out of sync with the beat
of the times.27

In Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law
Julie Cohen, who Benkler quoted earlier, echoes these themes but takes
aim at cyberlaw scholarship that she believes has suffered from drinking
too deep of ideas like Barlow’s.
25

Benkler, supra note 22, at 81–82 (footnotes omitted). To be fairer to Benkler
than perhaps he is to himself, to me it seemed that his own work never presented
commons status as a sufficient condition for the range of benign outcomes he
discusses, merely as a necessary one which allowed a hitherto unlikely and
counter-hegemonic set of ideas the possibility of success.
26
One of the true architects of the internet, Vint Cerf, has a slide deck about
blockchain with one slide in it. It takes the form of a flowchart. The flowchart
box asks the question “Do I need a blockchain?” The arrow goes to a single
answer. “No.” Vinton G. Cerf, (@vgcerf), TWITTER, (Jul. 19, 2018, 9:49 AM)
https://twitter.com/vgcerf/status/1019987651301081089?lang=en. True, this is
an overstatement. But it is a nice corrective and one which, given its source,
probably deserves our attention.
27
Benkler, supra note 22, at 84.
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Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it
also hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay . . . I
identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining:
utopianism about platforms for distributed cultural and political
production (and concomitant failure to reckon with the
transformative force of informational capitalism); utopianism about
anonymity as a force for institutional disruption (and concomitant
failure to acknowledge the essential role of institutions in cabining
the human capacity for malice and mayhem); and utopianism about
the relationship between information and communication networks
and human freedom (and concomitant failure to contend with the
powerful and inherently informational mechanisms by which
existing protections for human rights are increasingly outflanked
and coopted). It has become increasingly apparent that functioning
legal institutions have indispensable roles to play in protecting and
advancing human freedom. It has also become increasingly
apparent, however, that the legal institutions we need are different
than the ones we have.28

Cohen’s solutions attempt to respond to each of those failings in turn.
She addresses the nightmare of network enthusiasts: that the very
characteristics they lauded—openness, commons-based production,
distributed architecture—might not only fail to produce positive
outcomes but (under some circumstances and on some platforms) be a
problem rather than a solution.
The results of distributed cultural and political production also
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the
contrary have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve.
The particular quality-control mechanisms that keep open source
software robust and secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly)
objective work far less well (or not at all) within massivelyintermediated environments that are optimized to advertiser-driven
platform revenue models. In such environments, the vaunted
“wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector. Algorithmic processes
optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt social sharing
heighten the volatility of online interactions, and surveillant
assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content targeting
and behavioral marketing create powerful––and easily weaponized–
–stimulus-response feedback loops. The result is a sociotechnical

28

Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 85, 85–86 (2019).
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apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and deepening
preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions.29

Or, to put it less elegantly: reality today.
In Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism Ben Edelman also
casts a dubious eye on Barlow’s predictions.
Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
calls for a “civilization of the mind in cyberspace,” and he says it
will be “more humane and fair” than what governments created.
Barlow’s vision is unapologetically optimistic, easily embraced by
anyone who longs for better times to come. Yet twenty years later,
it’s easy to see some important respects in which reality fell short of
his vision. Alongside the Internet’s many pluses are clickbait,
scams, hacks, and all manner of privacy violations. Ten thousand
hours of cat videos may be delightful, but they’re no civilization of
the mind. With a bit of hindsight, Barlow’s techno-utopianism looks
as stilted as other utopianism—and equally far removed from
reality.30

Edelman faults Barlow for failing to envisage the institutions that would
bring about a better world. After listing a series of government successes,
he also suggests that the state has a much more robust role to play than
Barlow envisaged and that Barlow was wrong to lay such stress on the
Golden Rule, of “do as you would be done by.” “But the moral
suasion—and practical effectiveness—of the Golden Rule presupposes
participants of roughly equal power and status. It is no small feat to
meaningfully consider what Joe User might want from Mega Social
Network if the tables were turned and Joe owned the goliath.”31
On one level Edelman’s argument seems like a moral categoryerror. The common sense moral norm, ‘one should treat others as one
would like to be treated oneself’ does not depend on a capability
assessment. The heavyweight champion of the world could certainly beat
me up for no reason. Nevertheless, according to that norm, he is still
wrong to beat me up because he would not like to be brutalized for no
reason himself, even if it had to be by someone with a gun or an M1
tank. The same is true of the Golden Rule’s more formal instantiation in
Kantian moral theory. “Act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” does
not depend on the size of my biceps, bank account or gun collection, nor
those of the counterparties with whom I deal. To my knowledge, no one
29

Id. at 88 (footnotes omitted).
Benjamin Edelman, Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism, 18 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 97, 97 (2019) (footnotes omitted).
31
Id.
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in the long history of Kantian moral thought has ever suggested
otherwise. So I have to disagree on that portion of Edelman’s analysis.
The Golden Rule does not depend morally on participants of roughly
equal power and status. Indeed, its principal function as a normative
thought-primer is to force the more powerful to restrain themselves by
asking the question, “how would I like it if I were in the position of
powerless supplicant in this situation?” That is the point of the thought
exercise. With participants of roughly equal power and status there
would be much less need for the Golden Rule in the first place.
Yet on another level, Edelman has an undeniable point, albeit in
a different register. Barlow was addressing himself, as Doctorow puts it,
to the yeoman smallholders of a budding network. The moral problem
with Barlow’s argument is not that Facebook has more power than me,
and thus it is allowed—under the Golden Rule—to invade my privacy
because I cannot meaningfully threaten to invade its privacy. That just
takes us back to the normative category-error of me and the heavyweight
champion. The problem is that Facebook is a collection of contracts, not
an actual moral being. One can still apply Barlow’s framework to the
legal entity, the legal fiction, formed out of those contracts—the people
who signed them would presumably not like their privacy to be violated.
We can tell the corporation’s managers that they must act as if the norm
underlying their actions would become a universal law and there is
nothing incoherent in that command. Indeed, the justified outrage that
Edelman displays about corporate misdeeds, and his consequent criticism
of Barlow for undervaluing the role of the state, depends on exactly those
kind of moral intuitions. Still, it is more of a leap, cognitively speaking.
The Golden Rule still has moral force and normative coherence as it
confronts the corporate personality and the faceless algorithm. But, for
different reasons, neither is likely to pay it much mind. The problem is
not moral coherence, but enforcement. In the speech communities within
which algorithm or corporation are constituted, the Golden Rule either
does not exist as an internalized norm, or exists only because of
government mandates of the kind Edelman is advocating. I would restate
his argument thus: only the state has the power, status and administrative
capability to become the Kantian superego of corporations and Barlow is
wrong to neglect that fact. It is hard to deny that Edelman wins that
argument.
In that regard, Edelman points out some of the digital
achievements of the state. He points out the success the state has had in
reining in the most clear-cut violations of copyright and the progress it
has made on online scams. While Edelman thinks there is much work to
be done—whether in competition policy or cyberbullying—he takes a
longer time-frame, one that makes him cautiously optimistic.
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A century ago, the Pure Food and Drug Act sought to assure
accurate labeling, purity, and ultimately safety to products
Americans consume every day. By all accounts this seemed difficult
at the time. What stops a factory from changing its process or
ingredients when the inspector leaves? And who’s to say what
consequences a drug might entail years later[?] Yet today the FDA
achieves substantial success, and the problems of that era are
delightfully in the past.
A generation later, the GI Bill of Rights stood for the principle
that after defending the nation, a serviceman deserved a quality
education and the reliable job it would usually bring. The next
generation established Medicare—a safety net to assure that our
nation’s elderly would get sustenance and medical care befitting the
nation’s prosperity. For both of these, there were serious questions
about cost and sustainability from the outset—but the moral
imperative was clear, and the projects went forward. I never
discussed these subjects with Barlow, and so far as I know he never
wrote about them or spoke publicly about them. But each of these
programs faced genuine challenges, arguably at least as
fundamental as the technology architecture Barlow considered so
important. We should be emboldened by our prior successes and no
less willing to take on great challenges as we look ahead.32

Another cluster of essays in this volume focuses more centrally
on the past and future of digital intellectual property. In their
contribution, The Enigma of Digital Property: A Tribute to John Perry
Barlow,33 Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto carefully assess the
legacy of Barlow’s ideas, and those of his fellow travelers, about
copyright online. Like me, they give his predictions a good grade, but
think that he underestimated the possibility that copyright law could be
changed to deal with the digital world, sometimes in ways that threatened
the freedoms Barlow cared so much about. They use as an example, the
recent lobbying over Articles 11 and 13 of the EU’s Directive on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market. Article 13, which makes online
platforms liable if copyright infringing material is uploaded to them, has
been roundly condemned.
Critics have argued that Article 13 would effectively mandate
monitoring and filtering across all platforms, violating user privacy
and free speech interests as automated systems would be obliged to
scan all content and block even legitimate, noninfringing uses of
copyrighted work such as quotations and parodies. Article 13 also
32

Id. at 102 (footnotes omitted).
Pamela Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto, The Enigma of Digital Property:
A Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019).
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raises competition concerns, as it would likely favor and entrench
major existing platforms, which already have or can afford to
implement the necessary surveillance and filtering technologies,
while disadvantaging smaller and newer entrants to the market.
Dozens of European intellectual property (IP) scholars have
written articles criticizing the Article 13 filtering mandate on
various grounds, including the threat it poses for freedom of
expression on the Internet . . . In addition, Tim Berners-Lee, Vint
Cerf, and numerous other Internet pioneers signed an open letter
urging the EU Parliament to drop Article 13:
By requiring Internet platforms to perform automatic
filtering [on] all of the content that their users upload,
Article 13 takes an unprecedented step towards the
transformation of the Internet from an open platform for
sharing and innovation, into a tool for the automated
surveillance and control of its users.
More than 145 civil society organizations have expressed
opposition to adoption of Article 13, as have more than 5 million
people who signed a petition against it.34

Despite all of this, Article 13 passed. Samuelson and Hashimoto observe
that Barlow “would have been appalled at the curtailment of freedom of
expression and access to knowledge on the Internet that Articles 11 and
13 will almost certainly bring about.”35
However their view is not entirely, or even mainly, pessimistic.
They argue that artists have managed to find ways to get compensated
online, in some cases using methods that Barlow predicted, and conclude
that the real danger is that attempts to restore pre-digital levels of control
may actually threaten the attractive features of the network along with
the illicit activity.
John Perry Barlow had a vision of an economy of ideas in
which information would flow freely through the Internet ether.
While his hope that copyright would disappear in the new creative
economy is unlikely to transpire, there is some reason to hope that
policymakers will come to recognize that creative sectors of the
economy are thriving. Barlow insisted that
we have a profound responsibility to be better ancestors.
What we do now will likely determine the productivity and
freedom of 20 generations of artists yet unborn. So it is
time to stop speculating about when the new economy of
34
35
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Id. at 111.
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ideas will arrive. It’s here. Now comes the hard part, which
also happens to be the fun part: making it work.
As a tribute to Barlow, let’s not screw things up by adopting
stronger copyright rules that will inhibit rather than promote the
progress of science, as the Constitution directs.36

Jessica Litman, in her article, Imaginary Bottles,37 also gives
Barlow high marks for his predictive powers about the digital
marketplace of the future.
Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later. His prediction
that, in the near future, “information will be generated
collaboratively by the cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,”
was an eerily accurate description of Twitter. Barlow’s suggestion
that information itself was supplanting money as our dominant
currency presaged a future ruled by Google, Facebook, and
Amazon, three companies that derive much of their monetary value
from trafficking in information. He proposed that we
reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as
more akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge.
As a non-carbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information
evolves, spreads, and, over time, it spoils. It creates relationships
and meaning. Some information’s value depends on exclusivity;
other information is worth more the more common it becomes.38

Like Samuelson and Hashimoto, Litman thinks that,
Barlow might have underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright
owners. Despite significant missteps, bad bets, and massive
investment in stupid initiatives, they seem to have emerged into a
new world where, from their vantage point, the copyright rules are
startlingly similar to the rules that governed the old world, only
better. 39

When she says “better,” Litman means that, under the guise of protecting
intellectual property from a digital threat, copyright owners were able—
through technological happenstance, poorly reasoned court decisions or
legislative fiat—to extend their exclusive rights to actions that copyright
law had never previously regulated. Litman argues that this was not, as
many expected it to be, by extending their powers through encryption but
rather by taking a different approach.

36

Id. at 126 (footnotes omitted).
Jessica Litman, Imaginary Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 127 (2019).
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Id. at 128 (footnotes omitted).
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Id. at 128–29.
37

53

IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)

[Vol. 18

The key to this approach was a breathtakingly expansive
reinterpretation of the exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies,
predicated on a very broad definition of “copy.” Fans of this new
understanding maintain that whenever a work appears in the
working memory of any computer anywhere, an actionable copy
has been made, in violation of the statutory reproduction right. By
insisting, again and again, that the word “copy” had long been
understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if they were
right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some
courts that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them
extensive rights to control any appearance of their works over
digital networks.
The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers
who pay attention to statutory language. The copyright statute has,
since 1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a
work is fixed.” Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and
copyright owners haven’t asked Congress to do so. Being attached
to a material object, though, is precisely the characteristic that
Barlow argued that digital files lack. The modern revisionist
interpretation expands the understanding of a “copy” beyond the
idea of a tangible material object to include temporary and
ephemeral instantiations. Essentially, it reads the words “material
objects” out of the statutory definition.
Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has
ceased to be seen as radical. That has allowed copyright owners to
sell their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles . . . .40

And thus, over 25 years, we move from selling wine without bottles to
selling wine in imaginary bottles. All of this was accomplished, Litman
argues, without much in the way of other changes to copyright law.
Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about the ways that
copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and counterproductive
in 2019. If the purpose of copyright law is to compensate creators
for the products of their minds, it hasn’t yet come close to achieving
that goal. Oodles of money flood into the copyright system. Most of
that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’ pockets, and
where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a closely
guarded secret. Creators across a wide swathe of fields complain of
a shocking lack of transparency . . . .
Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than
they seemed 25 years ago. Remove information from its containers
and it spills. Spills spread. As different individual creators and
40
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researchers discover closely-held details of how money and rights
move through the copyright system, that knowledge may itself
transform the ways that copyright owners do business . . . . Even if
the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to crumble under
its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information may enable
the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and how the
system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to
wrest back some control, or at least some money, from the legacy
rights holders seeking to preserve the old regime.41

Jonathan Zittrain is the author of a wonderful book, The Future
of the Internet: And How to Stop It,42 that explores many of the issues in
this symposium. In that book, Zittrain argues that the openness of the
internet does indeed make it vulnerable to misuse, to spam and malware
and misinformation. Yet he argues that the cure for openness may
sometimes be more openness. Spam sites originally loaded themselves
with the words that searchers might look for, making search engines
useless. Search engines reacted by turning to so called “water hole”
algorithms, using the links created by the denizens of the network as a
form of informal peer review, thus once again elevating the real sites to
the top of search lists. Spammers responded with search engine
optimization strategies, gamed links and so on—an endless arms race in
which the open nature of the network is both disease and cure, or at least
inoculation.
In his contribution to this volume, John Perry Barlow’s Call for
Persuasion Over Power,43 Zittrain muses on copyright law and Barlow’s
comments about it, noting that even before the digital revolution,
copyright laws had strayed far indeed from a layperson’s common sense
understanding of what behavior was regulated.
A glance at the U.S. copyright code by the time of Napster
showed just how far Title 17 had quietly diverged from day-to-day
reality. The idea that singing a song aloud at a birthday party could
result in thousands of dollars in “damages” was counterintuitive, to
say the least, even as there’s legitimate rationale for the core
“performance right” within copyright. The statutory limitations to
the right are tellingly mincing, such as 17 U.S.C. § 110(6), which
establishes that notwithstanding the public performance right, there
are some limited exceptions, such as:

41

Id. at 135–36 (footnotes omitted).
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Jonathan L. Zittrain, John Perry Barlow’s Call for Persuasion Over Power,
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performance of a nondramatic musical work by a
governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or
horticultural organization, in the course of an annual
agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by
such body or organization . . . .
(It appears to be an open question whether the first gathering by a
horticultural organization can be “annual” and thus qualify for the
exception, or if litigants must wait until the following year to see if
there is another one.)44

It was this tangled body of law that content owners tried to reformulate
in the digital age, now always with success.
Most legislative proposals stalled in Congress, and the lawsuits
against individual users were retired despite most targeted users
choosing to settle. This might suggest a victory for Barlow’s way of
thinking—a certain peace emerged that reformalized commercial
relationships around activities that, to the users, could still seem
organic. But the copyright wars didn’t see victory by one side or the
other so much as a muddling through. Today, the chaos of selfpublished Web pages, hosted on individual Web servers, has given
way to the carefully indexed homogeneity of DMCA-takedownfriendly Facebook, including the automatic monitoring of private
chat for the presence of links to file sharing sites (as they are found,
they are redacted), and Facebook’s silent tracking of all usage for
the benefit of ad targeting.
Today music and movies are much less ripped and copied freely
than they are subscribed and linked to like a utility—via one of a
handful of streaming titans like Spotify, Tidal, Netflix, or Apple—
with artists seeking to make a living from their work generally no
better off than they were before the Internet came about . . . .45

The result, Zittrain argues is a muddle, a tangled mixture of open and
closed, artist-favoring and artist-exploiting rules. He closes his article
with an ironic “synecdoche: Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace remains free, but the authoritative version of The
Economy of Ideas (as rendered in a 1994 issue of WIRED) is . . . metered
through a paywall.”46
In their article, Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?47 Madhavi
Sunder and Anupam Chander choose what at first might seem a
44
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whimsical topic through which to approach Barlow’s ideas. They argue
that “Barlow was right about where the economy would go. He was
wrong that intellectual property would not follow.”48 Thus the subject of
their contribution to the symposium:
This essay considers IP in expressions of joy and shared meaning
online in the form of emotes, GIFS, and memes: the stuff of which
dreams are made. These aesthetic experiences bring playfulness and
humanity to the internet. Are they the proper subject of intellectual
property? Are such forms of cultural innovation and appropriation
better addressed by ethics or law?49

Barlow had predicted that the wine would float free of the bottles, that
citizens would want the experience rather than the packaging it came in.
Sunder and Chander believe he was correct, but that the law has shifted
to match the new reality, sometimes in ways that seem overly
appropriative and controlling.
Intellectual property, however, has not only survived the doom
of the information economy—it has thrived. Today, intellectual
property has fully evolved from goods to a good time. As consumer
researchers have become savvier about how to package and market
the human need for fantasy, play, imagination, and haptic
experience, areas of thought and expression once free as the air we
breathe are increasingly becoming commodified and metered fare,
regulated by licenses and royalties, requiring permission and
payment.
....
In recent writing, one of us (Sunder) has repudiated this
expansion of rights, decrying the threat to fundamentally human
activity, such as the ability to play, imagine, learn with others, and
to reference the cultural works that shape our lives and societies.
Unlike Barlow, the critique does not turn on the form in which
information is conveyed—that is, bottles or no bottles, in Barlow’s

Chander and Madhavi Sunder, Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?, 18 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 143, 143 (2019). I have to disagree. Indeed, in the very passage
they quote to substantiate that claim, Barlow seems to me to say the reverse, that
while dancing on the grave of copyright might seem enjoyable, it does not solve
the problems we have. “While there is a certain grim fun to be had in it, dancing
on the grave of copyright and patent will solve little, especially when so few are
willing to admit that the occupant of this grave is even deceased, and so many
are trying to uphold by force what can no longer be upheld by popular consent.”
Barlow, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasis added).
48
Chander and Sunder, supra note 47, at 145.
49
Id.
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parlance. Rather, the critique is premised on the nature of art itself .
. . .50

Sunder and Chander give many examples of the use of copyright law to
regulate cultural creativity on the microlevel. They conclude by using
memes to illustrate their point—and to close their article with an actual
debate in meme form. To get that, you will have to read the article.51
Peter Jaszi—who introduced me to copyright law, Ring Lardner
and a host of other fascinating subjects—has had a central role in
copyright reforms and attempted copyright reforms over the last 25
years. Most of all he has seen some of the successful campaigns to derail
the kinds of copyright expansions that Samuelson and Hashimoto
decried. In his essay for this volume, What Didn’t Happen: An Essay in
Speculation,52 he celebrates the power of inaction.
Some of the last 25 years’ most important positive developments in
copyright policy have—in fact—been negatives: the collapse of the
SOPA/PIPA bills in 2012, the congressional failure to enact
categorical and comprehensive paracopyright legislation in 1998,
and the long and ultimately successful effort (throughout the midand late-90’s) to block enactment of sui generis database protection
in U.S. law. The congress’s failure to enact term extension
legislation (despite having been greenlighted by the Supreme Court
in Eldred v. Reno) is another example.
So one minor goal of this essay is to celebrate the power of
inaction. Another is to acknowledge the pleasure of having your
predictions proven wrong. I’m happy to say that in 1995 I told a
Senate panel that a 20-year term extension would be “represent[] a
down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.”
Obviously, and happily, it didn’t work out that way . . . .53

Jaszi’s point is a good one. Most of the Barlowian energy over the last 25
years has been devoted to a series of attempts to block attempts to
expand copyright law, sometimes in ways that seemed to threaten
fundamental and attractive components of the internet. Bills with
acronym names like SOPA and PIPA tried to make the web safe for
copyright, but in the process also seemed to make it safe for censorship.
Jaszi, though, focuses in particular on a series of expansions of copyright
that affect the network principally in denying to ourselves the ability to

50
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use it to share the culture of the past: copyright term extension. He
focuses on the terms of the debate.
For decades, arguments on both sides of the issue were primarily
made in what might be called a “consumerist” frame, with
crisscrossing claims about whether a more robust public domain
would (or wouldn’t) offer more conventional information goods at
lower prices. For many (or most) of that era’s public domain
advocates, myself included, engaged with the issue primarily, if not
exclusively, in similar terms. Even the heroes of the early resistance
to term extension, such as the late Professor Dennis Karjala, cast
their arguments about the costs of a longer protection period
primarily in terms of the loss to the public of specific finished
derivative works (such as motion pictures based on public domain
originals) that it might bring about—an expanded argument, to be
sure, but one with roots in the dominant consumerist rhetoric
nonetheless . . . .
This narrow, market-oriented understanding of the value of the
public domain enabled, in turn, another set of tropes, in which the
public domain was figured as a kind of information limbo in which
neglected works linger precisely because nobody owns them . . . .54

But Jaszi argues that both the culture and the terms of the debate have
changed, in precisely the way that Barlow might have predicted; because
the network actually changes the way we experience culture.
Thanks to sweeping changes in the way we think and talk about
networked digital technology, no one ever again can refer to the
Internet as a “series of tubes” without major risk of embarrassment.
What once was viewed as a delivery system is now commonly
figured as a space for virtual interaction and collaboration—in
accord with Barlow’s foundational vision. And it is this shift that
(in turn) has enabled the emergence of what was for many a whole
new way to think about the public domain: less as a repository for
disregarded cultural cast-offs and more as a rich mine of source
material. To those of us with an early inchoate sense of the
potential value inherent in the unowned, it provided a new wealth of
practical and appealing examples of why the public domain really
mattered. For others, direct experience online was a powerful
teacher in its own right . . . .
....
In an environment marked by ubiquitous high-speed Internet
connectivity, 200 million active websites, and a vast array of
information tools, the Web hasn’t brought us everything we
54
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hoped—and has brought much we might never have wished to see.
Ultimately, though, it was the Internet itself that came to the rescue
of copyright’s open spaces. In this at least, John Perry Barlow’s
organic vision of cyberspace has been realized.55

The final essay in this volume comes from Charles Nesson, one
of the creators of Harvard’s Berkman (later Berkman-Klein) Center and a
person who, like Barlow, embraced the possibilities that the network
opened up for human freedom. Nesson closes the circle on Barlow’s
Declaration by offering one of his own; A Declaration of the Mission of
University in Barlowspace.56 Nesson takes seriously the ills that the
network has unleashed or magnified, as well as the good that it has done.
He argues, in fact, that we need closed spaces as well as open ones,
curated bases of knowledge as well as free-form self-indexing ones. He
has a candidate for these closed spaces: our universities.
Universities and schools, on behalf of future generations, I ask
you to preserve space for freedom of mind into the future. Only in
such shared mindspace will human liberty of thought survive.
....
. . . [T]rust is not an inherent feature of the open net. We must find
and build trust within closed classrooms within the wider
environment of the open net. Unless the cyberspace of our future
contains interior closed spaces in which human trust and freedom of
mind can live, truth as we have known it will not survive.
....
. . . To find freedom of mind amid the enveloping surveillance and
lurking trolls of the open net has proven to be more difficult than
many expected. The game is not over. Create space for freedom of
mind NOW. Let us call it Barlowspace in his honor.57

***
There is much about the contemporary web to make one despair.
Some of it has to do with the architecture of openness. The freedom and
anonymity that empowers the dissident also protects the troll. Some of it
has to do with basic problems in human psychology. We are not as
rational as we would like to imagine ourselves and the web can be an
echo chamber in which those psychological flaws are amplified in an
endless feedback loop. Some of it has to do with regulatory mistakes we
have made. The fights over net-neutrality or Europe’s Article 13 did not
55
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go well. Some has to do with the ability of corporations to replace open
with closed, to move from the open web to the closed and controlling
app. Some has to do with forms of economic concentration, arguably
aided by lax antitrust enforcement, to which the web gives the additional
winner-take-all power of network effects. In all of this it is particularly
easy to lose hope, which perhaps explains the vitriol with which
Barlow’s more hopeful (and naïve) pronouncements were attacked. No
one is more bitter than the idealist who has lost his faith.
Yet to succumb to doom and gloom would be a mistake. At the
beginning of this essay I said “For all intents and purposes, the web that
is so central to every aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until
1991. Maybe 1994, if you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It
is as if I told you that no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until
25 years ago.” The converse is also true. We can see the current state of
the network as so dreadful because we have become complacent about
all of the good things it brings to our lives, our culture and our economy.
This has been the greatest democratization of communicative ability in
the history of the species. And it happened in a space of 25 years. Of
course not everything went well! Duh!
We have a long history of fearing openness: I call it cultural
agoraphobia58—the ability to see the downside of open systems,
networks and forms of communication with perfect clarity: 20-20
downside vision—and yet to be blind to the positive possibilities they
open up. This is not something new. When the Bible was translated into
the language of the laity, or the franchise opened wide, people
predicted—often accurately—the evils that would follow. Conflicting
theologies, religious schism, demagoguery and ugly fanning of mob
prejudice; it all actually happened. It happened on the network as well.
Yet, to return to the question asked by my title, no, “the internet is not
over.” It is 25 years old. Today’s travails should not make us forget what
we have gained. Honoring the life and thought of John Perry Barlow
seems a particularly fitting way to do so.
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BARLOW’S LEGACY
CORY DOCTOROW

“Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the
present controls the past.”1
And now we are come to the great techlash, long overdue and
desperately needed. With the techlash comes the political contest to
assemble the narrative of What Just Happened and How We Got Here,
because “Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the
present controls the past.”
Barlow is a key figure in that narrative, and so defining his
legacy is key to the project of seizing the future. As we contest over that
legacy, I will here set out my view on it. It’s an insider’s view: I met
Barlow first through his writing, and then as a teenager on The WELL,
and then at a dinner in London with Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) attorney Cindy Cohn (now the executive director of EFF), and
then I worked with him, on and off, for more than a decade, through my
work with EFF. He lectured to my students at USC, and wrote the
introduction to one of my essay collections, and hung out with me at
Burning Man, and we spoke on so many bills together, and I wrote him
into one of my novels as a character, an act that he blessed. I emceed
events where he spoke and sat with him in his hospital room as he lay
dying. I make no claim to being Barlow’s best or closest friend, but I
count myself mightily privileged to have been a friend, a colleague, and a
protege of his.
There is a story today about “cyber-utopians” told as a part of the
techlash: Once, there were people who believed that the internet would
automatically be a force for good. They told us all to connect to one
another and fended off anyone who sought to rein in the power of the
technology industry, naively ushering in an era of mass surveillance,
monopolism, manipulation, even genocide. These people may have been
well-intentioned, but they were smart enough that they should have
known better, and if they hadn’t been so unforgivably naive (and,
possibly, secretly in the pay of the future monopolists) we might not be
in such dire shape today.
In support of this contention, they cite aphorisms like “The Net
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it,” coined by
1
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Barlow’s EFF-co-founder and erstwhile roommate John Gilmore who
rivals Barlow for the title of internet zelig. Gilmore has a hand in the
invention of the Free Software movement, the legalization of civilian
access to cryptography, the ISP industry, commercial open source,
software-defined radio, marijuana legalization, and a hundred other
projects large and small.
But context is everything: “The Net interprets censorship as
damage and routes around it” was a prescription as much as an
observation. It was uttered in the context of a nascent internet whose
technical caretakers disagreed on many ethical and technical points, but
were united in a sense of civic duty to keep the technology open and
universal and “free as in freedom.” Gilmore didn’t mean, “Stand down
everyone, we’ve built a censorship-proof internet that will automatically
maintain its integrity.” He meant, “To you, my comrades-in-arms who
toil endlessly to make our balky, wonderful invention run, I say: the
same measures that we take to re-knit our network when a technical
failure tears holes in its fabric can be repurposed to resist censorship, to
route around the nodes that have fallen under a censor’s thrall. Our
shared civic mission, heretofore dedicated primarily to the technical task
of preserving a forum for discourse, can and should be expanded to the
political task of preserving that forum, and what’s more, the tactics that
we have mastered so thoroughly for the former will serve us in the
latter.”
Critics of political slogans take note: the fact that a complex idea
is reduced to a pithy bumper-sticker is not (necessarily) reductive; it can
be a necessary and extremely valuable convenience. A URL is not a
web-page and even the best URL rarely substitutes for the page it refers
to. But requiring us to forego pointers and deal only in things, to refer to
web-pages solely by their complete texts rather than the brief summaries
that unambiguously point to them, would be a hard discourse.
When Barlow advocated for a free internet––“free” in all the
usefully overlapping and ambiguous senses of that word––he wasn’t
doing so because he lacked an appreciation of the risks of a monopolized
internet, or an internet that was under the thumb of a repressive state.
Rather, he did so precisely because he feared that a globe-spanning
network of ubiquitous, sensor-studded, actuating devices that were
designed and governed without some kind of ethical commitment,
without the pioneering spirit of the early internet and its yeoman
smallholders who defended it from those who sought to dominate or
pervert it, that we would arrive at a dystopian future where the
entertainment industry’s Huxelyism was the means for realizing the
nightmares of Orwell.
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You don’t found an organization like the Electronic Frontier
Foundation because you are sanguine about the future of the internet:
you do so because your hope for an amazing, open future is haunted by
terror of a network suborned for the purposes of spying and control.
“If there is hope . . . it lies in the proles”2
The techlash began within tech. Naturally. Notwithstanding the
genuine privilege-blindness of techies who often live in a bubble of
weath, technological competence, and agency, no one was better situated
to spot the problems with tech––market-concentration, the reckless
collection and warehousing of sensitive personal information, deceptive
and manipulative business practices, the misuse of tech by repressive
states, bullies, stalkers, and would-be ethnic cleansers––than people who
understood precisely how the technology worked, knew the people
responsible for the key decisions, and understood their frailty and
capacity for self-deception.
These early coalmine canaries were atomized and isolated. At
EFF, we heard from some of them: whistleblowers who came in with
printouts and wild tales. Think of Mark Klein, who wandered through the
front door of the old Shotwell Street office in San Francisco’s Mission
district with a sheaf of documents and a hard-to-believe tale about his
years at AT&T building a secret room for the NSA to use while illegally
wiretapping the whole internet. Klein wasn’t a crank. He was a hero, and
the litigation spawned by his act of bravery is still underway, more than a
decade later.
Tech is a great force-multiplier. The canny user of technology
can project their will over millions or even billions of devices, and,
potentially, over the people who use those devices, too. That kind of
power is terrifying, especially in the hands of unaccountable, frail, and
fallible elites.
The project of teaching “STEM” to everyone did not begin as an
attempt to maximize the national GDP by raising a generation of startup
founders: it was a prescient attempt at self-defense, a mission to pluralize
the power of tech.
“Tech” is not a force unto itself. Technology’s imperatives are
the imperatives of the people who design, control, and use technology.
Information doesn’t want to be free, but people do.

2

ORWELL, supra note 1, at 94.
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Barlow loved people. When Skype was invented, he kept it
turned on at all hours, and allowed anyone in the world to initiate a
session with him. Some were colleagues, some were admirers, and a
good fraction were randos who were just exploring this new
videoconferencing system. Barlow doted on these randos, and
rhapsodized about the joy of helping a stranger halfway across the world
practice their conversational English.
The last time I spoke with Barlow, as he lay in a hospital bed in
San Francisco, he told me that if he ever got out, he wanted to go drive a
car for Lyft, and just meet new people all day long and talk to them about
what they wanted and what he wanted and make human connections.
Barlow was not naive about the ways in which humans could be
terrible to other people and themselves. His posthumously published
memoir, finished just weeks before he died, is simultaneously full of
celebrations of the people who crossed his path and score-settling that
verges on the unseemly or petty.
It’s just that Barlow thought that the answer to human frailty was
more humans. The answer to an empathy gap was spending time with the
people for whom you lacked empathy. That while these things did not
guarantee the development of an ethical stance, their absence guaranteed
a kind of rootless, free-floating sociopathy.
Doctrinal free-market thinkers have excused much sociopathy
with the self-evident aphorism that “incentives matter.” As with “the Net
interprets censorship, etc,” this saying references much subtext, notably
the idea that kindness creates dependency and helplessness. It is a
doctrine of cruelty, dressed up as pragmatism.
But incentives do matter. Designing a system that can only be
navigated by being a selfish bastard creates selfish bastardry, and the
cognitive dissonance of everyday cruelties generates a kind of protective
scar-tissue in the form of a reflex of judgment, dismissal, and cruelty.
And contrariwise, designing a system where we celebrate civic
duty, kindness, empathy and the giving of gifts without the expectation
of a reward produces an environment where the angels of our better
nature can shout down the cruel, lizard-brain impulses that mutter just
below the threshold of perception.
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“Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two makes four.”3
Generations of elevation of selfishness to virtue has produced a
public discourse where espousing a belief in human goodness marks you
out as a patsy at best and a dangerous idiot at worst.
There’s a statistical illiteracy in this proposition. After all, if 99.9
percent of the world is composed of bastards, how unlikely is it that you
and everyone you know are just unremarkably flawed vessels whose
nature fluctuates between reaction and reason?
But the idea that humans are mostly OK and made worse or
better by the stories they tell about their own nature has been in disrepute
since the Reagan years, and without the freedom to admit this otherwise
obvious truth, we’ve had to compose all kinds of other excuses for our
world.
Take the concentration of tech into Big Tech: the theorists who
insisted that unfettered markets and doctrinal selfishness would produce
competitive and vibrant markets find themselves scrambling to explain
the conversion of the internet from a crazy bazaar into five big services
filled with screenshots from the other four. They field all manner of
unconvincing explanations for this phenomenon, like “first-mover
advantage”4 or “network effects,”5 because they can’t say, “Dismantling
antitrust enforcement gave rise to a new wave of trusts on a scale not
seen since the robber-barons.”
But if first-movers and network effects predicted success, we’d
all be searching the internet by logging into Altavista from our Crays.
The utterly plausible explanation for Big Tech––that we stopped
enforcing the rules that punished underhanded growth tactics like
mergers to monopoly––is resisted with the fervor of an anti-vaxxer
explaining away their kid’s measles: “It’s not because I didn’t get her
vaccinated, it’s because of environmental toxins!”
3

ORWELL, supra note 1, at 109.
“In marketing strategy, first-mover advantage (FMA) is the advantage gained
by the initial (‘first-moving’) significant occupant of a market segment.” Firstmover advantage, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firstmover_advantage (last accessed June 9, 2019).
5
“A network effect (also called network externality or demand-side economies
of scale) is the effect described in economics and business that an additional
user of a good or service has on the value of that product to others. When a
network effect is present, the value of a product or service increases according to
the number of others using it.” Network effect, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_effect (last accessed June 9, 2019).
4
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Bigness multiplies all the risks of tech. Putting everyone’s social
lives on Facebook creates a one-stop shop for mass-scale manipulation.
Putting everyone’s mobile data in one of two silos creates an irresistible
target for state surveillance. Putting everyone’s attention at the mercy of
four or five gatekeepers turns their normal human foibles and cherishes
illusions into facts of life that everyone else in the world must navigate.
Think of this in analogy to climate change. Your racist Facebook
uncle’s climate denial around the Thanksgiving table may ruin your
digestion, but it won’t cook the planet. But change your uncle’s name to
Koch, give him a multi-billion-dollar warchest, give it a generation, and
before you know it we’ll be drinking our urine and digging through
rubble looking for canned goods.
In the same way, your idiotic college roommate’s social theory
that “everyone should just be honest, all the time,” might make you want
to change the locks on your dorm-room. But make that kid’s name
Zuckerberg, put him in charge of the social lives of two billion people,
and his bizarre belief that “Having two identities for yourself is an
example of a lack of integrity”6 becomes an existential threat to human
thriving.
Implicit in the belief in bigness is a belief in a special kind of
person, an Ayn Randian titan, whose innate superiority is so fabulous
that any attempt to rein it in will redound to the detriment of all of us.
Markets act as a kind of sorting hat, finding these natural rulers and
elevating them to positions of power, and the scurrying little people’s
misguided attempt to dethrone them must be resisted, for their own
sakes.
But no one is smart enough and competent enough to be the
dictator of two billion peoples’ social lives. It’s not merely that Mark
Zuckerberg is wrong about how people get along, it’s that no one is right
enough to wield that power.
Generations of insistence that some among us are born to rule,
and revelations that the people who rise to power in that environment are
at best fallible and at worst deplorable have created a massive
dissonance, a great collective yearning for a One True King to lead us
out of our dark times.
There’s a narrative about Cambridge Analytica and the 2016
election of a boorish white supremacist grifter to the US presidency:
6

See Miguel Helft, Facebook, Foe of Anonymity, Is Forced to Explain a Secret,
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/14/technology/14facebook.html.
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Cambridge Analytica lied about everything except their sales literature,
where they truthfully revealed that they had discovered a way to turn
Facebook into a mind-control ray that would make decent people into
racists.
But there’s another, more plausible version of that narrative:
Facebook spied on everyone and found all the racists, whose
imperfections have a variety of causes, but prominent among them is the
belief that some people are better than others and markets tell you who is
and isn’t good. Having found the racists, Cambridge Analytica
convinced them that voting for Donald Trump would advance their
cause.
This version of events suggests several countermeasures: make
Facebook stop spying on people; help people see that the winners and
losers in the marketplace are better predicted by cruelty and indifference
to their neighbors than by virtue; ease the anxiety that everyone who
doesn’t win big in the 21st Century lottery will lose terribly.
That is: fix the incentives; find the better natures of people; help
people understand and master their technology; reverse the forces that
permit a few people to rise to dominate the rest of us.
That is: treat the internet with the gravitas that it is due, as a
system that could be a force for great human flourishing, but only if we
ensure that it isn’t used to snuff out human dignity and agency.
Barlow made his reputation by insisting, long before it was
obvious to most people, that getting the internet’s future right would be a
necessary precondition to getting humanity’s future right. By insisting
that the toy network used for telling jokes and arguing about Star Trek
would grow up to be the pluripotent network that allowed anyone,
anywhere to talk to anyone else, anywhere, using any program or
protocol they chose. By insisting that the internet be regulated with
regard to all the ways that it would come to touch our lives in the
future—and not merely as a better radio station, or a very convenient
video-on-demand service, or a jihadi recruiting tool, or as the greatest
pornography distribution system in human history.
When a problem is a long way off, activists’ primary activity for
many years is to simply convince people that there is a problem: that
someday your cigarettes will give you cancer; that someday, climate
change will threaten billions of lives; that someday, the text-messaging
system called “the internet” will grow to be our species-wide,
civilization-spanning nervous system.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

68

But if the activist is right, then eventually convincing people that
there is a problem will take care of itself. Your doctor finds a tumor.
California burns. Burmese mobs visit genocide upon the Rohingya.
I call that moment “peak indifference.” It’s the moment when the
problem’s unchecked progress creates its own momentum, and every
day, of their own accord, people recognize that the problem is there.
After peak indifference, the activist’s job changes: now, they
must convince people not to give in to nihilism. Because by the time a
problem like cancer or climate or concentration is so manifest that we
can’t deny it, it can seem like it’s too late to do anything about it.
After peak indifference, the activist’s job changes to convincing
people to have hope.
Barlow never gave up hope. He was unabashedly, unashamedly,
publicly and vocally hopeful.
That hope plays into the narrative of techno-utopian naivete. But
Barlow wasn’t naive. He knew how much trouble we were in––and he
also knew how wonderful things could be, if we could only dig ourselves
out of that trouble. The techlash isn’t a repudiation of Barlow’s
hopefulness: it is his vindication.
Barlow’s legacy, then, isn’t a foolish belief that history would
steer clear of dystopia of its own accord; rather, his legacy is the noble
belief that we, together, pluralistically and through collective reasoning
and collective action, could navigate the dangerous waters we find
ourselves in, patch the holes the rocks knocked in our ship, and find our
way to a better land.

INVENTING THE FUTURE:
BARLOW AND BEYOND
CINDY COHN

We are creating a world that all may enter without privilege or
prejudice accorded by race, economic power, military force, or
station of birth.
We are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may express his
or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced
into silence or conformity.
....
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it be
more humane and fair than the world your governments have made
before.1

I know the purpose of this volume is not to merely praise or bury
John Perry Barlow, but to use him as a jumping off point. But I don’t
think I can get to the second part without addressing what many of his
critics miss about what he was trying to do with the A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace (Declaration).
Since Barlow’s death, I’ve spent a lot of time trying to ensure
that the straw men who have Barlow’s face taped to them don’t
overshadow the actual man. The basic straw man story goes like this:
Barlow was the leader of a band of naïve techno-utopians who believed
that the Internet would magically fix all problems without creating any
new ones. History has shown that the Internet didn’t solve all problems
and created many new ones, so Barlow was a fool or worse. Pieces like
this showed up periodically during his lifetime too.
To be fair, the real Barlow definitely was an optimist and he
loved all attention, positive or negative. You could argue that he
sometimes pasted his own face on that straw man. Especially in the
Declaration, his language was expansive and visionary. You don’t start a
legal or policy argument with: “you weary giants of flesh and steel.”2
You don’t seek nuance with: “I declare the global social space we are
building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose
1

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 5–7 (2019), reprinted from John Perry Barlow, A
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (FEB.
8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
2
Id. at 5.
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on us.”3 In talking about the Declaration at Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) many years later, Barlow admitted that when he
stepped out of a party at Davos to write it, he was both a little drunk and
trying desperately to channel Thomas Jefferson. So maybe some of the
sweeping rebukes are just trying to match his original bravado.
But I think that this approach misses what Barlow was up to.
Barlow wasn’t trying to predict the future; he was trying to invent it.
Here’s what he wrote in response to one of those “straw men” articles in
the Washington Post in 2015:
I [] knew that we were building the most penetrating and total
surveillance system that could be imagined, and I was no more
comfortable with the Googles (which didn’t exist but predictably
would) who would peer out through those All-Seeing Eyes than I
was with an equally enhanced NSA, Chinese Government, or
United States Cyber Command. However, just as Alan Kay said,
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it,” I knew it’s also
true that a good way to invent the future is to predict it. So I
predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a running start before the
laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up what Ed Snowden now
correctly calls “turn-key totalitarianism.” Which is now available to
a number of secretive institutions, public and private (not that
there’s a useful distinction).4

Barlow was trying to use the force of his will and mighty pen to
bring a good future to pass in a world where it was far from certain. He
was trying to get out ahead of what he knew would be the powerful
forces against freedom online.
To be truthful, I didn’t really understand that at first either. I
used to start my early Internet law presentations with a quote from
Ecclesiastes: “there is nothing new under the sun.”5 I would then
proceed, like a good American litigator, to tie the liberties of the future
Internet to the precedents in the founding of the country. I would tie
anonymous online speakers to Publius of the Federalist Papers.6 I would
tie the need for digital encryption to the physical encryption systems

3

Id.
Letter to the Editor from John Perry Barlow to the Wash. Post (sent in response
to J. Silverman, The Internet’s First Anarchist, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2015
(evening edition)).
5
Ecclesiastes 1:9.
6
A series of 85 essays, written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and
John Jay, explaining the Constitution and urging its ratification in the State of
New York. See generally THE FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton et al).
4
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used by Madison and Jefferson.7 Later I would tie the fight against mass
surveillance to James Otis’ fight against general warrants.8 Since
Barlow’s assertions were factually wrong—of course people could be
held accountable for what they did online as long as their feet touched
down in the jurisdiction of some government somewhere—I worried that
he risked us losing the civil liberties and human rights online that so
many had worked so hard to win offline.
In retrospect, we both had useful strategies for convincing
different audiences to protect freedom online. It’s just that I aimed for
the Supreme Court while Barlow aimed for the sky. Unlike me, he gave a
big voice to the dream that the digital world could be a chance for a fresh
start against the incumbents—governments, telecommunications
companies, movie and record cartels and more. His vision drew strongly
on that powerful American idea that one could, like Huck Finn, “light out
for the territory” to start anew.9
Remember, Barlow was writing in 1996 as the United States
government tried to stop “indecent” speech online and demanded that all
telecommunications lines be built to be easily tappable.10 Barlow cofounded EFF with Mitch Kapor and John Gilmore in 1990 in response to
government raids on online services like bulletin boards that reflected a
nearly complete lack of understanding about the early users of public
digital networks.11 Governments were the biggest worry for building a

7

See Rachel B. Doyle, The Founding Fathers Encrypted Secret Messages, Too,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 20, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/h3ll0-mrpr3s1d3nt/521193/; see also Chris Campbell, Thomas Jefferson Used
Encryption, LAISSEZ FAIRE BOOKS (Sept. 1, 2012), https://lfb.org/thomasjefferson-used-encryption/.
8
See Kade Crockford, A Brilliant Young Man Who Left Plum Job in Opposition
to General Warrants (in 1760), AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 18, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/brilliant-young-man-wholeft-plum-job-opposition-general-warrants; see also David Snyder, The NSA’s
“General Warrants”, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (2007),
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/generalwarrantsmemo.pdf.
9
MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN 295 (Glassbook
Classic N.D.) (1884) (ebook).
10
See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1021 (2012)); see
also Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)).
11
See John Perry Barlow, A Not Terribly Brief History of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 8, 1990),
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free technology future in the early to mid-1990s so it’s no surprise that
Barlow focused his attention there.12
Barlow did so much inventing of the future that sometimes we
forget what has gone his way. Chief among them is that the digital
revolution eliminated barriers that physical distance used to create for
information sharing and connection. He inspired people to believe that
this new network would let them speak and connect to anyone around the
world. On that score, the Internet has given a voice to far more people
than broadcast or cable television or newspapers. Barlow’s vision
arguably led, along with some strong legal strategy, to the Supreme
Court’s embrace of the Internet as a place protected by the First
Amendment in Reno v. ACLU:
From the publishers’ point of view, it constitutes a vast platform
from which to address and hear from a world-wide audience of
millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or
organization with a computer connected to the Internet can
“publish” information. Publishers include government agencies,
educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and
individuals.13

This promise is not over. At EFF we continue to work with
people in remote (and not so remote) parts around the world who are
struggling to make their voices heard and who still view the Internet as
that best pathway to operating outside of repressive government control.
Oppressed people worldwide continue to go to extraordinary lengths to
use the Internet to get their message out to the world.
Barlow’s early focus on governments as key obstacles to online
freedom has helped us gain some protections that we might not have had
without him. In order to ensure that the Internet became a place for
formerly marginalized voices, we helped ensure that those places could
https://www.eff.org/pages/not-terribly-brief-history-electronic-frontierfoundation.
12
Barlow didn’t just write about governments in the 1990s either and those who
stop with the Declaration are selling him short. In 1993, long before the
Declaration, Barlow published Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of
Mind on the Global Net. This essay, much longer and less expansive than the
Declaration, recognized that the internet would create fundamental problems for
intellectual property regimes and the companies that make their money from
them. See John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of
Mind on the Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019), also available at
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (1994), https://www.eff.org/pages/selling-winewithout-bottles-economy-mind-global-net.
13
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
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exist, in part by standing up for the idea that, except in criminal
circumstances, hosts should not be held legally responsible for what
those voices say.14 We have also seen digital search and seizure laws
move slowly in the right direction, most importantly through the growing
recognition from the Supreme Court, that the Fourth Amendment must
be interpreted to reflect the realities of the modern world.15 We lifted
government restrictions on developing and sharing tools that protect
privacy and security.16
Today we take it for granted that we can type or talk or scheme
or build a tool or product or share or store information with someone in
Gabon, Sao Paolo, or Bali just as easily as we can someone across town.
People build friendships, create and grow political movements, fall in
love and make each other laugh or cry across incredible physical
distances instantaneously. We create mixes and remixes of our culture,
building on each other’s ideas with insight and ease. We have
collaborative projects from Wikimedia to the Tor Project to Creative
Commons Network, which span the globe in ways that were unthinkable
in 1990. The same is true for businesses large and small. That this sort of
distance-hopping would become commonplace was not obvious in the
1990s. Barlow’s impact, “We will spread ourselves across the Planet so
that no one can arrest our thoughts[,]” is undeniable.17
But there are major differences in the world we inhabit now and
the world Barlow tried to invent. One of the key areas that has emerged
as critical is a focus on how, through network effects, a lack of
competition and stifled innovation, a small set of private entities has
14

17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (protecting, through the safe harbor provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, service providers who meet certain
conditions from monetary damages for the infringing activities of their users and
other third parties on the Internet); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (providing, in the
safe harbor provision of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider”).
15
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (stating that as
“technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas
normally guarded from inquisitive eyes,” the Supreme Court must assure
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted).
16
See Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that software source code was speech protected by the First
Amendment and that the government’s regulations preventing its publication
were unconstitutional).
17
Barlow, supra note 1, at 7.
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ended up having a tremendous impact on our civil liberties even if they
are not the primary focus of the Constitution. While in the 1990s it was
reasonable to focus on the government as the biggest risk to freedom
online, we now have to address the problem of centralized corporate
power, both as a tool of governmental repression and as its own problem
for privacy, speech, and innovation.18 Governments didn’t go away,
though. With the rise of authoritarian governments around the world we
may soon see more focus on Barlow’s original targets and there are now
far more of them that have the technical wherewithal to censor,
undermine and attack activists. The growth in the importance of the
Internet means that the fronts on which we have to defend it have grown
too.
Unlike the early days of the Internet, where a somewhat blank
slate allowed the powerful offline incumbent companies to be cheerfully
upended by upstart new players, we now have a set of big Internet
companies that, having created their fortresses, are now trying to pull up
the ladder. This is in addition to the long-ago success of the big
telecommunications companies in eliminating serious competition in the
broadband market. So, from the top layer of the Internet infrastructure to
the bottom we have fewer choices and leverage than we should.
Sadly, the big Internet companies are now backing away from
the kinds of protections that helped make it possible for them to exist.
They are too often abandoning any commitment to provide a forum for
marginalized people to speak, including the legal protections necessary
for someone to create a new speech platform. They attack or fail to
defend the right to build interoperable and competitive tools. They use
one-sided click-wrap “contracts” to both disempower their users and
support technical and legal claims that prevent reverse engineering and
other sorts of follow-on innovation. These Internet giants may not need
the protection of these laws anymore, but their future competitors will.
This centralization of corporate power has other consequences as
well. Barlow believed that new approaches to solving conflicts would
emerge, “Where there are real conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will
identify them and address them by our means. We are forming our own
Social Contract.”19 At this point in our contentious Internet history, it’s
clear that this hasn’t occurred, at least not yet and not at scale.
18

Note that Barlow himself recognized this concern about corporate power in
2015. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. There are smatterings of it in
earlier writings as well—Barlow had no love for monopolies or cartels, even if
that wasn’t his primary concern in the Declaration.
19
See Barlow, supra note 1.
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Harassment, hatred and other serious problems online have instead
spurred calls for large online platforms to serve as judge, jury and
executioner of what people may say online, even as the business models
of these platforms arguably feed this behavior. The big companies have
obliged, and now happily report how much speech they have censored
rather than how well they have done differentiating the bad speech from
the good or providing a forum for marginalized voices, much less
adjusting their business models.
Finally, we have not succeeded in building a world “without
privilege or prejudice,” instead all too often re-creating or even making
worse offline discrimination of marginalized people. While technology
has made it possible for marginalized groups to find each other, associate
and build communities together, this has not translated into the kind of
political, financial or social power Barlow envisioned. Worse, the
technology companies that have reaped the most financial benefits of this
new world are even less diverse at the top than the corporate dinosaurs
they replaced.
In the end, I think Barlow was right to focus on technological
advances empowering users and communities to self-organize to respond
to bad actors and actions online, even if we aren’t there yet. But we also
need law and policy to ensure that we can create and support the tools
necessary to keep the Internet free. Without that, the big corporations are
inevitably going to cater to those with the most power and voice, rather
than stand with the less powerful. And governments will happily put
pressure on them to do so. By pressuring our corporate dictators to
protect us, without efforts to empower users and communities to protect
themselves, we risk further re-creating online the marginalization that the
powerless have long experienced.
In short, we are seeing that in many ways the new bosses are the
same as the old bosses. Offline prejudices and power differentials are
more easily replicated online than Barlow had hoped—and they are just
as difficult to undo.
INVENTING 2039
So on to the fun question posed by this symposium. What should
we take from today into the next 20 years? Or as Barlow might put it,
what do we need to say and do today to invent the future we want? While
a short answer could be that we want to win our current fights: rein in
government surveillance, protect coders, privacy and freedom of
expression, ensure neither copyright nor overbroad criminal laws squelch
freedom of expression, freedom to tinker or innovation online, and more.
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But Barlow would want us to go further. I brainstormed a bit
with my EFF colleagues and the theme that came up consistently in our
conversations was envisioning a future where power and control rested to
the end points in the network—the humans. Here are some of the ideas
we generated, presented with a light touch of Barlow-style rhetoric:
We are building a civilization that empowers humans as the
users, builders and beneficiaries of technologies. Governments,
businesses, religions, cultures, communities and robots all matter, but
they all work under, and are transparent to, the bright light of the humans
they serve. We’re building a society that gives power back to people,
especially those who have been robbed of it for too long. We
unflinchingly recognize the bias and prejudices that have forestalled
equity and caused our visions of a just society to fall short, and we use
the power of technology and law to ensure those wrongs cannot invade
further into our digital societies.
We are building a world where the users have primary control
over their tools, devices and networks. Technology serves us, not the
other way around, and it treats efforts to surveil, track or profile us as
hostile measures that should be blocked. Where it cannot, we have
protected pathways—legal, technological, policy and cultural—so that
we can leave those walled gardens, panopticons and crystal prisons to
build our own new worlds.
We’re building a society where technological advances serve to
empower humans rather than tricking, manipulating or replacing them.
Builders take care to ensure that all technologies, no matter how
sophisticated, are fundamentally accountable to the humans who are
impacted by them, not just the humans who build or deploy them.
We are building a society where control has moved from
centralized systems—from the Facebooks and Amazons and
Alphabets—to the end points, the users. A society where power is
distributed along with technology, including the power to control who
can see what we do and say and to keep ourselves secure. We are
building a civilization where people not only have the right to speak,
they have the right to have their voices heard and heeded. A civilization
where people can gather together to build a better world, free of
government or corporate surveillance. A civilization where agreements
must really be “agreed” to, because all those party to them have the
power to require a real negotiation and meeting of the minds. A
civilization where the consequences of inevitable technological mistakes
and glitches are borne by those who implement and benefit from the
technology, not just those who are affected by their mistakes or lack of
care.
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We seek a civilization governed not by corporate policies but
primarily by self-governing communities of trust, where protections for
users come from their tools and communities, who have careful,
thoughtful mechanisms for stepping in when users are harassed,
threatened or harmed, along with mechanisms to correct mistakes and
redress wrongs. If that fails, people can obtain real legal redress from
those who have harmed them, but also have an easy path to leave,
including to choose or start a community that better reflects their values
and protects them. We seek a world where people have many such
communities to choose from and can participate in multiple ones
seamlessly, including choosing a separate identity for each. Ultimately,
we seek a civilization that contains multiple options, laboratories and
experiments for how to organize a society, so that we can all learn and
make conscious choices to move forward.
We are building a civilization where empowerment is not
expressed through property rights, ownership and one-sided adhesion
contracts as much as by protecting autonomy and control while still
promoting free expression and transparency. Just as Barlow recognized
the need for new methods of monetizing creative work,20 in the next 20
years we will evolve new ways to establish control and protection over
our personal data. We will recognize both the need for personal and
associational privacy and control and the critical role of free flowing
information in keeping us informed and empowered.
In short, we are building a world where everyone has free (as in
speech) access to read, speak, create, and control their experience,
including creating their own tools and protecting their own privacy. A
world where humans have the legal, policy and cultural support and
protection to do so. Where individuals have the strength and processing
power to take on larger organizations, whether government or corporate,
as well as to be protected from them. A world where our technology,
whether as simple as an email or as complex as an AI system, is
trustworthy and loyal to us.
May it be more humane and fair than the world your
governments and giant companies have made before.

20

See Barlow, supra note 12.

A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UTOPIA?
YOCHAI BENKLER

John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape the
oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional forms in
modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern state. One
might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the medicine,
education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh water system, and
public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?”1 The
Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that assumed that if
only the state were to back off markets will take care of it all, but also a
left-anchored critique of the state as a critical site of protecting the power
and privilege of elites, insistence that individual self-actualization
demanded a state contained within narrow boundaries, and a deep
skepticism of all forms of authority, as Fred Turner showed in From
Counterculture to Cyberculture.2 Selling Wine Without Bottles is not
against markets or payment as such, but rather a resistance to the
totalizing vision of commodity exchange as all there is. In this, for me a
telling passage was:
[M]ost of what a middle class American purchases has little to do
with survival. We buy beauty, prestige, experience, education, and
all the obscure pleasures of owning. Many of these things can not
only be expressed in non-material terms, they can be acquired by
non-material means.
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for,
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed.

1
2

MONTY PYTHON’S LIFE OF BRIAN (Sony Pictures 1979).
FRED TURNER, FROM COUNTERCULTURE TO CYBERCULTURE (2006).
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Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an
economy which consists almost entirely of information.3

Here was the nub of it. An ambition to live in spaces where the
commodity form was not everything. Where we could produce with and
for each other in relations of social exchange. The problem was not so
much markets as markets. It was the totalizing sense that markets are all
there is. Nothing captured this so clearly at the time than the battles over
music copyright, where the Recording Industry Association of America’s
(RIAA) vision of a celestial jukebox meant that music was a relationship
that should be fully mediated by money, down to the briefest moments of
pleasure or cultural reference. The position that Barlow presented here,
widely shared by many of us who worked to theorize and practically
construct the public domain, was a vision that music was a social
relationship and that markets had to be cabined alongside a robust
commons-based cultural production.
I spent much of the last twenty-five years focused primarily on
the latter of the two problems—the extent of the market and how we can
escape its totalizing reach. Only occasionally, and quite late in my own
work, did I turn to how we think about how we counter the oppressive
potential of the state without losing the benefits of its ability to deliver
public goods, contain market power, and redistribute wealth.
As I was preparing for the oddly introspective exercise of writing
my contribution here, I dug up an August 1995 draft of the job talk with
which I tried to persuade law schools to hire me. I opened with this:
Recognizing this historical moment presents us with a rare instance
at which we can make choices about the architecture of the new
technological base upon which our society and economy will be
built. Choices we make now will affect investment and use patterns,
which in turn will further affect the paths along which technology
itself will develop, and will affect how we conceive of information
and knowledge, and how we produce and consume that information
and knowledge. The network architecture and the patterns of use of
electronic communications that will develop from these choices will
have significant effects on our cultural, social, and economic
structure.

And then closed with:
Because the attributes of digital communications technology have
the potential to effect profound changes in the way we interact with
3

John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottes: The Economy of Mind on the
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 23–24 (2019).
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one another, the stakes of how we regulate the networks through
which we will interact are very high. We could move ourselves
towards a society in which the production and consumption of
information and knowledge is decentralized and diversified,
emphasizing those attributes of digital technology that make
possible nonhierarchical, open communications available on a
more-or-less equal basis to all end users. We could also move our
society towards a centralized economy, in which a few large
information conglomerates have such fine-tuned information about
our preferences, powers, and vulnerabilities, that they can exert a
tremendous amount of control over our every choice. We will likely
move towards something that is neither Cybertopia nor Orwell’s
dystopia. But where along the spectrum from phobia to utopia our
society will actually end up will likely be affected by accumulated
choices we make today and tomorrow about who controls the
various components and aspects of the communications
infrastructure upon which our information society will be built. That
is where legislators, judges, and lawyers come in, for in every legal
decision, regulatory action, or law that effects an institutional
determination about who controls which resources that are pertinent
to the development of the electronic communications network, a
piece of our future is being determined.

Plus ça change.
In the 1990s, the particular institutional battle over power to
control the information economy and society were battles over the scope
of commons. I thought that the most important choices would be about
property and commons—in particular how building robust commons
could provide a steady resource base on which decentralized, selfgoverning communities and individuals could construct a robust system
of information, communications, knowledge, and cultural production that
was not dependent on market relations and could provide a measure of
freedom from powerful market actors, as well as from the state.
The primary failure of that vision was that except in important
isolated settings, where commons-based practices took root early and
were able to outcompete the state and the market, expansion of the
domain of nonmarket production has stalled.
The fundamental battle that I think Barlow insisted we join, and
that I too focused on, was the right battle for its time. It continues to be
the case that battles over the shape of property rights and technological
affordances will shape bargaining power within markets, and will shape
the existence and relative prevalence or importance of non-market forms
of production and social exchange. It’s still the case that in principle, as
we project twenty-five years forward, we might be in a world in which a
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core set of basic materials is pumped into our homes as electricity and
water are, and feed distributed fabricators (3D printers) become as
ubiquitous as laundry machines or microwaves. Such a system would
allow us to share designs as free and open source software (FOSS), user
innovation, or fan fiction are shared today, and to fabricate much of the
stuff we need in non-commodified, household production for our own
use and to share and exchange with others. No one has captured the
potential for such a non-commodified society like Cory Doctorow in
Walkaway. It’s still the case that the pattern of control over energy
generation could shift toward a distributed system, as solar panels and
wind turbines get connected over a neutral, public grid. It’s still the case
that services that depend on platforms could be structured as
cooperatives. Whether any of these developments will emerge will
depend in large measure on what institutional choices we make about the
technology and about how it is used in actual institutional settings and
firms. It will depend on whether this time (unlike in the 1990s), we will
succeed in seeing a population-level cultural change from people
perceiving themselves as consumers to people seeing themselves as
producers. And it will depend on whether we can integrate that shift into
our day to day practice as a revised view of the state and the market,
rather than as a displacement.
And there’s the rub. Because the kind of optimism that typified
Barlow’s writing, as well as at least some of my own, is much harder to
sustain now that we’ve seen how the successes of the first generation of
battles over the commons have turned out.
Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi. The fact that the
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open access
commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve people’s
freedom from the power of a small number of corporations. Both on the
consumer end, like Roku, and on the cloud services side, Linux is
everywhere. The Internet of Things could not run on anything other than
FOSS and spectrum commons. And yet, these devices are all centrally
controlled, and many function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance
systems. Just as industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants
and effluents into the commons of the air and water to externalize some
of their costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open layers,
creating new toll booths and points of observation,4 and using the “free”
nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost input from
4

See generally Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145
DAEDALUS 18 (2016).
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which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as Julie Cohen puts
it.5
What the past quarter century has taught us is that there are five
basic failure modes of commons-based strategies to construct more
attractive forms of social relations.
1. Companies and countries can usually sustain focused
strategic efforts for longer and more actively than
distributed networks of users. They can and do use these
advantages strategically to re-centralize control over
consumers and voters using mechanisms that are layered
over or circumvent the still-open parts of the ecosystem.
This is not true in all cases; Wikipedia has enough
activated users that they are able to overcome concerted
efforts to distort information; major FOSS development
projects of core pieces of infrastructure beat out proprietary
solutions.
But, as Wikipedia approaches its 20th
anniversary, we have to recognize that these major
examples of successful distributed commons-based social
production continue to be our prime examples. Time and
again over the past twenty years we have seen companies
spending money to harness relatively passive consumers—
whether it is in carrier-operated WiFi networks that
completely overshadowed the emergence of community
wireless networks, or whether it is in the App economy that
Apple introduced, based on the App Store model, that
increasingly has displaced for most people the openstandards based personal computer running an openstandards based html browser. And in the past five years
we have seen countries find ways of using the open nature
of communications to engage in propaganda and
manipulation, as well as to track dissidents and opponents
by tapping into the surveillance capabilities that companies
developed to continuously gather information about their
users for commercial sale.
2. Distributed social relations can themselves develop internal
hierarchies and inequities (the Iron Law of Oligarchy), as
current debates over Wikipedia and FOSS gender
participation ratios and governance make clear.

5

See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal
Construction of the Surveillance Economy, 31 PHILOSOPHY & TECH. 213 (2018).
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3. Distributed open communications have provided enormous
play for genuinely hateful and harmful behavior, such that
we find ourselves seeking some power to control the worst
abuses—the power of the platforms we want to hold
democratically accountable, or the power of countries to
regulate those platforms for us. As early as Gamergate,
when networked gamers mobilized to harass and intimidate
women: game developers and media critics, in the name of
geek masculinity and free speech, and more prominently
since the various elections of 2016, we have come to
appreciate the extent to which fully distributed networks
can underwrite abusive behavior.
4. More fundamentally, as long as we live in a society where
people have to make money to eat and keep a roof over
their heads, markets produce stuff we really like and want.
For all the broad complaints about Amazon, it has
produced enormous consumer welfare. More directly, for
all the romanticization of fan videos and remix, the
emergence of subscription streaming services like Netflix
and Amazon Prime has been a boon to professional video
creators and underwritten a golden age of professional
video entertainment and narrative, both fiction and nonfiction.
5. States are still necessary to counter market power, provide
public goods on a sustained and large-scale basis by using
coercive taxing and spending powers, redistribute wealth,
and provide basic social and economic security for the
majority of the population.
Markets and states have proved remarkably resilient and
adaptive. Even where technological standards and institutions made it
possible for commons-based, distributed action to take root, both market
actors and states have found ways to impose their goals on most of the
population. This occurred primarily when the population engaging with
technology shifted from the more active and technically capable early
adopters to encompass a broader range of users, most of whom couldn’t,
or didn’t care to, use the freedoms that early adopters had put in place for
themselves. In part, this “domestication” of user creativity was done as a
sustained, intentional campaign, like the RIAA and MPAA’s litigation
and legislation campaign against remix culture in favor of the celestial
jukebox. In part, it may simply reflect the diversity of motivation among
human beings and the prevalence of the culture of passive consumption
when it is available. Perhaps there simply are more sheep than cats.
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Beyond the simple fact that market and state actors re-emerged
as central sources of power, states in particular seem to present a much
more likely source of accountable power and counteracting force to
market-based power than was the prevailing sense among both left- and
right-libertarians in the 1990s. A resurgent progressive movement is
fighting hard to change the basic narrative on how important it is to
harness the state, accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.
So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on social
relations. We need a clearer and more fully articulated political economy
of technology. We need a better understanding of what the state and the
market are for, in the context of a genuine three-way interaction between
state, market, and commons-based production specifically or social,
nonmarket production more generally. And we need to internalize the
limits of anarchism, whether of the right or left spin. I see present
debates over blockchain, cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net,
and I see in them a rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so
poetically. The words are still there, but the music seems out of sync
with the beat of the times.

INTERNET UTOPIANISM AND THE PRACTICAL
INEVITABILITY OF LAW
JULIE E. COHEN

INTRODUCTION
Writing at the dawn of the digital era, John Perry Barlow
proclaimed cyberspace to be a new domain of pure freedom. Addressing
the nations of the world, he cautioned that their laws, which were “based
on matter,” simply did not speak to conduct in the new virtual realm.1 As
both Barlow and the cyberlaw scholars who took up his call recognized,
that was not so much a statement of fact as it was an exercise in
deliberate utopianism. But it has proved prescient in a way that they
certainly did not intend. The “laws” that increasingly have no meaning in
online environments include not only the mandates of market regulators
but also the guarantees that supposedly protect the fundamental rights of
internet users, including the expressive and associational freedoms
whose supremacy Barlow asserted. More generally, in the networked
information era, protections for fundamental human rights—both on- and
offline—have begun to fail comprehensively.
Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it also
hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay, adapted from a
forthcoming book on the evolution of legal institutions in the information
era,2 I identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining: utopianism
about platforms for distributed cultural and political production (and
concomitant failure to reckon with the transformative force of
informational capitalism); utopianism about anonymity as a force for
institutional disruption (and concomitant failure to acknowledge the
essential role of institutions in cabining the human capacity for malice
and mayhem); and utopianism about the relationship between
information and communication networks and human freedom (and
concomitant failure to contend with the powerful and inherently
informational mechanisms by which existing protections for human
rights are increasingly outflanked and coopted). It has become
increasingly apparent that functioning legal institutions have
1

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 5 (2012) (originally published on Feb. 8, 1996).
2
JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS
OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2019).
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indispensable roles to play in protecting and advancing human freedom.
It has also become increasingly apparent, however, that the legal
institutions we need are different than the ones we have.

I. THE PLATFORMIZATION OF EVERYTHING:
DISTRIBUTED PRODUCTION, DATA PRIVACY, AND THE
PROBLEM OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM
Some of the scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call
prophesied that decentralized coordination of cultural and political
activity by networked communities of peers would increasingly displace
centralized, top-down control of cultural and political production, with
transformative and broadly freedom-promoting effects.3 Without
question, decentralized production strategies have expanded access to
information and political capacity-building for people all around the
world and have come to be regarded as essential tools for fostering
human freedom in the networked information era. The grander visions of
wholesale, democratizing transformation in political economy and in
government have not materialized, however. Instead, strategies for
decentralized cultural and political production have fueled a very
different kind of transformation, organized around the emergence of
dominant global platforms that afford new vantage points for
surveillance, data harvesting, surplus extraction, and manipulation.
Some of the obstacles to commons-based cultural and political
production were predictable. Leading software firms initially waged
public and creative campaigns against open source software, labeling it
unreliable, insecure, and a point of entry for organized crime. Although
open source products and accompanying services eventually achieved
widespread penetration in certain industry sectors and some onceformidable opponents have become adherents, persistent, thorny issues
continue to surround the interfaces between open source and proprietary
systems and modules.4 The major content industries have resisted
3

See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Dan Hunter & F.
Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 951 (2004);
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A
Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in
COORDINATING THE INTERNET 62–91 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds.,
1997).
4
See David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and Open Source:
The Battle over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Bryan
Pfaffenberger, The Rhetoric of Dread: Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (FUD) in
Information Technology Marketing, 13 KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL’Y 78 (2000).
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commons-based production and open-access distribution strategies for
educational and cultural materials and have devised a continuing stream
of legal and technological methods for asserting control over their
products and business models.5 Political activists, for their part, quickly
learned that the networked digital information environment afforded not
only unprecedented scope for dissent and resistance but also new, hidden
control points for state censorship and surveillance.6
Other failure modes for commons-based production were wholly
unanticipated, and that was so in part because internet utopian projects
elevated openness and freedom from control over all other priorities,
most notably including privacy and data protection. Evangelists for
internet openness, confident in the ability of enlightened netizens to
assert their own privacy interests, painted calls for stricter regulation as
threats to the net’s most fundamental values.7 But openness has proved a
double-edged sword. The allure of open content models has been a
powerful factor driving the emergence of new information businesses
whose revenue models are based on harvesting and monetizing the data
flows generated by content developers and content users, including
global platform giants Google, Facebook, and Amazon and a host of

5

See, e.g., Andi Sporkin, Publishers Applaud “Research Works Act,”
Bipartisan Legislation to End Government Mandates on Private-Sector
Scholarly Publishing, ASS’N OF AMERICAN PUBLISHERS (Dec. 23, 2011),
https://perma.cc/M5Y5-UJZC; Ian Graber-Stiehl, Science’s Pirate Queen,
VERGE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/DY7H-7D4Y. See generally AnneMarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online
Copyright Enforcement, 89 ORE. L. REV. 81 (2010); Anne-Marie Bridy, Internet
Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1524 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively
Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, The
Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347 (2005); Rebecca
Tushnet, All of This Has Happened Before and All of This Will Happen Again:
Innovation in Copyright Licensing, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1447 (2014).
6
REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 51–66 (2012); ZEYNEP TUFECKI, TWITTER
AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 251–54
(2017).
7
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142–62
(1998). But see James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Julie E. Cohen,
Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look
at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996).
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others.8 Platform protocols invite commons-based production
arrangements, and commons-based production arrangements in turn
reinforce platform logics of data harvesting and proprietary, algorithmic
knowledge production.9
The results of distributed cultural and political production also
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the contrary
have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve. The particular
quality-control mechanisms that keep open source software robust and
secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly) objective work far less well
(or not at all) within massively-intermediated environments that are
optimized to advertiser-driven platform revenue models. In such
environments, the vaunted “wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector.
Algorithmic processes optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt
social sharing heighten the volatility of online interactions, and
surveillant assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content
targeting and behavioral marketing create powerful—and easily
weaponized—stimulus-response feedback loops.10 The result is a
sociotechnical apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and
deepening preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions.
Under conditions of pervasive, data-driven intermediation—
enabled in part by thought leaders’ failure to take privacy and data
protection seriously as worthy and freedom-advancing projects—power
from below becomes power directed toward whatever purpose its
organizers want to advance. Platform-based, massively-intermediated
environments have become fertile breeding grounds for conspiracy
theories (including coordinated campaigns to foster denialism about
climate change, vaccination, and similar matters), disinformation
campaigns designed to discredit political actors and institutions, and
virulent forms of bigotry, ideological extremism, and ethnic
8

See TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY
(2017); Guy Pessach, Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism
in a Post IP Era, 54 OSGOODE HALL L. REV. 225 (2016).
9
See Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction
of the Surveillance Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213 (2018); Julie E. Cohen, Law
for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 153–61 (2017).
10
On clickbait and social sharing strategies, see Bryan Gardiner, You’ll Be
Outraged at How Easy It Was to Get You to Click on This Headline, WIRED
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/4QXK-5M56; Alice Marwick, Why Do People
Share Fake News? A Sociotechnical Model of Media Effects, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 474 (2018), https://perma.cc/DT4C-94E. On surveillance as behavioral
conditioning, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE
CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF
POWER (2019).
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nationalism.11 At the same time, and paradoxically, the increasingly
pronounced orientation toward manufactured outrage and political
polarization within such environments also dissipates other kinds of
political energy. It has become more difficult to enlist networked publics
in the work of building movements capable of growing, sustaining
themselves, and organizing for change in the real world.12
Among scholars and commentators who write about digital
media, a debate has raged about whether it is fair to blame dominant
platforms for these problems. According to media scholar Siva
Vaidhyanathan, “the problem with Facebook is Facebook,” and more
specifically the combination of Facebook’s global reach, its
optimization-based business model, and the ways that its information
feeds have displaced other, potentially moderating sources of
information.13 Others argue that such explanations unfairly blame
platforms for longstanding dysfunctions that are not of their creation.14
Without question, part of the problem with Facebook and others is the
preexisting social and cultural divisions that information cascades
amplify. That logic, though, undercuts the optimism about bottom-up
organization that the Internet’s founding visionaries expressed. Part of
the problem with Facebook and other platforms is people, easily
distracted, highly susceptible to misinformation, and prone to herd
behavior. It also undercuts the logic that designated the internet and its
networked virtual spaces as sites of utopian separation for the life of the
mind. Platform-based environments are inextricably embedded in realworld societies; platform governance requires real-world, institutional
(i.e., non-utopian) solutions.
11

See Jonathan Albright, Untrue-Tube: Monetizing Misery and Disinformation,
MEDIUM (Feb. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y6BM-CQCD; Rob Faris, et al.,
Partisanship, Propaganda, and Disinformation: Online Media and the 2016
U.S. Presidential Election, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOCY’ AT
HARVARD UNIV. (Aug. 16, 2017), https://perma.cc/8SCW-R9HE; Alice
Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation & Disinformation Online,
DATA & SOC’Y (2017), https://perma.cc/356L-XZQA; Christopher Paul &
Miriam Matthew, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model:
Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It, RAND CORP.: PERSPECTIVES
(2016), https://perma.cc/CLB5-A5AG; Julia Carrie Wong, How Facebook and
YouTube Help Spread Anti-Vaxxer Propaganda, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3NN6-R5Q7.
12
See TUFECKI, supra note 6, at 189–222 (discussing examples).
13
SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS
US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 1 (2018).
14
See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, India’s Lynching Epidemic and the Problem
with Blaming Tech, ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/MBA8-LNYZ.
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II. UNBUNDLING INSTITUTIONS:
ANONYMITY, TRUST AND THE PROBLEM OF SCALE
Other scholars and activists who took up Barlow’s call focused
on enabling capabilities for distributed, anonymous communication and
coordination, and here again the scorecard is mixed. It is indisputable
that anonymity has played an essential structural role in modern
democratic societies and equally indisputable that networked information
and communication technologies have provided anonymous dissenters
with invaluable tools for naming and challenging abuses of economic
and political power. Around the world, both activists pursuing social
change and journalists reporting on controversial topics now rely on
capabilities for anonymous, networked communication to protect
themselves and their sources, and projects dedicated to creating,
maintaining, and improving such capabilities have become sites of
ongoing research and activism in their own right.15 Persistent and
intractable questions remain, however, about the extent to which
behaviors that historically have functioned as safety valves within more
complex institutional structures can assume more central roles in the
project of securing fundamental rights and freedoms for all people.
To begin with, and continuing the themes developed in the
previous section, anonymous online activity has valences that are more
complicated than romanticized narratives equating anonymity with press
freedom and democratic self-determination acknowledge. The projects of
building and sustaining utopia require utopians—people united in their
unequivocal commitment to the ground truths and operating norms of a
utopian project. Some utopian ground truths and operating norms are
ugly and unworthy of anyone’s allegiance. In networked spaces, cadres
of technological cognoscenti wield anonymity as a new and potent
source of social and political power to be deployed toward a wide variety
of ends. They orchestrate large-scale whistleblowing, operate safe
channels for journalists, and distribute samizdat on behalf of political
dissidents—and also spread hate speech, disinformation, and fascist and
nationalist ideologies.

15

See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 227–37; Eva Galperin, Cell Phone Guide
for Occupy Wall Street Protesters (and Everyone Else), ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.
(Oct. 14, 2011), https://perma.cc/7NAC-M9YB; Eva Galperin, Don’t Get Your
Sources in Syria Killed, COMMITTEE TO PROJECT JOURNALISTS (May 21, 2012),
https://perma.cc/37NY-TZAQ; Andy Greenberg, Laura Poitras on the Crypto
Tools That Made Her Snowden Film Possible, WIRED (Oct. 15, 2014); Jenna
McLaughlin, The FBI vs. Apple Debate Just Got Less White, INTERCEPT (Mar. 8,
2016), https://perma.cc/LM53-CRJG.
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More generally, the trajectories of projects designed to scale up
certain types of anonymous interaction and communication demonstrate
that breaking things is easier than rebuilding them. Consider two muchdiscussed examples involving anonymous infrastructures for enabling
fundamental market and governance functions. The first is the
blockchain, a set of technological protocols for enabling distributed,
secure authentication of transactions and credentials. In theory, such
technologies might be deployed within existing institutional fabrics in
ways that eliminate opportunities for corruption, waste, and rentseeking.16 But uses for private surplus extraction and self-interested (and
environmentally destructive) speculation are far more widespread, and
some argue that the highest and best uses of blockchain technologies
involve the creation of alternative currencies to displace state-sponsored
fiat currency and ultimately the state itself.17 The second example is
WikiLeaks, which rapidly attained heroic status among civil liberties
advocates for its stated commitment to facilitating anonymous
whistleblowing about powerful wrongdoers. WikiLeaks, however, is not
a free press advocacy organization. It rejects certain essential editorial
and quality control functions that the press as an institution typically has
performed and espouses an endgame that is far more disruptive.18
WikiLeaks’ evolving role in the era of ascendant platform-based
disinformation campaigns is proof that the distinction matters.19
16

See generally PRIMAVERA DEFILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND
THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018).
17

See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Is Bitcoin a Waste of Electricity, or
Something Worse?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/7G2H-W9T6;
Nellie Bowles, Making a Crypto Utopia in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2,
2018), https://perma.cc/BZL4-AC5K. See generally KEVIN WERBACH, THE
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST (2018).
18
Compare Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the
Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 311 (2011) (painting WikiLeaks heroically), with ANDY GREENBERG, THIS
MACHINE KILLS SECRETS: HOW WIKILEAKS, CYPHERPUNKS, AND HACTIVISTS
AIM TO FREE THE WORLD’S INFORMATION 285–313 (2012) (developing a more
neutral account); see also Bill Keller, Dealing With Assange and the Wikileaks
Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 26, 2011), https://perma.cc/XP5Y-525Z
(discussing editorial considerations). On the institutional functions of the press,
see Erin C. Carroll, Platforms and the Fall of the Fourth Estate: Looking
Beyond the First Amendment to Protect Watchdog Journalism, 79 MD. L. REV.,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300966.
19
See Mark Fenster, ‘Bullets of Truth’: Julian Assange and the Politics of
Transparency (Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 19-12, Jan.
27, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3323950; David
A. Graham, Is WikiLeaks a Russian Front?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 29, 2018),
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As both of those examples illustrate, moreover, other obstacles
to coding scalable, anonymity-centered, democratic institutions are
cultural. As Gabriella Coleman has shown, hacker culture speaks the
intertwined languages of liberal individualism and libertarianism and
posits enlightened self-reliance and, by necessary implication, technical
meritocracy as cardinal virtues.20 Those commitments in turn complicate
efforts to transform digital anonymity from a tool for resistance to the
foundation of a stable framework for guaranteeing fundamental rights
and freedoms. Understood as (anti-)institutional projects, both
WikiLeaks and blockchain-based cryptocurrency projects reflect
ideologies that are powerfully utopian but not particularly democratic.
They express and reproduce a particular kind of moral and ideological
purity that is inconsistent with a broadly inclusive social compact. And
they illustrate powerfully that, although capabilities for anonymous
online communication and coordination have played and will continue to
play an important role in efforts to secure fundamental rights and
freedoms for all people, such capabilities cannot stand in for other kinds
of institution-building. Structurally speaking, anonymous dissent and
opposition are safety valves. Achieving durable, effective protection for
fundamental rights and freedoms also requires other mechanisms.

III. UNRAVELING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:
INFORMATION, NETWORKS, AND THE PROBLEM OF POWER
Both strands of utopian thinking about internet-enabled
governance that I have just described are rooted in a more general habit
of utopian thinking about the relationship between information and
human freedom. That habit is deeply ahistorical. Networked information
technologies are not simply instruments of liberation, nor do they simply
afford new avenues for control and cooptation. Over the course of many
decades, social and legal institutions have come to reflect the shaping
influence of the “control revolution” that began with the introduction of
automated information systems into industrial-era factories and

https://perma.cc/W3HT-RMV5; see also Andy Greenberg, How Reporters
Pulled Off The Panama Papers, The Biggest Leak in Whistleblower History,
WIRED (Apr. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/WJF9-EUMP (describing investigative
journalists’ use of encryption tools to coordinate a controlled leak of documents
detailing a massive scheme for global tax evasion).
20
See generally GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER,
SPY: THE MANY FACES OF ANONYMOUS (2014); GABRIELLA COLEMAN, CODING
FREEDOM: THE ETHICS AND AESTHETICS OF HACKING 183–205 (2012).
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businesses.21 The processes of institutional evolution have produced new
institutional configurations and competencies that are intensively
informational in character and that have posed difficult challenges for
traditional approaches to conceptualizing and enforcing fundamental
human rights.
The same networked capabilities that enable widespread public
access to information also have enabled powerful corporate entities to
build and manage far-flung global empires. As a practical matter, such
entities wield increasing power over the conditions of human freedom.
Giant transnational corporations that construct global networked supply
chains enjoy nearly unlimited authority over their workers and outsize
influence over the surrounding communities. The state-centered human
rights discourses and institutions that emerged in the post-World War II
era did not contemplate such rearrangements, and both powerful
economic actors and the developed economies of the Global North have
resisted reform efforts that might bring transnational norms and domestic
constitutional obligations to bear directly on private economic activity.22
In the U.S., at least, the direction of constitutional reform has run the
other way.23
Capabilities for networked digital communication and for highly
informationalized, managerial oversight also have catalyzed profound
changes in the structure and operation of regulatory and governance
institutions, and those changes have unfolded in ways that have
accelerated the marginalization of human rights commitments. The
increasing power and prominence of network-and-standard-based legalinstitutional arrangements for economic governance—arrangements that
exist to facilitate global flows of extractive activity and that tend to treat
protective regulation as network damage—has left older human rights
institutions increasingly sidelined.24 Meanwhile, as emergent human
rights discourses and practices organized around capabilities for human
flourishing and sustainable development have encountered and engaged
21

See generally JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION:
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1986).
22
See generally STEFANIE KHOURY & DAVID WHYTE, CORPORATE HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: GLOBAL PROSPECTS FOR LEGAL ACTION (2017).
23
See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018).
24
On network-and-standard-based governance arrangements, see Julie E. Cohen,
Networks, Standards, and Network-and-Standard-Based Governance, in AFTER
THE DIGITAL TORNADO (Kevin Werbach, ed., forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339351.
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with economic governance arrangements, they have become increasingly
expert-driven and inaccessible to the populations whose futures they
affect. In particular, activists and advocates have raised persistent
concerns about the methodological tyranny of utilitarianism in the
articulation of development goals and benchmarks.25 Efforts to reorient
human rights discourse and practice toward the problem of private
economic power also have undergone a novel form of institutional
cooptation that relocates those efforts inside corporations themselves and
restyles them as “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) practice.
Initiatives such as the UN Global Compact rely on hortatory strategies to
extract commitments that may or may not be honored and project an
image of consensus around gradual forward progress that may or may
not correspond to reality.26
The powerful global platform businesses that have emerged in
the twenty-first century did not cause any of these changes, but they have
proved apt at exploiting them. So, for example, as the European Union
has worked to export its high standards for personal data protection to the
rest of the world, U.S. platform businesses have supported efforts to
insert strengthened mandates for cross-border flow into bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements, including especially agreements involving
the Asian nations that are increasingly significant players in the emerging
cross-border data servicing economy.27 Platform businesses also have
taken an entrepreneurial approach to the CSR movement. The Global
Network Initiative, founded in 2008 by a coalition of platform firms,
academics, and human rights NGOs, represented an attempt both to
25

See Sally Engle Merry & John M. Conley, Measuring the World: Indicators,
Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S83
(2011); AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators:
Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 253 (2009). See generally
KEVIN E. DAVIS, ANGELINA FISHER, BENEDICT KINGSBURY & SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, EDS., GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH
QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS (2012).
26
See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John
Ruggie); The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://perma.cc/5LZV-AJYY (last accessed June 26, 2018);
KHOURY & WHYTE, supra note 22, at 48–61.
27
See Svetlana Yakovleva & Kristina Irion, The Best of Both Worlds? Free
Trade in Services, and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection, 2 EUR. DATA
PROTECTION L. REV. 191 (2016); Graham Greenleaf, Free Trade Agreements
and Data Privacy: Future Perils of Faustian Bargains, in TRANSATLANTIC
DATA PRIVACY RELATIONS AS A CHALLENGE FOR DEMOCRACY 181–212 (Dan
Svantesson & Dariusz Kloza eds., 2017).
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coordinate resistance to censorship demands by authoritarian states and
to respond to criticisms levied at platforms for acceding to such
demands.28 Compliance with the GNI’s principles, however, remains
voluntary and inconsistent, even as the vast and growing extent of
commercial surveillance—encompassing information of an astonishing
variety, granularity, and intimacy—deepens the symbiosis between
public and private surveillance power.29
Last but not least, data-driven, algorithmic processes multiply
both obstacles to accountability and opportunities for cooptation of
accountability structures. Smart digital technologies produce decisions
that are ad hoc, personalized, and pattern-based rather than principled
and generalizable. They don’t give reasons for—or even draw attention
to—the choices they make, and those choices are continually evolving.
The design of automated machine-learning processes also includes a
number of steps that scrutiny of their end results does not capture.30
Those attributes sit in profound tension with traditional articulations of
the institutional features that a commitment to the rule of law requires,
and they create oversight problems that extend far outside the traditional
competencies of courts.31 And here again, efforts to devise new oversight
mechanisms have offered new avenues for the assertion and reproduction
of informational power: Consider, for example, the Federal Trade
Commission’s privacy and data security consent decrees, which rely
heavily on attestations of compliance by private sector auditors that are
28

GNI Principles on Freedom of Expression and Privacy, GLOBAL NETWORK
INITIATIVE (May 2017), https://perma.cc/J32J-GMXB; see MACKINNON, supra
note 6, at 138–39, 179–82.
29
See, e.g., Daithi Mac Sithigh & Mathias Siems, The Chinese Social Credit
System: A Model for Other Countries? (EUI Dept. of Law Working Paper
2019/01), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3310085; David
Cole, “We Kill People Based on Metadata,” N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2014),
https://perma.cc/ERY2-Z44L; Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle,
The Perpetual Lineup: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, CTR.
ON PRIVACY AND TECH., GEORGETOWN LAW (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://perma.cc/8FUT-RR3R; Caroline Haskins, Dozens of Cities Have Secretly
Experimented with Predictive Policing Software, VICE MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 6,
2019), https://perma.cc/ZY4B-HDCH; Tim Cushing, Cops Wanting To Track
Movements Of Hundreds Of People Are Turning To Google For Location
Records, TECHDIRT (Mar. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/3K3Z-T8P9.
30
See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars
Should Learn about Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017).
31
See generally MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 133–56,
174–85 (2015); Julie E. Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 1, (2019).
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largely unverifiable and that bootstrap self-defined standards of
adequacy.32 Or consider emergent regimes for “content moderation at
scale,” which rely on a combination of privatized algorithmic governance
and standardized performance reporting as a means of demonstrating
compliance to the outside world.33 Both developments reflect beliefs
about the best uses of new informational capabilities to manage legal and
regulatory processes; neither expresses a commitment to robust public
accountability.

CONCLUSION
None of the problems I have described, of course, is Barlow’s
fault. But those who would advance the intertwined projects of human
freedom and democratic self-government should choose their prophets
carefully—or, perhaps, should not place their faith in prophets at all.
Advancing human freedom through the absence of law was never really
in the cards. The difficulty, rather, is that the information-era problems
now requiring institutional solutions are profoundly unfamiliar to
institutional actors whose established modes of both action and selflegitimation are backward-looking. New informational capabilities
demand both new governance modalities and new institutional
arrangements capable of deploying them effectively. Due in part to hardto-break habits of framing such questions as anti-openness, antiinnovation, or conducive to censorship (or, more usually, all three), we
still have vanishingly little idea what such capabilities and structures
might look like and how they might be conformed in some recognizable
way to rule-of-law ideals. Those are urgent projects for a post-utopian
era.

32

See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014); Megan Gray, Understanding
and Improving Privacy Audits under FTC Orders (May 5, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3165143.
33
See generally TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET:
PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE
SOCIAL MEDIA (2018).

REVISITING BARLOW’S MISPLACED
OPTIMISM
BENJAMIN EDELMAN†

Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace calls
for a “civilization of the mind in cyberspace,” and he says it will be
“more humane and fair” than what governments have created.1 Barlow’s
vision is unapologetically optimistic, easily embraced by anyone who
longs for better times to come. Yet twenty years later, it’s easy to see
some important respects in which reality fell short of his vision.
Alongside the Internet’s many pluses are clickbait, scams, hacks, and all
manner of privacy violations. Ten thousand hours of cat videos may be
delightful, but they’re no civilization of the mind. With a bit of
hindsight, Barlow’s techno-utopianism looks as stilted as other
utopianism—and equally far removed from reality.
Beyond being overly optimistic about how perfectly the ‘net
would unfold, Barlow was also needlessly skeptical of plausible
institutions to bring improvements. He writes: “The only law that all our
constituent cultures would generally recognize is the Golden Rule.”2 But
the moral suasion—and practical effectiveness—of the Golden Rule
presupposes participants of roughly equal power and status. It is no
small feat to meaningfully consider what Joe User might want from
Mega Social Network if the tables were turned and Joe owned the
goliath. As a practical matter, any claim a user has against a goliath
requires state institutions to adjudicate and enforce. When Barlow wrote
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, tech goliaths were
much smaller. Plus, the Internet’s early users were in a certain sense
more sophisticated than the mainstream users who eventually joined. So
the gap from little to big was much narrower then, arguably making
governments less important in that era. But as the big get bigger and as
the Internet attracts average users who lack the special sophistication of
early adopters, governments play key roles—adjudicating disputes,
enforcing contracts and beyond.

†

Benjamin Edelman is an economist at Microsoft. He presents his personal
views, not the views of his employer. His other writings are at
www.benedelman.org.
1
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 7 (2019).
2
Id. at 6.
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I. THE SUCCESSES OF RECENT TECH-POLICY
It’s easy to criticize government interventions that are hamhanded or worse, and even easier to mock the occasional politician
abusing terminology. (Think Ted Stevens’ “series of tubes.”3) But
stepping back, I’m struck by the important work that governments have
done with relative success. Let me offer some specific examples:
First, government succeeded in reining in some of the most
clear-cut violations of copyright. Consider Napster. It was a remarkable
moment when internationally-known tech startups, VC-backed firms,
and even publicly-traded firms were fairly alleged to have intentionally
facilitated copyright infringement, and indisputably profited from it.4
Against that backdrop, Barlow presented piracy as both inevitable and
appropriate, and he made the arguments well. But the fact of piracy in
the shadows nowhere necessitates investors getting rich—or content
creators giving up the rights plainly provided by longstanding law. More
recently, rights-holders and service providers found room to disagree
about copyright treatment of peer-to-peer video sites,5 news articles,6
image thumbnails,7 and countless other issues arguably at the boundaries
of copyright. If one of these is your life’s work or your income source, it
may seem like no small matter. One wouldn’t say courts have offered an
overwhelmingly compelling approach to these questions. Nonetheless,
3

Senator Ted Stevens, Remarks at Senate Commerce Committee Hearing on
Net Neutrality (June 28, 2006).
4
For example, Napster counted among its funders some of Silicon Valley’s
most well-regarded investors. In separate litigation against video-streaming
service Veoh, Universal Music Group alleged that three of Veoh’s investors
were so intertwined with company operations that they should themselves be
liable for the infringement UMG saw at Veoh’s site—the Ninth Circuit
disagreed. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners L.L.C., 718
F.3d 1006, 1013, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2013). Meanwhile, litigation documents
revealed that YouTube co-founders personally uploaded infringing material,
embracing a strategy of using infringing videos to attract users and increase the
site’s valuation. See Viacom’s Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 8–10, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube
Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103).
5
See e.g., Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
6
See e.g., EU Copyright Directive, Art. 11 (not yet in force); see also Ley De
Propiedad Intelectual (B.O.E. 2014, 11404) (Spain) (limiting how news
aggregators and other online services can use news from publishers, and broadly
requiring licenses and payments); Achtes Gesetz Zur Änderung des
Urheberrechtsgesetzes [Copyright Law], May 7, 2013, BGBL I at 23 (Ger.)
(same).
7
See e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
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courts successfully put a stop to the most brazen illegality, and to those
who sought to profit most directly from it. Napster and Grokster, good
riddance.8
Second, government has made important progress opposing
online scams.

8

•

Post-transaction marketers placed ambiguous buttons like
“continue” onto retailers’ confirmation screens. Pressing
such a button enrolled a user in a high-priced monthly
subscription from a company whose site she had never
even visited. “But wait!” you might protest: “She never
gave that company her credit card number.” That’s true
but oddly irrelevant: Post-transaction marketers copied a
customer’s credit card numbers from the just-completed
transaction, making it altogether too easy to “agree” to a
monthly charge that was genuinely unexpected.9

•

Online platforms sold games and virtual trinkets to kids
and denied parents’ requests for refunds. It’s Hornbook
law that kids broadly have the right to void transactions,10
most of all those entered in the “weakness of youth.”
Online games, designed to addict, fit the rule in spades.
Nonetheless, game and app platforms argued that they had
always said “all sales are final,” so they refused refunds.
Litigation by private attorneys (this author among them)
and the FTC delivered refunds for many who were
harmed.11

•

Tech support scammers claimed to call from well-known
tech companies, but charged big money for snake oil or

See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
(effectively shuttering the firm); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913 (2005) (same).
9
See MAJORITY STAFF OF OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, STAFF OF
S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., 11TH CONG., AGGRESSIVE SALES
TACTICS ON THE INTERNET AND THEIR IMPACT ON AMERICAN CONSUMERS
(Comm. Print 2009); Benjamin Edelman, Deception in Post-Transaction
Marketing, BENEDELMAN.ORG (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://www.benedelman.org/posttransaction/.
10
See 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 9:5 (4th ed. 2018).
11
See, e.g., Bohannon v. Facebook, Inc., No. 12-cv-01894-BLF, 2019 WL
188671 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 1, 2019); see also FTC proceedings against
Amazon.com, Inc. (F.T.C. File No. 122 3238, Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-01038,
W.D. Wash.), Apple Inc. (F.T.C. File No. 112 3108), and Google, Inc. (F.T.C.
File No. 122 3237).
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worse. After a series of raids in the United States and
abroad, key perpetrators were brought to justice, and these
schemes much reduced.12
Super-libertarians sometimes blame victims for their gullibility in falling
for these schemes. But I doubt Barlow would have had that instinct.
Barlow was always a friend to the little guy, and I never knew him to
blame anyone even for the clearest of foolishness. In any event these
practices are basically offensive to most Americans. To its credit, the
judicial system saw the offense and stepped into action.
Notably, all these successes were achieved via traditional
mechanisms of state power. Lawyers wrote complaints and filed
motions. Judges heard witnesses and wrote decisions. Politicians held
hearings and talked of new legislation. (Occasionally, though only
occasionally, they actually passed bills on these subjects.) The industry
details would be unfamiliar to the Founding Fathers, but the procedure
was as they intended it. Government doesn’t look so hopeless after all.
Though the misbehavior occurred online, the perpetrators were fleshand-blood—unavoidably subject to legal proceedings.

II. WORK TO BE DONE
Despite these successes, much important work remains to be
done in making online communication all it can be. Some examples:
First, competition policy demands renewed attention. The
leading online social network has grown so large that its founder-CEO
can’t name a viable alternative.13 In many countries, the leading search
engine outranks competitors fifty-to-one. Even sectors with competition
are a far cry from the models in economics textbooks. In online travel
booking, two behemoths together control all the brands you’ve heard
of.14 Competition in smartphone operating systems is similarly just two
choices. Some argue that consolidation results from proper factors,
causes little harm, or is otherwise unobjectionable. Reasonable people
can disagree. But as politicians on both sides of the aisle turn their focus
to market concentration, we can’t assume unchecked market forces are
the end of the story.
12

See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Elite IT Partners, No. 2:19-cv-00125-RJS (D. Utah 2019).
Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Joint
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. (2018) (testimony of Mark Zuckerberg).
14
Benjamin Edelman, Impact of OTA Bias and Consolidation on Consumers,
BENEDELMAN.ORG (July 12, 2017),
http://www.benedelman.org/publications/ota-bias-12jul2017.pdf.
13
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Second, consumers demand improved handling of hacking,
ransomware, and the like. It is an outrage for an anonymous villain to
hack your computer, encrypt your files, and demand, quite literally, a
ransom for release of your hard-earned data. Equally outrageous are the
sites that specialize in hosting material designed to harm—sites designed
for negative reviews of small businesses (removable only if businesses
pay for that privilege); sites that solicit photos of ex-lovers (again,
removed only upon payment). Apparently market forces create these
abominations. But no one should be surprised if a civilized democracy
elects to prevent them.
Third, cyber-bullying is unsustainable. This isn’t just schoolkid
antics; careers have been ruined, and lives lost. Tech goliath platforms
host these attacks, and they’ve been troublingly indifferent to the harm
they facilitate.
I credit the predictable practical difficulties in government
interventions on these subjects. Some schemes cross jurisdictions,
creating a longstanding challenge. Do citizens of Illinois want to pay
their police to pursue a hacker who mostly targets New Yorkers? How
about the citizens of India? Russia? Yet everyone is somewhere. A
perpetrator may think himself safe by staying far from his victims, but
organized victims can nonetheless seek satisfaction—whether by
themselves paying the cost of pursuit, or by targeting the miscreant’s
inevitable local assets and resources.
Fixing other problems will require consensus on who should
actually be blamed. When a user is hacked, should we blame that user
(for failing to keep her computer or phone secure), the company whose
software or service was too easily hacked, or the hacker who actually
pressed the button? Does the answer change when the harm is money
lost versus privacy versus life itself? In the abstract, few people endorse
blaming the victim. Yet the experts who examine these problems often
cannot resist telling victims how they went astray.
Reflecting on these situations, I inevitably turn back to Barlow’s
reference to the Golden Rule as the supposed only source of authority.
The victim of a cyber-mob would be thrilled to agree not to bully anyone
in exchange for not being bullied. But that imagined agreement does her
little good. The reality is that she is being bullied. Either someone will
help, or no one will help. The Barlow I knew would have wanted to
help, but with the departure of his body, we’re left only with his text
which calls for every man to himself. I don’t see why that’s the right
result or a necessary result. Anyone who cares about a victim—really,
anyone who knows a victim—should want better.
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III. LOOKING FORWARD
In offering a vision of government making genuine progress on
these challenges, I’m reminded of the bold government programs that are
today largely beyond dispute.
A century ago, the Pure Food and Drug Act sought to assure
accurate labeling, purity, and ultimately safety to products Americans
consume every day.15 By all accounts this seemed difficult at the time.
What stops a factory from changing its process or ingredients when the
inspector leaves? And who’s to say what consequences a drug might
entail years later. Yet today the FDA achieves substantial success, and
the problems of that era are delightfully in the past.
A generation later, the GI Bill of Rights stood for the principle
that after defending the nation, a serviceman deserved a quality
education and the reliable job it would usually bring.16 The next
generation established Medicare—a safety net to assure that our nation’s
elderly would get sustenance and medical care befitting the nation’s
prosperity.17 For both of these, there were serious questions about cost
and sustainability from the outset—but the moral imperative was clear,
and the projects went forward. I never discussed these subjects with
Barlow, and so far as I know he never wrote about them or spoke
publicly about them. But each of these programs faced genuine
challenges, arguably at least as fundamental as the technology
architecture Barlow considered so important. We should be emboldened
by our prior successes and no less willing to take on great challenges as
we look ahead.
Ultimately, we can’t have an important area of commercial and
social activity that is above the law. Barlow excitedly envisioned a tech
sector that was de facto above the law. The past twenty years, and
especially the past few, have shown why that’s every bit as dangerous as
it sounds. In Barlow’s honor, we should aspire for better.

15

See Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
See Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat.
284.
17
See Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §§ 1801–1844, 79 Stat.
286.
16
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John Perry Barlow was a seer as well as a great songwriter. His
provocative prose from The Economy of Ideas1 speaks to us today as
though it was written yesterday:
Throughout the time I’ve been groping around cyberspace, an
immense, unsolved conundrum has remained at the root of nearly
every legal, ethical, governmental, and social vexation to be found
in the Virtual World. I refer to the problem of digitized property.
The enigma is this: If our property can be infinitely reproduced and
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can
we protect it? How are we going to get paid for the work we do with
our minds? And if we can’t get paid, what will assure the continued
creation and distribution of such work?2

Twenty-five years after WIRED’s publication of Barlow’s poetically
prescient essay, the enigma of digitized property remains a serious
concern to many creators. Recording artists loudly complain that the
digital platforms that monetize their music are undercompensating them.3
Surveys of published authors report falling incomes from

†
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and Vice Chair of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (John Perry Barlow’s
successor in that role). I had the pleasure of serving on the EFF Board with
Barlow for almost 20 years.
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1
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994), also
available as Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global
Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019) (reprinted from ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (1993), https://www.eff.org/pages/selling-wine-without-bottleseconomy-mind-global-net (earlier version)).
2
Barlow, supra note 1, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8 (“The riddle is this
. . . .”). Google Scholar reports that this essay has been cited in 580 publications,
278 of which were in law review articles.
3
See, e.g., Charlotte Hassan, Reasons Why Some Artists Absolutely Hate Spotify,
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
2016/03/21/why-artists-pull-their-music-from-spotify-but-not-youtube/.
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commercializing their creative work.4 Layoffs of news reporters at both
conventional and digital newspapers are all too common.5 Peer-to-peer
file sharing of movies and music continues to be remarkably prevalent,6
notwithstanding prodigious efforts by entertainment industry groups to
curtail it through lawsuits and private enforcement arrangements with
Internet access providers.7 Photographers report widespread infringements of their works on the Internet.8 Software “piracy” remains at least
as rampant today as it was twenty-five years ago.9
Although Barlow predicted that copyright would not survive in
the digital age,10 Part I explains that legislatures in the U.S. and EU have
4

See, e.g., Six Takeaways from the Authors Guild 2018 Author Income Survey,
AUTHORS GUILD (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.authorsguild.org/industryadvocacy/six-takeaways-from-the-authors-guild-2018-authors-income-survey/.
5
See, e.g., Elizabeth Grieco et al., About a Third of Large U.S. Newspapers
Have Suffered Layoffs Since 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (July 23, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/23/about-a-third-of-large-u-snewspapers-have-suffered-layoffs-since-2017/.
6
See, e.g., File Sharing, TECXIPIO MAG., https://www.tecxipio.com/statisticsfile-sharing (last accessed Mar. 27, 2019) (reporting that an average of 28
million Internet users per day engage in peer-to-peer file sharing).
7
See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private
Ordering for Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 ORE. L. REV. 81, 101 (2010).
8
See, e.g., Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act of 2017:
Hearing on H.R. 3945 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong.
(2018) (statement of David P. Trust), https://uscopyrightreform.org/
202018/09/29/house-judiciary-committee-hearing-the-case-act-2017/.
9
Barlow, supra note 1, at 88, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 14. For an example
of recent estimates about software piracy, see Joseph Noonan, 2018 Revulytics
Software Piracy Statistics and Thoughts on the BSA Global Software Survey,
REVULYTICS BLOG (June 7, 2018), https://www.revulytics.com/blog/2018revulytics-software-piracy-statistics (estimating the commercial value of
unlicensed software at $46.3 billion).
10
John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, 8.10 WIRED 238, 242 (Oct.
2000), https://www.wired.com/2000/10/download/. A rich legal literature
emerged in the 1990s and 2000s that resonates with Barlow’s skepticism about
the future of copyright in the digital age and his celebration of free culture. See,
e.g., KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE, & JENNIFER JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW: TALES
FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2006); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008); THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2001);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); JESSICA
D. LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2000); SIVA VAIDYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS
AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT
THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001).
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sought to address the enigma of digitized property by strengthening
copyright rules and insisting that some previously unregulated uses must
be licensed. That Part also discusses Barlow’s cry for Internet freedoms,
some of which have been echoed by commentators in the EU and U.S. in
reaction to stricter copyright rules. Part II explores some ideas Barlow
had about how the digitized property enigma might be addressed without
tightening copyright rules. He had confidence that creative people would
figure out ways to thrive in the economy of ideas. Part III provides
evidence that the entertainment, book publishing, and other conventional
copyright industries have indeed found ways to overcome the enigma of
digitized property. New economies of creativity have emerged that
Barlow would have celebrated.

I. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO BOLSTER COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN
THE DIGITAL AGE
Legislatures in the U.S. and EU have responded to copyright
owner claims about losses due to unauthorized online uses of their works
by proposing or enacting new laws. A recent U.S. example is the Music
Modernization Act (MMA) which established a revised framework for
compulsory licensing of recorded music by online digital services such
as Pandora.11 The MMA also extended federal protection to sound
recordings produced prior to 1972, which had previously been protected
only by state laws.12 Congress has also considered legislation to allow
copyright owners to bring small claims to a review board in the
Copyright Office to get compensation for online infringements that now
go unremedied because of the high costs of litigation.13
11

See Pub. L. No. 115-264, — Stat. — (2018), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
115th-congress/house-bill/1551/text. For a discussion of how the MMA changed
the regulation of sound recording copyright rules and licensing framework, see
Tyler Ochoa, An Analysis of Titles I and III of the Music Modernization Act,
Part 2 of 2, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2019/01/an-analysis-of-title-i-and-title-iiiof-the-music-modernization-act-part-2-of-2-guest-blog-post.htm.
12
For an explanation of the part of the MMA that deals with pre-1972
recordings, see Tyler Ochoa, An Analysis of Title II of Public Law 115-264: The
Classics Protection and Access Act, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Oct. 28,
2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/10/an-analysis-of-title-ii-ofpublic-law-115-264-the-classics-protection-and-access-act-guest-blog-post.htm.
13
Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement (CASE) Act, H.R. 3945,
115th Cong. (2017). For a discussion of the main features of this Act, see
generally Pamela Samuelson & Kathryn Hashimoto, Scholarly Concerns About
a Proposed Copyright Small Claims Tribunal, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 689
(2018).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

106

A far more ambitious and far-reaching initiative is the Council of
the European Union’s proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital
Single Market (DSM).14 Article 11 of this Directive (sometimes known
as the “link tax” provision) would create a new set of exclusive rights for
EU press publishers to control online reproductions and distributions of
more than a few words from the contents of their sites.15 Article 13
(sometimes known as the “upload filter” provision) would impose new
obligations on Internet content sharing sites (such as YouTube) to block
uploads of digital content unless the upload files were either licensed or
otherwise known to be non-infringing.16 Failure to comply with this
blocking obligation would result in the sites being directly liable for any
user infringements.17 Article 13 represents a stark break from the “notice
and takedown” rules adopted in the late 1990s that provided Internet
service providers (ISPs) with a safe harbor from liability for user
infringements of which they were unaware or unable to control.18 The
main goal of these significant expansions of ISP liability rules is to give
European content owners greater leverage to induce the content sharing
14

Council of the EU, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market—Outcome of
Proceedings, ST 6637 2019 INIT (Feb. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Proposed DSM
Directive], https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6637-2019INIT/en/pdf. As of this writing, the European Commission, Council, and
Parliament completed a “trilogue” on a final text for this Directive, which the
European Parliament approved in March 2019 and the EU Council adopted in
April 2019. Article 11 is now Article 15; Article 13 is now Article 17. See,
Carlton Daniel, What to Make of the European Directive on Copyright in the
Digital Single Market, THE HILL (Apr. 25, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/
opinion/technology/440683-what-to-make-of-the-european-directive-oncopyright-in-the-digital-single. The final step is for each member state of the EU
to transpose the Directive into its national laws by 2021. See Eleanora Rosati,
BREAKING: Council Adopts DSM Directive, IPKAT (Apr. 15, 2019),
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/04/breaking-council-adopts-dsmdirective.html. Some parts of this article’s discussion of the DSM Directive are
drawn from Pamela Samuelson, Questioning a New Intellectual Property Right
for Press Publishers, 61 COMM. ACM 20 (Mar. 2019) and Pamela Samuelson,
The EU’s Controversial Digital Single Market Directive, 60 COMM. ACM 20
(Nov. 2018).
15
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 14, art. 11.
16
Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 14, art. 13.
17
Id.
18
Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 13; 17
U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012).
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platforms to license EU digital contents or face large damage awards in
court.19
Barlow would have been among the fiercest critics of these new
liability rules had he lived just a little bit longer. As he wrote in The
Economy of Ideas:
[W]hen the primary articles of commerce in a society look so much
like speech as to be indistinguishable from it, and when the
traditional methods of protecting their ownership have become
ineffectual, attempting to fix the problem with broader and more
vigorous enforcement will inevitably threaten freedom of speech.
The greatest constraint on your future liberties may come not from
government but from corporate legal departments laboring to
protect by force what can no longer be protected by practical
efficiency or general social consent.20

Barlow back then believed that “digital technology [was] erasing the
legal jurisdictions of the physical world and replacing them with the
unbounded and perhaps permanently lawless waves of cyberspace.”21
But initiatives such as the DSM Directive vividly demonstrate that
conventional copyright industries, their lobbyists, and governments that
attend to these industries’ concerns are determined to make and enforce
strict copyright rules that will tame the electronic frontier that Barlow so
cherished and championed.
Barlow would have been heartened, though, by the many
European scholars who have taken up the freedom of expression banner
he waved so vigorously way back when. In April 2018, for example, a
group of 169 IP academics sent a Statement to the EU Parliament

19

Articles 11 and 13 are not the only articles of the DSM Directive that aim to
enhance licensing of EU creative contents and ensure that authors and other
rights holders have more opportunities to receive compensation for their
creations or databases. See, e.g., Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 14, art. 7
(providing framework for licensing of out-of-commerce works); Proposed DSM
Directive, supra note 14, arts. 14–16 (aiming to facilitate fair remuneration for
authors and performers).
20
Barlow, supra note 1, at 86, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 11.
21
Barlow, supra note 1, at 86, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 12 (“digital
technology is also erasing the legal jurisdictions . . . .”). For a legal analysis that
resonated with Barlow’s conception, see generally David R. Johnson and David
G. Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367 (1996) (suggesting that cyberspace should be regarded as its own
jurisdiction).
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strongly opposing Article 11.22 These academics believe that Article 11
would likely impede the free flow of news and other information vital to
a democratic society, would harm journalists and others involved with
news-related content, and would create uncertainty about the Article’s
coverage and scope.23 Also unclear was how the new publisher right
would interact with existing copyright laws, which typically allow for
fair quotations, and database rights, which allow extractions of
insubstantial parts of database contents.24
Signatories of this Statement were also unpersuaded by the
economic argument for Article 11.25 A new press publisher right would
considerably increase transaction costs as well as exacerbate existing
power asymmetries in media markets. There was “no indication
whatsoever that the proposed right will produce the positive results it is
supposed to.”26 Moreover, “considering current high levels of market
concentration on online advertising markets and in media, a publishers’
right may well backfire: further strengthening the power of media
conglomerates and of global platforms to the detriment of smaller
players.”27
Another report on Article 11 observed that online journalists
perceive the new right as a threat to the nature of news communication in

22

Marco Ricolfi, Raquel Xalabarder & Mirelle van Eechoud, Academics Against
Press Publishers’ Right, INST. FOR INFO. LAW (2018),
https://www.ivir.nl/academics-against-press-publishers-right/. See also MAX
PLANCK INST. FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, Position Statement on
Proposed Modernisation of European Copyright Rules, Part E Protection of
Press Publications Concerning Digital Uses,
https://www.ip.mpg.de/fileadmin/ipmpg/content/stellungnahmen/MPI_Position_
Statement_PART_E_Publishers_2017_02_21_RMH_VM-def-1.pdf; Martin
Kretschmer et al., The European Commission’s Public Consultation on the Role
of Publishers in the Copyright Value Chain: A Response by the European
Copyright Society, 38 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 591 (2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2801595.
23
Ricolfi et al., supra note 22.
24
Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L. 167) 10, 16; Directive
96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the
Legal Protection of Databases art. 8, 1996 O.J. (L. 77) 20, 26.
25
Ricolfi et al., supra note 22.
26
Id.
27
Id.
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the modern era: “Paying for links is as absurd as paying for citations in
the academy would be.”28
Even more dangerous for freedom of expression on the Internet
is Article 13. Critics have argued that Article 13 would effectively
mandate monitoring and filtering across all platforms, violating user
privacy and free speech interests as automated systems would be obliged
to scan all content and block even legitimate, noninfringing uses of
copyrighted works such as quotations and parodies.29 Article 13 also
raises competition concerns, as it would likely favor and entrench major
existing platforms, which already have or can afford to implement the
necessary surveillance and filtering technologies, while disadvantaging
smaller and newer entrants to the market.30
Dozens of European intellectual property (IP) scholars have
written articles criticizing the Article 13 filtering mandate on various
grounds, including the threat it poses for freedom of expression on the
Internet.31 Among the prominent critics of Article 13 is David Kaye, the
United Nation’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, who
wrote a nine-page letter explaining why Article 13 is inconsistent with
EU’s commitments under international human rights instruments.32 In
28

LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF PRESS PUBLISHERS
AND AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS IN THE COPYRIGHT DIRECTIVE: A STUDY
COMMISSIONED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 34 (2017) (internal quotes
omitted), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/596810/
IPOL_STU%282017%29596810_EN.pdf.
29
See, e.g., Benjamin Austin, Proposed EU Copyright Directive Poses Risks to
Free Expression, Consumer Privacy, and Competition, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE
(June 12, 2018), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/proposedeu-copyright-directive-poses-risks-to-free-expression-consumer-pri.
30
Id.
31
See Article 13 Research: Studies, Opinions and Sources of Data, CREATE
(UK Copyright and Creative Economy Centre: Univ. of Glasgow),
https://www.create.ac.uk/policy-responses/eu-copyright-reform/article-13research/ (listing critiques of Article 13); see, e.g., Martin Senftleben et al., The
Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Fundamental Rights and the Open
Internet in the Framework of the EU Copyright Reform, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 149 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3054967.
32
David Kaye (Special Rapporteur), Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 7–8,
U.N. Doc. OL OTH 41/2018 (June 13, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-OTH-41-2018.pdf (detailing specific
concerns and concluding that “I am very seriously concerned that the proposed
Directive would establish a regime of active monitoring and prior censorship of
user-generated content that is inconsistent with Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.”).
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addition, Tim Berners-Lee, Vint Cerf, and numerous other Internet
pioneers signed an open letter urging the EU Parliament to drop Article
13:
By requiring Internet platforms to perform automatic filtering [on]
all of the content that their users upload, Article 13 takes an
unprecedented step towards the transformation of the Internet from
an open platform for sharing and innovation, into a tool for the
automated surveillance and control of its users.33

More than 145 civil society organizations have expressed opposition to
adoption of Article 13,34 as have more than 5 million people who signed
a petition against it.35
Copyright industry lobbying groups, however, have succeeded in
persuading EU policymakers to maintain and even strengthen the new
rules that will impose strict infringement liability on websites that allow
users to upload contents.36 Whether Articles 11 and 13 will achieve the
intended goal of boosting compensation to EU content providers from
Internet platforms remains to be seen.
Google and Facebook are among the most obvious targets of
these new regulations. While these firms may ultimately decide against
licensing uses of EU contents,37 at least they can afford to pay such fees
33

Letter from Vint Cerf et al. to Antonio Tajani, President of the European
Parliament (June 12, 2018), https://www.eff.org/files/2018/06/12/article13
letter.pdf. See also Rhett Jones, The Founding Fathers of the Internet Plead with
EU to Squash Its Bad Copyright Bill, GIZMODO (June 13, 2018, 11:57 AM),
https://gizmodo.com/the-founding-fathers-of-the-internet-plead-with-eu-to-s1826792360.
34
See, e.g., Open Letter to Member of the European Parliament, https://
copybuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Copyright-Open-Letter-on-EPPlenary-Vote-on-Negotiation-Mandate.pdf. See also ASS’N FOR PROGRESSIVE
COMMC’NS, Call to Members of the European Parliament: Open Letter on the
EU Copyright Reform (July 2018), https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/call-memberseuropean-parliament-open-letter-eu-copyright-reform.
35
See, e.g., Foo Yun Chee, EU Lawmakers to Vote on Copyright Overhaul Next
Tuesday, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-eu-copyright/eu-lawmakers-to-vote-on-copyright-overhaul-next-tuesdayidUSKCN1R228Z (linking to the change.org online petition with more than 5
million signatures).
36
Cory Doctorow, The Final Version of the EU’s Copyright Directive Is the
Worst One Yet, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2019/02/final-version-eus-copyright-directive-worst-one-yet.
37
See, e.g., Matthew Karnitschnig & Chris Spillane, Plan to Make Google Pay
for News Hits Rocks, POLITICO (Feb. 15, 2017, 7:36 PM),
https://www.politico.eu/article/plan-to-make-google-pay-for-news-hits-rocks-
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if they decide that doing so is their best option. Smaller online services
are likely to be much more constrained.
TechDirt, for example, a prominent site for online technology
news and commentary, doubts that it can continue publishing in the EU:
Article 13 makes a commenting system untenable, as we simply
cannot setup [sic] a filter that will block people from uploading
copyright-covered content. Article 11 potentially makes our posts
untenable, since we frequently quote other news sites in order to
comment on them . . . .38

TechDirt notes that the goal of those who support Articles 11 and 13
is not just to close the (made up, mythical) “value gap.” It is to
fundamentally change the internet away from an open system of
communications—one that anyone can use to bypass traditional
gatekeepers, to a closed “broadcast” system, in which key legacy
gatekeepers control access to the public, via a complicated set of
licenses that strip all of the benefits and profits from the system.39

TechDirt perceives Articles 11 and 13 to have serious negative
implications for the general public as well as for individual creators:
Not only will [these new rules] do great harm to the general public’s
ability to communicate freely over the internet, it will do massive
harm to artists and creators—especially more independent ones,
who will be effectively blocked from using these platforms to
connect directly with their fans. Rather they will be required to go
through “licensed” intermediaries, who will demand a huge cut of
any money. In other words, it’s a return to the pre-internet days,
where if you wanted to become a professional creator, your only
options were to sign away all your rights to giant conglomerate
record labels/studios/publishers.40

Barlow would have been appalled at the curtailment of freedom of
expression and access to knowledge on the Internet that Articles 11 and
13 will almost certainly bring about.
copyright-reform-european-commission/ (noting Google refused to license
contents from Spanish and German rights holders when those countries adopted
Article 11-like press publisher rights).
38
Mike Masnick, EU Moves Forward with Agreement to Fundamentally
Change the Internet from Open to Closed, TECHDIRT (Feb. 14, 2019, 2:10 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190213/12071341588/eu-moves-forwardwith-agreement-to-fundamentally-change-internet-open-to-closed.shtml.
39
Id.
40
Id.
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The EU’s adoption of Article 13 will undoubtedly embolden
copyright industries with a global reach to try to export that mandate to
other countries. The next target will likely be the U.S. Copyright Office,
which has been considering whether to recommend changes to the safe
harbor rules Congress adopted in 1998 for ISPs.41 Under current law,
ISPs are not liable for user infringements unless copyright owners
provide them with specific notice about the presence of infringing
materials on their sites and the ISPs fail to promptly take down the
infringing materials.42 The U.S. safe harbor rules have, in the view of
many, supported freedom of expression on the Internet to a considerable
degree.43 Barlow would have considered it a great tragedy for freedom of
information, speech, and expression on the Internet if Congress abandons
these safe harbors and adopts an EU-style filtering mandate in the
misguided hope that doing so would solve the enigma of digitized
property, as Barlow so eloquently phrased it.

II. JOHN PERRY BARLOW’S IDEAS FOR ADDRESSING THE ENIGMA OF
DIGITIZED PROPERTY
Barlow may have been insightful enough to recognize the
enigma of digitized property a quarter of a century ago, but he was not
enough of a prophet to articulate a framework for a comprehensive
solution. Yet, The Economy of Ideas offered some thoughts about
plausible strategies. He perceived, for example, the emergence of “a
parallel economy developing, mostly among small, fast moving
enterprises who protect their ideas by getting into the marketplace
quicker than their larger competitors” such as incumbent industries “who
base their protection on fear and litigation.”44 First-mover advantages
have indeed proven very important to attaining competitive advantage in
the software industry.45 Barlow recognized that “people seem to
eventually buy the software they really use. Once a program becomes
41

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECTION 512 STUDY, https://www.copyright.gov/
policy/section512/.
42
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012).
43
See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment Letter on Section 512
Study before the U.S. Copyright Office (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.eff.org/files/
2016/04/01/eff_comments_512_study_4.1.2016.pdf; Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Additional Comment Letter on Section 512 Study before the U.S.
Copyright Office (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.eff.org/files/2017/02/22/20157_additional_comments_of_eff_512_study.pdf.
44
Barlow, supra note 1, at 88–89, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 16.
45
Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1255, 1289–90 (2009).
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central to your work, you want the latest version of it, the best support,
the actual manuals, all privileges attached to ownership.”46 The software
industry has been very creative over the years in finding ways to
monetize its digitized property.47
Unsurprisingly, Barlow offered his experience with the Grateful
Dead, the rock band for whom he often wrote songs, as an example of
how creators can achieve success by encouraging fans to make and share
copies of their creations.48 The Dead used this strategy of allowing their
fans to freely record the band’s live performances to become “the largest
concert draw in America.”49 Creators who can build relationships with
consumers find ways to get paid. Doctors, lawyers, architects, and
consultants, for instance, “are already being paid directly for their
intellectual property. Who needs copyright when you’re on a retainer?”50
More generally, Barlow thought that the ability to monetize
creations would depend on “the quality of performance, the uniqueness
of your point of view, the validity of your expertise, its relevance to your
market, and underlying everything, the ability of that market to access
your creative services swiftly, conveniently and interactively.”51 A point
of view, Barlow observed, “is an asset which cannot be stolen or
duplicated.”52
Barlow was skeptical, though, about crypto bottling of digital
content as a solution to the digitized property enigma.53 In the years after
his WIRED article, copyright industries, such as producers of motion
pictures and sellers of e-books, have employed technical protection
measures (TPMs) to enable them to sell digital copies without undue risk
that those digital copies would “leak” and lead to mass infringements.54
To provide legal reinforcement for these TPM protections, Congress
enacted laws to outlaw bypassing of copyright-protective TPMs as well
46

Barlow, supra note 1, at 128, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 25.
See, e.g., James Bessen & Walter Frick, How Software Is Helping Big
Companies Dominate, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/11/how-software-is-helping-big-companies-dominate
(explaining how software enables companies to spread into different areas and
creates new business models).
48
See Barlow, supra note 1, at 126, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 21.
49
Id.
50
Barlow, supra note 1, at 128, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 26.
51
Barlow, supra note 1, at 128, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 27.
52
Barlow, supra note 1, at 126, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 22.
53
See Barlow, supra note 1, at 129, 18 DUKE L. & TECH . REV. at 27–29.
54
See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 96, 102 (2010) (describing content owners’ use of TPMs).
47
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as the development and dissemination of tools to bypass the TPMs.55
Barlow’s prediction that crypto bottles would fail was, it seems, off the
mark. Consumers have adjusted to TPMs more than might have seemed
likely in 1994.56
Barlow circled back to the digital property enigma in a second
WIRED article, The Next Economy of Ideas, in 2000.57 This article
discussed the “paradigm-shattering” Napster phenomenon.58 Millions of
Internet users downloaded Napster’s client-side software and used it to
interact with Napster’s server-side search and directory functions to
share many billions of copies of popular music with one another.59
“[T]he geriatrics of the entertainment industry,” Barlow observed,
“didn’t see this coming. They figured the Internet was about as much of a
threat to their infotainment empire as ham radio was to NBC. Even after
that assumption was creamed, they remained as serene as sunning
crocodiles.”60 These crocodiles, however, didn’t stay serene for very
long. They sued Napster for contributory copyright infringement and
were able to get an injunction to shut down that service.61
That injunction notwithstanding, Barlow articulated three
significant problems for the recording industry: first, network-based
technologies such as Napster gave ordinary people “distributive power
equal to Time Warner’s,”62 second, users of these technologies “don’t
give a flying byte about the existing legal battlements,”63 and third, “[n]o
law can be successfully imposed on a huge population that does not

55

17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012). The origins of this legislation are discussed in
LITMAN, supra note 10, at 136–45. For critical commentary on these anticircumvention rules, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the
Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised,
14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).
56
For an informative discussion of TPMs used to protect copyrights, see, for
example, JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, TECHNOLOGICAL COMPLEMENTS TO
COPYRIGHT (2005).
57
See Barlow, supra note 10. For a discussion about consumer issues with
technically protected content, see, for example, NATALI HELBERGER ET AL.,
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND CONSUMER ACCEPTABILITY (Dec. 2004),
https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/INDICAREStateoftheArtReport.pdf.
58
Barlow, supra note 10, at 240.
59
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.
2001).
60
Barlow, supra note 10, at 240.
61
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019, 1029.
62
Barlow, supra note 10, at 240.
63
Id.
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morally support it and possesses easy means for its invisible evasion.”64
Barlow was confident that “[t]he future will win; there will be no
property in cyberspace.”65
Initially seeming to bear out Barlow’s prediction, a number of
more decentralized peer-to-peer file sharing technologies were developed
to enable ordinary music lovers to continue file sharing to their heart’s
content. Although some of these services were also shut down by
copyright injunctions,66 the BitTorrent protocol has enabled file sharing
to continue apace.67 Barlow would not have been surprised at estimates
that more than 27.4 million people worldwide engaged in file sharing on
a daily basis in 2017.68
As an alternative to the seemingly ubiquitous file sharing
phenomenon, Apple persuaded the recording industry to license digital
music to Apple’s iTunes service so that consumers who wanted to
lawfully acquire music could do so conveniently and at a modest pricepoint.69 Spotify, Pandora, and TIDAL are among the entities that have
subsequently obtained licenses to popular recorded music.70 Spotify
alone has about 200 million active monthly users, of whom

64

Id.
Id. at 241.
66
See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Inc., 518 F. Supp.
2d 1197, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 2007). For a discussion of why Grokster was not as
much of a win for MGM as it had hoped, see Pamela Samuelson, Three
Reactions to the Grokster Decision, 13 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 177
(2006).
67
See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1026–28 (9th Cir.
2013) (explaining BitTorrent’s architecture and how it can be used to engage in
infringing conduct).
68
File Sharing Landscape 2017: Where Did Peer-to-Peer Network Users Share
Which Files During 2017?, TECXIPIO MAG. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.
tecxipio.com/single-post/file-sharing-in-peer-to-peer-networks-2017; see
generally MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011)
(reporting on international studies of media piracy, recommending against heavy
enforcement of copyrights).
69
See, e.g., Steve Knopper, iTunes’ 10th Anniversary: How Steve Jobs Turned
the Industry Upside Down, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 26, 2013, 6:45 PM),
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/itunes-10th-anniversaryhow-steve-jobs-turned-the-industry-upside-down-68985/.
70
See, e.g., Craig Grannell, A History of Music Streaming, DYNAUDIO (May 16,
2018), https://www.dynaudio.com/dynaudio-academy/2018/may/a-history-ofmusic-streaming.
65
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approximately 91 million pay for the service.71 The upshot is that
hundreds of millions of users now have lawful access to an almost
unimaginably rich array of digital music through these licensed services.
Others, of course, continue to prefer to obtain the music they love
through file sharing.
Barlow’s prediction that Napster was going to spell the death of
copyright72 may have been wrong, but that industry weathered the
Napster and subsequent file sharing storms only by making considerable
adjustments to their business models and providing consumers with a
wider array of content at more reasonable prices and with fewer technical
restrictions than the industry would have preferred in the immediate
aftermath of the Napster case.

III. THE SKY IS RISING: THE NEW ECONOMY OF IDEAS IS THRIVING
In The Next Economy of Ideas, Barlow predicted that creators
would find innovative ways to be rewarded for their works in the new
economy: “artists and writers of the future will adapt to practical
possibility. Many have already done so. They are, after all, creative
people.”73 He foresaw a creative milieu in cyberspace in which corporate
interests would exercise less control and barriers to entry would be low.
Barlow imagined a future of creative output and compensation as part of
a larger and more fertile digital ecosystem, available to all. “We can
enter into a convenient and interactive relationship with audiences, who,
being human, will be far more ethically inclined to pay us than the
moguls ever were. What could be a stronger incentive to create than
that?”74
Yet, even conventional copyright industries have been thriving
as never before. Although the Recording Industry of America
Association may have been convinced that the “easy availability of freely
downloadable commercial songs will bring on the apocalypse,”75
empirical data in 2000 showed that “during the two years since MP3
music began flooding the Net, CD sales have risen by 20 percent.”76
Several economic studies from the 2010s bear out Barlow’s skepticism
71

Daniel Sanchez, Spotify Now Has 200 Million Monthly Active Users, But How
Many of Them Are Paying?, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www
.digitalmusicnews.com/2019/01/11/spotify-200-million-monthly-active-users/.
72
Barlow, supra note 10, at 240.
73
Id. at 252.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 241.
76
Id.
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about the “death knell” warnings from legacy industries77 that
technological change would cause the destruction or decline of most
cultural businesses. These studies show that digitization has ushered in a
thriving new creative economy and indeed, a “golden age” of creativity,
bringing new products to market and enabling new revenue
opportunities. One report published in 2012 stated that the value of the
worldwide entertainment industry had grown from $449 billion to $745
billion between 1998 and 2010.78 Moreover, the share of U.S. household
spending on entertainment from 2000 to 2008 had increased 15 percent,
and new content creation overall ballooned.79 A 2014 update of this
report, focusing on the U.S. market, confirmed the continued growth of
creative outputs among a more diverse array of independent creators,80
just as Barlow had predicted. In the digital age, music, video, and books
can be produced and distributed by almost anyone who has access to a
computer and an internet connection.
Statistics bear out that the entertainment industry is growing both
in terms of revenue and quantity of content. According to the latest
iteration of this report, “[t]he internet has provided new tools and
services that have enabled more creation, more distribution, more
promotion, more access to fans and more ways to make money than ever
before.”81 Looking specifically at four sectors—music, film and video,
77

See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, No, RIAA, It’s Not the End of the World for
Musicians, 83 UMKC L. REV. 287, 287–88 (2014) (describing dire statements
made by music industry representatives). See also supra notes 3–9.
78
MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 2 (2012 ed.) [hereinafter SKY
IS RISING 2012], https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising/ (drawing upon data
compiled from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), iDATE, and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
79
Id. at 2–3.
80
MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 4–5, 26 (2014 ed.)
[hereinafter SKY IS RISING 2014], https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising2014/.
Two additional reports by the same authors looked, respectively, at similar
patterns in Europe and the luxury goods market online. See MICHAEL MASNICK
& MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: REGIONAL STUDY (2013),
https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising2/ (analyzing six European countries);
MICHAEL MASNICK & MICHAEL HO, THE SKY IS RISING: LUXURY GOODS
(2014), https://www.techdirt.com/skyisrising/luxury.
81
MICHAEL MASNICK & LEIGH BEADON, THE SKY IS RISING; A DETAILED LOOK
AT THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 2 (2019 ed.) [hereinafter SKY
IS RISING 2019], https://skyisrising.com/TheSkyIsRising2019.pdf. See also
Carrier, supra note 77, at 297–98 (describing Kickstarter, “which, as of
November 2014, raised $1 billion from more than 7 million people to fund
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books, and video games—the report found that much more content is
being produced, the industries are growing, and the internet is largely
responsible for the growth.82 The report describes the following success
stories in the creative economy:
•

music: sources show an increased number of new music
releases, by more artists, and more ways for fans to
consume their music and support them;83

•

video entertainment: new and traditional forms of video,
including television, film, online streaming services, and
user-generated content, are seeing a significant expansion
in investment, content creation, and consumer
consumption;84

•

books, ebooks, and audio books: more than ever before,
books of all types—digital and print, in the U.S. and
elsewhere—are being published (including a growing selfpublishing industry) with a wide array of consumer access
opportunities;85

•

video games: with the rise of the mobile gaming market,
live game streaming, and e-sports events, online gaming
appears to be rapidly expanding, with even more exciting
creative possibilities ahead.86

Furthermore, content industries—even those that were struggling
earlier—are all now thriving. According to the 2019 report, global
73,000 creative products.”); Steven Johnson, The Creative Apocalypse That
Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 19, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/magazine/the-creative-apocalypse-thatwasnt.html?_r=1 (“Writers, performers, directors and even musicians report
their economic fortunes to be similar to those of their counterparts 15 years ago,
and in many cases they have improved. Against all odds, the voices of the artists
seem to be louder than ever.”).
82
SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 4.
83
Id. at 5–12. See also GLYNN S. LUNNEY, JR., COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY
AND MUSIC IN THE U.S. RECORDING INDUSTRY (2018) (correlating the rise of file
sharing and decline in recorded music sales with the creation of more new
music).
84
SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 13–24.
85
Id. at 25–31. See also JOEL WALDFOGEL, DIGITAL RENAISSANCE: WHAT DATA
AND ECONOMICS TELL US ABOUT THE FUTURE OF POPULAR CULTURE 133
(2018) (“Between 2006 and 2015, the number of new self-published e-books
rose from essentially zero to just over 150,000 titles per year.”).
86
SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 32–40.
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entertainment and media revenues hit the $1.88 trillion mark in 2017;
experts predict these industries will reach $2.2 trillion in 2021 and
continue to grow 4 to 5 percent beyond that. The sky indeed appears to
be rising in the age of online creativity and prosperity, just as Barlow had
imagined.
Economist Joel Waldfogel has been studying data on the impact
of digital technology for creative industries for over a decade. His recent
book reports on sales data and critics’ and users’ reviews and “best of”
lists, from which he ascertained that digitization has reduced production
costs for creative output and distribution, yet the quality of content has
remained high.87 Although Waldfogel acknowledges that certain tradeoffs occurred, including initial revenue reductions in some legacy media
sectors, he concludes that a net gain has resulted from the increased
number and quality of new products created:
While declining revenues are creating real pain for many creators
and intermediaries, the volume of new materials created, and the
apparent satisfaction that consumers and critics derive from the new
content, are both very high by historical standards. So the first
takeaway is that we are living through a digital renaissance.88

Other studies have reached similar conclusions. Focusing on independent
creators who have posted their works on nine online platforms, a 2018
ReCreate study found that the internet had enabled a substantial infusion
of new creators developing new works, often interacting directly with
their audiences and earning revenues from online posting activities
without the need to rely on traditional gatekeepers such as book
publishers, record labels, and movie studios.89 That study reported that an
estimated 14.8 million Americans posted their works on Amazon, eBay,
Etsy, Instagram, Shapeways, Tumblr, Twitch, WordPress, and YouTube
in 2016 and earned approximately $5.9 billion from commercializing
their online contents.90 Moreover, the number of such creators in 2017

87

Waldfogel, supra note 85.
Id. at 252–53.
89
ROBERT SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, UNLOCKING THE GATES:
AMERICA’S NEW CREATIVE ECONOMY 3 (2018),
https://www.recreatecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ReCreate-NewCreative-Economy-Study-Report-508.pdf; see also Carrier, supra note 77, at
287 (“[I]nnovations in technology have made it easier for musicians to
participate in every step of the creation, development, and marketing process.
And . . . forg[e] stronger connections with their fans.”).
90
SHAPIRO & ANEJA, supra note 89, at 3.
88
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grew to 16.9 million (+16.6%) and total revenues to $6.8 billion
(+14.8%).91
Still other studies confirm Barlow’s anecdotal observation that
live performances would complement recorded music, importantly
contributing to the financial well-being of musicians.92 Concert revenues
and ticket prices have continued to rise in the digital era:
Concert revenues continue to be a bright spot for the music
industry, as the North American concert industry grossed a recordbreaking $5.1 billion in 2013, . . . PwC estimated the U.S. concert
business at $8.61 billion for 2013, growing to $9.2 billion in 2014
with a compound annual growth rate of 3% through 2017. The
actual scarcity for seeing a musical performance live appears to be a
healthy and sustainable practice for the foreseeable future.93

Moreover, employment in the U.S. entertainment sector increased by
nearly 20 percent between 1998 to 2008.94 Another study by the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) found that wage trends for
creative workers in the digital age in several countries generally

91

ROBERT SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, TAKING ROOT: THE GROWTH OF
AMERICA’S NEW CREATIVE ECONOMY 2 (2019),
https://www.recreatecoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ReCreate-2017New-Creative-Economy-Study.pdf. The study also surmised that additional (and
as-yet unreported) income will have derived from mobile traffic directed from
social media. Id. at 3; see also Giancarlo F. Frosio, Digital Piracy Debunked: A
Short Note on Digital Threats and Intermediary Liability, 5 INTERNET POL’Y
REV. 1, 9 (2016), https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/digital-piracydebunked-short-note-digital-threats-and-intermediaryliability#footnoteref16_g7fp0et (describing increased numbers of independent
artists and labels in the current music industry).
92
See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
93
SKY IS RISING 2014, supra note 80, at 7; see also Carrier, supra note 77, at
299 (noting that “[t]ours also offer the opportunity for sponsorship deals that, in
the aggregate, are worth billions” including other complements such as apparel);
Frosio, supra note 91 (citing studies showing that sales of high-priced
complements has added to artists’ incomes); Joel Waldfogel, How Digitization
Has Created a Golden Age of Music, Movies, Books, and Television, 31 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 195, 211 (Summer 2017) (citing studies correlating
digitization with increased concert ticket sales and ticket prices).
94
SKY IS RISING 2012, supra note 78, at 2. Following the U.S. recession in late
2008, employment reportedly rose again in some entertainment industries. See
SKY IS RISING 2019, supra note 81, at 9–10 (music); id. at 19 (television and
cable TV).
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outperformed other occupations.95 Based on these findings, the study
concluded:
From a policy perspective, these results do not lend support to the
idea that creators’ income situation has systematically worsened
with the rise of the internet and its intermediaries, as argued by
some commentators in ‘value gap’ discussions. The income changes
creators experience over time are not aligned with general trends in
the total population: we see creators losing less or even gaining a
better income position in relative terms.96

Although the recent studies discussed above have focused
mainly on major entertainment industries (i.e., movies, television, books,
music, and video games), digitization has had profound impacts on other
significant industries, and none more so than computer software. In The
Next Economy of Ideas, Barlow remarked that the software industry,
despite “widespread piracy” was “booming.”97 Why? Barlow asked.
“Because the more a program is pirated, the more likely it is to become a
standard.”98 Barlow thus concluded from this and other examples that
“[n]oncommercial distribution of information increases the sale of
commercial information. Abundance breeds abundance . . . . And nothing
makes you famous faster than an audience willing to distribute your
work for free.”99
Despite the continued prevalence of software piracy, a 2017
report from the Business Software Alliance estimated the software
industry had directly contributed $564.4 billion to the annual U.S. GDP,
with a total value-added to GDP, including indirect impacts, in excess of
a trillion dollars a year.100 It also reported significant job growth of 2.9
million jobs (10.5 million jobs including indirect impacts), which
represents a 14.6 percent increase since 2014.101 Software-as-a-service
(SaaS) operating in the “cloud” is an increasingly successful business

95

Alexander Cuntz, Creators’ Income Situation in the Digital Age (WIPO,
Economic Research Working Paper No. 49, Dec. 2018), http://www.
lisdatacenter.org/wps/liswps/755.pdf.
96
Id.
97
Barlow, supra note 10, at 241.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 241–42.
100
See The Growing $1 Trillion Economic Impact of Software, BSA FOUND.
(Sep. 2017), https://software.org/reports/2017-us-software-impact/ (based on
2016 figures).
101
Id.
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model for software companies, one that isn’t vulnerable to software
piracy.102
In the 1990s, there was considerable skepticism about the
commercial viability of an open source sector of the software industry,103
perhaps in part because the open-source software movement seemed to
exemplify the open, collaborative spirit that Barlow celebrated in his
essays. Yet, somehow and quite remarkably, free and open-source
software has become a major force in the industry, not only as an
accepted norm in enterprise computing environments, but also through
the evolution of financially viable business models.104 The Linux
operating system is perhaps the highest profile example of community
developed open-source software,105 but millions more such projects are
ongoing today.106 Mainstream global corporations, such as IBM, Adobe,
and Google, are contributing substantial resources in support of Linux
and other open-source projects.107 Indeed, IBM recently made a $34
102

Cory Capoccia, The Final Frontier for SaaS Is CRM for Main Street, FORBES
(Feb. 22, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/02/22/the-final-frontierfor-saas-is-crm-for-main-street/#c605b2188cc9 (forecasting the global SaaS
market to reach $186 billion by 2024); see also Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy
Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1779
(2011) (discussing software-as-a-service and cloud computing).
103
See, e.g., Matt Germonprez et al., Open Source Communities of Competitors,
20 INTERACTIONS 54, 54 (Nov–Dec 2013); Samuelson, supra note 102, at 1777–
78.
104
See, e.g., STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004); Katherine
Noyes, Open Source Software Is Now a Norm in Businesses, PC WORLD (May
18, 2011, 10:07 AM),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/228136/open_source_software_now_a_norm_i
n_businesses.html; Max Schireson & Dharmesh Thakker, The Money in OpenSource Software, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016
/02/09/the-money-in-open-source-software/.
105
See, e.g., Paul Venezia, Linux at 25: How Linux Changed the World,
INFOWORLD (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3109204/
linux-at-25-how-linux-changed-the-world.html.
106
For example, GitHub, a software development platform, reported hosting 31
million developers and 96 million repositories in 2018. See The State of the
Octoverse 2018, GITHUB BLOG (Oct. 16, 2018), https://github.blog/2018-10-16state-of-the-octoverse/.
107
See, e.g., Sid Sijbrandij, How Open Source Became the Default Business
Model for Software, FORBES (Jul. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/16/how-open-sourcebecame-the-default-business-model-for-software/#62fcdb974e72 (noting open
source investments by Google, Facebook, and Adobe, among others); see also
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billion offer to buy Red Hat, a leading firm that supplies Linux and other
open source software and services to enterprise companies.108 Another
highly successful open source product is the Android platform for
smartphones, which Google has been able to monetize in other ways than
by sales of copies of the program.109 Open-source software providers
often recoup investments in software development through providing
value-added services, such as installation, customization, and
maintenance, or complementary assets, such as proprietary add-on
programs that perform specialized functions.110

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The enigma of digitized property may not have been resolved for
all creative sectors. Yet it is remarkable how well the economy of ideas,
to use Barlow’s term, has evolved over the last quarter-century. Yes,
copyright infringement is widespread in the online environment, but
millions of people make a multitude of non-infringing uses of
copyrighted works online as well. The netizens (to use another now
archaic term from the 1990s) of cyberspace have been creating and
sharing their creations, thereby promoting the greater public good, as
well or better now than at any time in human history.
As much as Barlow would have celebrated the financial
successes of so many millions of creators in cyberspace, he would also
have been pleased that the economy of ideas includes many millions of
people who create and share their creations online for free. Barlow
eloquently recognized “the inexplicable pleasures of information itself,
the joy of learning, knowing, and teaching; the strange good feeling of

Pamela Samuelson, IBM’s Pragmatic Embrace of Open Source, 49 COMM.
ACM 15 (Oct. 2006).
108
See Alex Sherman & Lora Kolodny, IBM To Acquire Red Hat in Deal Valued
at $34 Billion, CNBC (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/28/ibmto-acquire-red-hat-in-deal-valued-at-34-billion.html. Also in 2018, Microsoft
acquired GitHub for $7.5 billion. See Klint Finley, Why 2018 Was a Breakout
Year for Open Source Deals, WIRED (Dec. 23, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/why-2018-breakout-year-open-source-deals/.
109
See, e.g., Bogdan Petrovan, How Does Google Make Money from Android?,
ANDROID AUTHORITY (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.androidauthority.com/howdoes-google-make-money-from-android-669008/ (surmising that mobile
advertising and app sales contribute to Google’s Android business).
110
See, e.g., Paul-Noël Guély, Open-Source Software: From the Periphery of
Tech to the Mainstream of Finance, FORBES (Sep. 3, 2018, 7:45 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulnoelguely/2018/09/03/open-source-softwarefrom-the-periphery-of-tech-to-the-mainstream-of-finance/#4472149269ab.
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information coming into and out of oneself.”111 Those who share their
creations freely, said Barlow, “are getting paid in something besides
money,” for there is joy for many in the act of sharing.112
Those who like to tinker with digital copies of creative works,
such as by making remixes or mashups, have been able to participate in
the new creative economy as never before.113 Digitization has made it
possible not only to playfully build upon existing works, but also to share
those playful creations with others via online video-sharing services.114
Fan fiction has also emerged as another robust sector of the new
economy.115 This resonates with Barlow’s contention that ideas and
information are “conveyed by propagation, not distribution.”116 As with
jazz improvisations, stand-up comedy routines, and mime performances,
Barlow characterized information as an activity, oblivious of copyright
protection, flourishing with a life of its own.117
111

Barlow, supra note 1, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 23.
Barlow, supra note 1, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24. For a
theoretically rich account of this transformation, see, for example, YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2007).
113
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE
IN A HYBRID ECONOMY (2008).
114
See, e.g., David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the
Construction of Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1992); Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 563, 564 (2016). See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL,
DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER
SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION
(2012) (describing several industry sectors in which the freedom to copy
promotes creativity).
115
See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS, WHAT WE
BELIEVE, http://www.transformativeworks.org/what_we_believe/ (last visited
Mar. 20, 2019).
116
Barlow, supra note 1, at 89, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 17.
117
Barlow, supra note 1, at 90, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 18. Barlow also
observed that “[i]nformation is a relationship.” Barlow, supra note 1, at 126, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 20. The WIPO study also recognized that
[a]rtists do not have uniform motivations to create. Policy deliberations
should thus take into account non-monetary sources of artists’
motivation and carefully build incentive schemes targeting overall
psychic income, rather than focusing on income issues alone. For
example, changes in legal and other mechanisms can affect peer
recognition and ease of attribution of works, which ultimately influence
creators’ job satisfaction and further creativity. Income-focused
reforms might effectively lead to missing policy goals.
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Barlow was an enthusiastic endorser of open access for
copyrighted works when he spoke at the 2003 launch of the Creative
Commons (CC).118 The uptake of CC licensed works since then may
have exceeded the high expectations of its founders. Over 1 billion
creative works are now available under CC licenses on millions of
Internet sites.119 While many (and perhaps most) of these CC licensed
works are freely shared without restrictions, authors can retain rights to
control commercial exploitations by making their works available under
CC-NC licenses, which only allows free use for non-commercial
purposes. Many well-known authors have published digital versions of
their books under CC licenses so they are widely available to all online
users, but the authors still earn royalties on the sale of physical books.120
Millions of scholarly works are now freely available through digital
repositories, as colleges and universities have increasingly adopted open
access policies for their faculties’ scholarly research outputs.121
Digitization has been beneficial not only for the creation and
dissemination of new works, but also in extending the “long tail” of incopyright works that previously would have faded from public view as
they went out of print. Mass digitization of books from research
institutions has enabled older works to be rediscovered and used in novel
ways.122 By digitizing millions of books from research library
collections, indexing them, and serving up snippets of the books in
response to search queries, Google made it possible for researchers to
discover books relevant to their work and provide information on where

See Cuntz, supra note 95, at 46.
118
See John Perry Barlow at Creative Commons Launch (2002), https://archive.
org/details/lreincclaunch2a-jpbarlow-lres.
119
List of major Creative Commons licensed works, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_major_Creative_Commons_licensed_works (last
visited Apr. 4, 2019).
120
See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Giving It Away, FORBES (Dec. 1, 2006, 12:00 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/2006/11/30/cory-doctorow-copyright-techmedia_cz_cd_books06_1201doctorow.html#36825d278c20; Made with
Creative Commons: Knowledge Unlatched, MEDIUM (Sep. 18, 2017),
https://medium.com/made-with-creative-commons/knowledge-unlatcheda36a822bc77c (describing case studies).
121
See, e.g., OPEN ACCESS AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, https://hls.harvard.edu/library/for-faculty/open-access-and-scholarlypublishing/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2019).
122
See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012).
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copies of those books could be located.123 The HathiTrust digital library,
which was formed by Google’s library partners pooling digital copies of
books from their collections, now allows researchers from consortium
members to conduct searches across a corpus of more than 16 million
books to find ones that are relevant.124 Barlow would have been pleased
by this development and would have supported the initiative of some
libraries to engage in controlled digital lending of books that libraries
initially acquired in physical form,125 following the lead of the Internet
Archive with its online Open Library.126
John Perry Barlow had a vision of an economy of ideas in which
information would flow freely through the Internet ether. While his hope
that copyright would disappear in the new creative economy is unlikely
to transpire, there is some reason to hope that policymakers will come to
recognize that creative sectors of the economy are thriving. Barlow
insisted that
we have a profound responsibility to be better ancestors. What we
do now will likely determine the productivity and freedom of 20
generations of artists yet unborn. So it is time to stop speculating
about when the new economy of ideas will arrive. It’s here. Now
comes the hard part, which also happens to be the fun part: making
it work.127

As a tribute to Barlow, let’s not screw things up by adopting stronger
copyright rules that will inhibit rather than promote the progress of
science, as the Constitution directs.128
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IMAGINARY BOTTLES1
JESSICA LITMAN†

i.
In 1994, John Perry Barlow published The Economy of Ideas in
WIRED magazine.2 Subtitled “A Framework for patents and copyrights
in the Digital Age (everything you know about intellectual property is
wrong),” the article argued that commercializing copyrighted material in
a digital age was akin to selling wine without bottles.
Barlow’s metaphor was startlingly apt. For more than 200 years,
U.S. copyright law had defined the rights of both owners and users
primarily by regulating the creation and distribution of the tangible
objects in which copyrighted works were embodied.3 Networked digital
technology enabled the promiscuous copying and broad distribution of
works completely detached from tangible objects.
The enigma is this: if our property can be infinitely reproduced and
instantaneously distributed all over the planet without cost, without
our knowledge, without its even leaving our possession, how can
we protect it? . . . . 4
1

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives
4.0 International License (CC BY-ND 4.0).
†
John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of
Michigan. Jon Weinberg made extremely helpful comments on earlier versions
of this essay.
2
John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994), reprinted
as Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global Net, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8 (2019).
3
See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 581 (1986); L. Ray Patterson,
Copyright and the “Exclusive Right” of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 33
(1993); R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital
Networks, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 577, 583–610 (2003). As Barlow noted, the 20th
century dissemination of works using the broadcast spectrum had also posed a
wine-without-bottles problem, but most practical uses of broadcasting involved
the creation of copies. Live television and radio programming received no
copyright protection at all until the program was embodied in a tangible object.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102 (2012); Barlow, supra note 2, at 91, 18 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. at 19 (“[B]roadcast transmissions all lack the Constitutional
requirement of fixation as a ‘writing.’”).
4
Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8 (as “[t]he riddle is
this . . .”).
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Barlow’s answer was that we needed to reexamine our
assumptions about the value and nature of the information that copyright
law seeks to secure. Once that authorship was detached from its
containers, it would no longer work to assume that container-centric
regulation would treat it appropriately.
Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later. His prediction that,
in the near future, “information will be generated collaboratively by the
cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,”5 was an eerily accurate
description of Twitter. Barlow’s suggestion that information itself was
supplanting money as our dominant currency6 presaged a future ruled by
Google, Facebook, and Amazon, three companies that derive much of
their monetary value from trafficking in information. He proposed that
we reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as
more akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge. As a
non-carbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information evolves,
spreads, and, over time, it spoils. It creates relationships and meaning.
Some information’s value depends on exclusivity; other information is
worth more the more common it becomes.7
Legacy owners of intellectual property, he complained, were
engaging in futile efforts to buttress the old, container-centric rules to
enable them to stretch around the new reality. He predicted that the
disconnect between traditional copyright law and digital technology
would prove to be unbridgeable:
Intellectual property law cannot be patched, retrofitted, or
expanded to contain digitized expression any more than real estate
law might be revised to cover the allocation of broadcasting
spectrum (which, in fact, rather resembles what is being attempted
here). We will need to develop an entirely new set of methods as
befits this entirely new set of circumstances.8

Twenty-five years later, though, it appears that Barlow might
have underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright owners. Despite
significant missteps, bad bets, and massive investment in stupid
initiatives, they seem to have emerged into a new world where, from

5

Barlow, supra note 2, at 90, 18 DUKE L. & TEC. REV. at 19.
See Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24
(“[Information] may become the dominant form of human trade.”).
7
See Barlow, supra note 2, at 89–90, 126–27, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 19–
21.
8
Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 9.
6
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their vantage point, the copyright rules are startlingly similar to the rules
that governed the old world, only better.

ii.
Initially, copyright owners relied on a combination of two
strategies. First, they put their hopes in what Barlow described as
“crypto bottling.”9 Second, they backed up that plan with hefty helpings
of relentless litigation. In the 1990s, many lobbyists for legacy copyright
businesses insisted that, although consumers might enjoy content created
by amateurs if it were free, the only good reason for a consumer to pay
for Internet access would be to enjoy commercially-produced
entertainment and information products. It followed that one could make
a profit from providing Internet access by selling subscriptions to
consumers eager for that content. If copyright owners could prevent
consumers from gaining unlicensed access or making unlicensed copies,
they’d be able to charge them lots of money for licensed access. They
figured that devising a technological system to prevent unauthorized
access or use was just around the corner, and if hacking technological
protection were unlawful, that would effectively deter folks from piracy.
Copyright lobbyists persuaded Congress to protect copyright on
the Internet by enacting a law that made it illegal to circumvent copy
protection technology for any reason.10 Then, they sat back and waited
impatiently for software engineers to invent technology that could encase
copyrighted works in impregnable containers of encryption code. And
waited. Meanwhile, they delayed making their works available online.
While they were waiting, they sued upstart businesses that dared to offer
music or video over the Internet, or even to help consumers do it
themselves.11 Book publishers, movie studios and record labels were
reluctant to launch less-secure offerings, and wary of cannibalizing their
9

See Barlow, supra note 2, at 129, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 28.
See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998).
11
See, e.g., MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); UMG Recordings v.
Shelter Capital Partners, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2011); Arista Records, L.L.C.
v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009); A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Warner Bros. Entm’t v. WTV
Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal 2011); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. HummerWinblad, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta
Books L.L.C, 150 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2002); UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. iCraveTV, 53 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1831 (W.D. Pa.
2000).
10
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existing bricks-and-mortar business models.12 When they finally made
their works available over digital networks, they offered pallid and
overpriced digital services with terrible user interfaces, often constrained
by extremely buggy and annoying digital rights management
technology.13 So, there was a bunch of pent-up demand and no real
competition when a few well-capitalized businesses decided it was worth
the litigation risk to enter the digital market with offerings of their own.
Apple, Amazon, and Google soon became providers of online music,
books, and video. They were willing to defend expensive lawsuits, and
faced very little competition. Soon, all three had become obligatory
partners for content owners hoping to distribute their works online.
Online platforms figured out that they could make more money by
selling eyeballs to advertisers than they could by selling movies to
viewers or music to listeners. Apple, Amazon, and Google then
proceeded to become impossibly wealthy.14
Copyright owners resent that. They’ve coined the term “value
gap” to describe the injustice of the fact that platforms have too much
bargaining power and can therefore shape the terms of copyright licenses
to call for lower royalty payments than copyright owners believe they
ought to pay.15 It isn’t that platforms don’t purchase licenses for the
copyrighted content that appears on their services––they do. Because of
their market dominance, though, they have the upper hand in
negotiations and can insist on paying lower royalties than copyright
owners believe would be fair. Given how much money the big online
platforms are raking in, copyright owners figure they ought to be sharing
a bigger piece of it.16
Of course, we know now that all of the assumptions underlying
the impenetrable crypto-bottle strategy were misguided. There was

12

See, e.g., ANDREW ALBANESE, THE BATTLE OF $9.99 (2013).
See Jessica Litman, Antibiotic Resistance, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53,
53–58 (2012).
14
See id. at 58–66.
15
See American Assoc. of Independent Music et al., Joint Comments before the
US Copyright Office in re Section 512 Study, No. 2015-7 (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-89806; Warner
Music Group, Comments before the US Copyright Office in re Section 512
Study, No. 2015-7 (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2015-0013-86022.
16
See Jessica Litman, What We Don’t See When We See Copyright as Property,
77 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 536, 537–42 (2018).
13
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never going to be an impregnable crypto-bottle.17 The electronic game
industry has managed to make good-enough encryption work, but for
owners of copyrights in other works, the legal prohibition on hacking
copy-protection technology has been a bust.18 The additional deterrent
effect of making it illegal to circumvent digital rights management turned
out to be negligible. Moreover, the prohibition is so broadly worded that
it seems to forbid an independent mechanic from fixing any car
containing software,19 so people tend not to believe that the behavior it
prohibits is unlawful. Anyone can find easy-to-follow circumvention
instructions in respectable newspapers and online magazines;
circumvention software is ubiquitous.20 Several major media companies
have decided not to bother with digital rights management protection at
all, since it costs them something to encode every copy, and that
encoding doesn’t in fact provide meaningful protection.
As the crypto-bottle strategy failed, though, copyright owners
stumbled into a second tactic that has been far more effective. The key
to this approach was a breathtakingly expansive reinterpretation of the
exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies, predicated on a very broad
definition of “copy.”21 Fans of this new understanding maintain that
whenever a work appears in the working memory of any computer
anywhere, an actionable copy has been made, in violation of the statutory
reproduction right.22 By insisting, again and again, that the word “copy”
17

See CORY DOCTOROW, INFORMATION DOESN’T WANT TO BE FREE: LAWS FOR
THE INTERNET AGE (2014).
18
See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2010).
19

See Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg.
54010, 54021-23 (Oct. 26, 2018) (discussing proposed exemption “allowing for
circumvention of access controls controlling the functioning of motorized land
vehicles for purposes of diagnosis, repair, or lawful modification of a vehicle”).
20
See, e.g., Catherine Ellis, The Best Free DVD Copier 2019, TECHRADAR (Feb.
11, 2019), https://www.techradar.com/best/the-best-free-dvd-copier; Kirk
McElhearn, How To Rip DVDs and Blu-Ray Discs with Make MKV and
Handbrake, MACWORLD (Mar. 13, 2017),
https://www.macworld.com/article/3179350/how-to-rip-dvds-and-blu-ray-discswith-makemkv-and-handbrake.html; MacTheRipper, GUSTAVUS ADOPHUS
COLLEGE, https://gustavus.edu/gts/Mac_the_Ripper (last visited Mar. 6, 2019).
21
See Jessica Litman, Fetishizing Copies, in RUTH OKEDIJI, COPYRIGHT IN AN
AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 107 (2017).
22
See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 96–112 (2002) (testimony of Emery Simon, Business Software Alliance);
see generally Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1067 (2010).
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had long been understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if
they were right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some
courts that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them
extensive rights to control any appearance of their works over digital
networks.
The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers
who pay attention to statutory language. The copyright statute has, since
1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a work is
fixed.”23 Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and copyright owners
haven’t asked Congress to do so. Being attached to a material object,
though, is precisely the characteristic that Barlow argued that digital files
lack. The modern revisionist interpretation expands the understanding of
a “copy” beyond the idea of a tangible material object to include
temporary and ephemeral instantiations. Essentially, it reads the words
“material objects” out of the statutory definition.24
Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has
ceased to be seen as radical.25 That has allowed copyright owners to sell
their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles. Like the digital
23

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
Most defenses of the expanded conception of “copy” focus only on the
wording of the definition of “fixation,” which imposes the additional
requirement that the work’s instantiation in a material object must be
“sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17
U.S.C. § 101. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act Section 104 Report:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (Dec. 12 & 13, 2001) [hereinafter Section 104 Hearing] (statement
of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights). They assume that since computers
and computer memory chips are themselves material objects, any time
expression occupies a memory chip for a period of more than transitory
duration, a copy has been made. Proponents of the view that RAM copies
infringe copyrights argue that as long as the computer or other machine is on—
and it could be on indefinitely—a copy of the copyrighted work stored there can
be perceived or reproduced, thereby satisfying the “more than transitory
duration” standard. By that logic, a broadcast tower is a material object, an
unrecorded live television broadcast would therefore necessarily result in a
copy, and Congress’s conclusion that it did not must have been mistaken. See
Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking: The NII Intellectual Property Report,
COMM. ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 23 (“[H]olding a mirror up to a book would be
infringement because the book’s image could be perceived there for more than
transitory duration.”).
25
See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT,
CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 12 (2013).
24
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instantiations of the works, these imaginary bottles are not tangible. That
lack has turned out to carry with it unexpected advantages for rights
holders. Because the bottles are made-up creations, copyright owners
can imbue them with whatever characteristics they fancy. By encoding
restrictions in the terms of an end user license agreement, distributors of
copyrighted works have succeeded in limiting the uses consumers are
permitted to make of lawful copies of copyrighted works.26 It has
become conventional for copyright owners to insist that digital copies are
“licensed,” not “sold,” even in transactions that are expressly
denominated as sales.27 Because the terms of the license may permit or
forbid any encounter with the work that results in a digital copy, the
licensor is entitled to subject the purchaser’s use to whatever conditions
it chooses to impose. In particular, copyright owners have insisted that
their make-believe bottles are not subject to the first sale doctrine, and
the purchasers of those bottles may not pass them on to new owners.28
That’s a neat trick: a digital file may be a copy for the purpose of
infringement liability but not a copy for the purpose of transferring
ownership.
Copyright owners have even persuaded some courts that their
entitlement to denominate transactions as licenses rather than sales also
permits them to characterize transfers of physical media containing
copyrighted works as licenses of the material objects that may preclude
the purchaser from transferring the material object.29
26

The topic of the use of end user license agreements to negate user’s rights
under copyright law is much too involved and important for this short essay.
Peggy Radin and Aaron Perzanowski and Jason Schultz have published
excellent books with masterful discussions of the ramifications. See AARON
PERZANOWSKI & JASON SHULTZ, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (2016); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE (2012).
27
See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Even Amazon Can’t Keep Its EULA Story Straight,
BOING BOING (Jan. 12, 2010), https://boingboing.net/2010/01/12/even-amazoncant-kee.html.
28
See, e.g., First Sale Doctrine, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance
.org/policy/position-papers/first-sale-doctrine/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2019); Amici
Curiae Brief of Motion Picture Ass’n of America & Recording Industry Ass’n of
America at 7–9, Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018) (No.
16-2321), https://copyrightalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/ReDigiRIAA-Amicus-Brief.pdf; see generally First Sale Under Title 17: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the H. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. (June
2, 2014), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20140602/102290/HHRG113-JU03-Transcript-20140602.pdf.
29
Compare Vernor v. Autodesk, 621 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2010), with UMG
Recordings v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). In Disney Enterprises v.
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Twenty years ago, proponents of the broad reconstruction of
“copy” argued that the expansive understanding was an essential tool to
prevent digital piracy, but acknowledged that the law should find some
way to allow temporary digital copies that were incidental to legitimate
uses.30 Today, the fact that an otherwise legitimate use requires the
creation of a unauthorized digital copy is itself enough to make the use
illegitimate.31

iii.
In 2019, then, make-believe copyright bottles have given
copyright owners more legal control over uses of their works than they
enjoyed under the old-fangled bricks-and-mortar law. That enhanced
legal control hasn’t necessarily translated into actual control, but the
businesses that call themselves the “core copyright industries” report that
they are earning more money than ever,32 so things seem to be working
out okay for them so far.
Redbox Automated Retail, Disney claimed that language on the outside of its
boxed blu-ray disk, DVD, and digital download code combo packs that said
“codes are not for sale or transfer” and “this product . . . cannot be sold or rented
individually,” bound purchasers of the combo packs. Redbox purchased combo
packs and sold the three components separately. Disney claimed that a consumer
who purchased a download code from Redbox infringed its copyright when she
or he downloaded the movie, and that Redbox should be held liable as a
contributory infringer. The court initially ruled that the language did not create
an enforceable contract, both because it didn’t indicate that opening the box
would constitute assent and because the purported prohibition on transfer of
BluRay discs and DVDs sought to impose an unenforceable condition in
contravention of the first sale doctrine in section 109. Indeed, the district court
concluded that the overreaching terms of the purported license should be
considered copyright misuse. See Disney Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail,
No. CV 17-08655 DDP (AGRx), 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 61903 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
20, 2018). Disney revised the language to give purchasers clearer notice on the
outside of the combo pack box and added lengthy terms and conditions to its
digital download site. The court agreed that Disney could now succeed on its
claim that Redbox encouraged its customers to infringe Disney’s copyrights by
using the digital download, and entered a preliminary injunction. See Disney
Enters. v. Redbox Automated Retail, 336 F. Supp 3d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2018).
30
See, e.g., Section 104 Hearing, supra note 24 (statement of Mary Beth Peters,
Register of Copyrights); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE , DMCA SECTION 104
REP. 106-48 (Aug. 2001).
31
See Capitol Records v. Redigi, 910 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2018).
32
See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE
2018 REPORT (2018), https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/
copyright-industry-report-wm.pdf.
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Was Barlow wrong about the intellectual property crisis? He
predicted in 1994 that the extant system of IP law would fall under its
own weight:
It’s fairly paradigm warping to look at information through fresh
eyes––to see how very little it is like pig iron or pork bellies, and to
imagine the tottering travesties of case law we will stack up if we go
on legally treating it as though it were.
As I’ve said, I believe these towers of outmoded boilerplate will
be a smoking heap sometime in the next decade, and we mind
miners will have no choice but to cast our lot with new systems that
work.33

That didn’t happen, or, at least, it didn’t happen in that way or in
that time frame. Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about
the ways that copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and
counterproductive in 2019. If the purpose of copyright law is to
compensate creators for the products of their minds,34 it hasn’t yet come
close to achieving that goal.35 Oodles of money flood into the copyright
system. Most of that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’
pockets, and where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a
closely guarded secret.36 Creators across a wide swathe of fields
complain of a shocking lack of transparency. Proposals to replace the
current system with “new systems that work” have so far failed to attract
enough support to make them feasible.
Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than they
seemed 25 years ago. Remove information from its containers and it
spills. Spills spread. As different individual creators and researchers
discover closely-held details of how money and rights move through the
33

Barlow, supra note 2, at 127, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 24.
See Barlow, supra note 2, at 85, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. at 8.
35
I’ve discussed this problem elsewhere. See Litman, supra note 16, at 539–50;
Litman, supra note 18, at 8–12.
36
See, e.g., Peter C. DiCola & David Touve, Licensing in the Shadow of
Copyright, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 397 (2014); Eriq Gardner, Fox Rocked by
$179M ‘Bones’ Ruling: Lying, Cheating and “Reprehensible” Studio Fraud,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/fox-rocked-by-179-million-bones-ruling-lying-cheating-reprehensiblestudio-fraud-1190346; Eriq Gardner, ‘Walking Dead’ Producers Say AMC
Won’t Explain Basis for Denying Hundreds of Millions in Profits, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/walking-deadproducers-say-amc-wont-explain-basis-denying-hundreds-millions-profits1192470.
34
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copyright system,37 that knowledge may itself transform the ways that
copyright owners do business. Recent statutory amendments include
provisions designed to encourage music and sound recording rights
holders to disclose more data about the works they control;38 secrets
revealed as a result of publicized legal disputes have shone light on the
ways that some rights-holders conceal facts about their earnings and
payment.39 Even if the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to
crumble under its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information
may enable the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and
how the system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to
wrest back some control, or at least some money, from the legacy rights
holders seeking to preserve the old regime.

37

See, e.g., Zoe Keating, Another Year, TUMBLR, http://zoekeating.tumblr.com/
post/181269142164/another-year (last visited Mar. 9, 2019); Daniel Sanchez,
What Spotify Paid One Artist in 2018, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018),
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/12/19/zoe-keating-spotify-2018payout/.
38
See Hatch-Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 115-264 (2018).
Cynics suggest that the incentives in the new law will not suffice to persuade
major music publishers and labels to give up their secrets.
39
See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Wark Ent., Inc., Amended
Final Award, No. 1220052735 (JAMS Feb. 20, 2019) (Liu, Arb.),
https://pmcdeadline2.files.wordpress.com/2019/02/final-amended-awardredactions.pdf.

JOHN PERRY BARLOW’S CALL FOR
PERSUASION OVER POWER
JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN

John Perry Barlow’s insights were inseparable from his lyrical
way of conveying them. Paragraphs like this from his seminal 1994 essay
The Economy of Ideas come to mind:
What was previously considered a common human resource,
distributed among the minds and libraries of the world, as well as
the phenomena of nature herself, is now being fenced and deeded. It
is as though a new class of enterprise had arisen that claimed to own
the air and water.
What is to be done? While there is a certain grim fun to be had
in it, dancing on the grave of copyright and patent will solve little,
especially when so few are willing to admit that the occupant of this
grave is even deceased and are trying to force what can no longer be
upheld by popular consent.1

Barlow’s expression mates joy and canniness, and one of his
talents in writing about new technologies was to flip our conception of
the status quo in order to correct it. In 1994, the conventional sense was
that the Internet and its champions were heedlessly upsetting a
longstanding set of relationships and legal entitlements, with copyright as
a signal example. And while that was superficially true, it wasn’t the
whole story.
Copyright was a natural first area of contention during the
mainstreaming of the Internet because there was readily-tallied money at
stake; widespread Internet use absolutely stood to put a dent in
established, legally-protected cash flows; and polarized cultures of
righteousness had developed around views of the ethics of file sharing,
also known as “piracy.” The young hackers and dot-com founders
responsible for much of the internet’s mischief––having built the likes of
Napster, Gnutella, Napigator, KaZaA––were, to the Hollywood
establishment, right out of central casting as barbarians at the gate.
Barlow told us that those appearances were wrong. In fact, the
settled relationships of copyright holders comprised the unusual artifice
around the centuries-long production of entertainment. The practices of
copyright might comfortably apply to the highly stylized dealings to
carve up rights to the distribution of a movie, but the average citizen held
1

John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 14 (2019).
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an even longer-established set of expectations around performance and
sharing with which the free transfer of bits dovetailed very well.
A glance at the U.S. copyright code by the time of Napster
showed just how far Title 17 had quietly diverged from day-to-day
reality. The idea that singing a song aloud at a birthday party could result
in thousands of dollars in “damages” was counterintuitive, to say the
least, even as there’s legitimate rationale for the core “performance
right” within copyright. The statutory limitations to the right are tellingly
mincing, such as 17 U.S.C. § 110(6), which establishes that
notwithstanding the public performance right, there are some limited
exceptions, such as:
performance of a nondramatic musical work by a governmental
body or a nonprofit agricultural or horticultural organization, in the
course of an annual agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition
conducted by such body or organization . . . .2

(It appears to be an open question whether the first gathering by a
horticultural organization can be “annual” and thus qualify for the
exception, or if litigants must wait until the following year to see if there
is another one.)
The performance right was visited again in the 1998 Fairness in
Music Licensing Act, which sought to settle a longstanding dispute
between the NRA––that is, the National Restaurant Association––and
ASCAP, the leading U.S. organization coordinating licenses for public
performances of songs. The dispute was over restaurants’ playing of the
radio while people ate. While radio stations already paid for the rights to
broadcast music, ASCAP wanted restaurants3 to have to license the
music as well. The NRA made great hay of the fact that ASCAP had
previously sent letters to Girl Scout camps asking them to license up,4
and accused ASCAP of wanting royalties for kids singing Puff the Magic
Dragon around campfires. ASCAP’s chief operating officer at first
responded combatively: “They buy paper, twine, and glue for their
crafts––they can pay for the music, too.”5 ASCAP reconsidered and later
2

17 U.S.C. § 110 (2000).
Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other Establishments: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).
4
Elisabeth Bumiller, Ascap Asks Royalties From Girl Scouts, and Regrets It,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/17/nyregion
/ascap-asks-royalties-from-girl-scouts-and-regrets-it.html.
5
Lisa Bannon, Ascap Cautions the Girl Scouts: Don't Sing 'God Bless America',
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 21, 1996), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB8405758923
77365000.
3
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said the demand was a mistake, but the political tide had turned. The
Fairness in Music Licensing Act provided that no royalties were needed–
–at least so long as the restaurants were smaller than 3,750 square feet,
and used no more than six speakers to play the music.6 (Barlow’s own
view of ASCAP, for what it’s worth: “I'm a member of ASCAP, and if
you think that's the solution, I invite you to write some songs.”)7
The music licensing and recording industry mentality clashed
quite a lot with mix-tape culture. As file sharing became routine, the
policy drawing board entertained increasingly desperate measures to
preserve what in fact had never been––people had always shared music
without practical legal burden; the Internet’s new affordances posed
genuine questions at the clash between what seemed like perfectly
reasonable interpersonal behavior, and the new costs it was imposing on
the industry. The industry’s prior encounters with new technology had, at
times, resulted in new restrictions on it. In 1984, the videocassette
recorder came within one Supreme Court vote of being found to be an
instrument of contributory copyright infringement, and thus illegal
without licensing.8 And in 1992, the music industry ensured through law
that something called the “Serial Copy Management System” would be
built into newly-emerging digital audio tape recorders, to prevent
copyrighted material from spreading losslessly too well.9 (Oddly, Title
17, which defines “children,” never specifies what the SCMS actually
is.)
It was against that backdrop that Barlow wrote. His observations
of the culture clash were vindicated as the industry floated such drastic
proposals as to “close the analog hole”10 by making recording devices
refuse to record music or images encountered in the wild that had “don’t
record me” dog-whistles placed within them. They proposed legislation
such as the “SSSCA”11 and “CBPTDA”12 to mandate that all computing
6

Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1997).
John Perry Barlow, Keynote Address at the Winter 1994 USENIX Conference:
Stopping the Information Railroad (Jan. 17, 1994) (transcript available at John
Perry Barlow, Stopping the Information Railroad, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan.
17, 1994), https://www.eff.org/pages/stopping-information-railroad).
8
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
9
See Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1992).
10
Eric Diehl & Teddy Furon, © Watermark: Closing the Analog Hole (July
2003) (paper presented at IEEE International Conference on Consumer
Electronics).
11
Security Systems Standards and Certification Act, Staff Working Draft, 107th
Cong. (2001), available at http://cryptome.org/sssca.htm.
12
Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th
Cong. (2002).
7
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equipment13 have digital rights management software built in. There were
outsized lawsuits14 against people who swapped copyrighted files over
peer-to-peer Internet services. There were legal threats against Internet
service providers,15 including universities.16
Very little of it endured. Most legislative proposals stalled in
Congress, and the lawsuits against individual users were retired despite
most targeted users choosing to settle. This might suggest a victory for
Barlow’s way of thinking––a certain peace emerged that reformalized
commercial relationships around activities that, to the users, could still
seem organic. But the copyright wars didn’t see victory by one side or
the other so much as a muddling through. Today, the chaos of selfpublished Web pages, hosted on individual Web servers, has given way
to the carefully indexed homogeneity of DMCA-takedown-friendly
Facebook,17 including the automatic monitoring of private chat for the
presence of links to file sharing sites (as they are found, they are
redacted), and Facebook’s silent tracking of all usage for the benefit of
ad targeting.
Today music and movies are much less ripped and copied freely
than they are subscribed and linked to like a utility––via one of a handful
of streaming titans like Spotify, Tidal, Netflix, or Apple––with artists
seeking to make a living from their work generally no better off18 than
they were before the Internet came about. Recording industry profits,
after a downsizing upon leaving the era of $15 compact discs, seem to
have stabilized.19 Even the American film industry––which is seeing

13

Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974,
2024–25 (2006).
14
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011).
15
RIAA v. Verizon, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2004),
https://epic.org/privacy/copyright/verizon/.
16
Anne Broache, RIAA Threatens 19 Universities with Lawsuits, CNET (Oct.
18, 2007), https://www.cnet.com/news/riaa-threatens-19-universities-withlawsuits/.
17
Daniel Sanchez, Facebook Promises Not to Rip Down Your Music Videos—If
You Use Their Music, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2017/12/11/facebook-sound-collection/.
18
Victor Luckerson, Is Spotify’s Model Wiping Out Music’s Middle Class?,
RINGER (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.theringer.com/tech/2019/1/16/18184314/
spotify-music-streaming-service-royalty-payout-model.
19
Felix Richter, Rise of Digital Formats Stops the Music Industry's Decline,
STATISTA (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.statista.com/chart/4713/global-recordedmusic-industry-revenues/.
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profit growth much slower than that of many global counterparts––
appears to be outpacing the broader economy.20
Of course, defending existing profit flows was not Barlow’s
starting or ending point. The sentiments of Barlow’s A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace transcend something as transactionallybased as the copyright wars. Rather, says Barlow, proposed new
restrictions there:
would declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble
than pig iron. In our world, whatever the human mind may create
can be reproduced and distributed infinitely at no cost. The global
conveyance of thought no longer requires your factories to
accomplish.21

What Barlow envisioned was a renaissance of person-to-person
interaction, one unmediated by corporate marketing departments:
We will create a civilization of the Mind in Cyberspace. May it
be more humane and fair than the world your governments have
made before.22

Alas, from the standpoint of 2019, humane and fair have turned out to be
tall orders. There remains a vibrant string of thriving, Lórien-like online
communities of art and learning defined largely by their insularity. But
the bulk of digital foot traffic has coalesced around sites known as much
for meanness and harassment as for earnest exchange, coupled with
demands by aggrieved users—rather than yesterday’s corporate
copyright holders—for intervention by the respective corporate
overseers. These sites are not self-governed in content or in design. They
are monetarily optimized consumer offerings as authentically
community-driven as Disney World’s Main Street USA.
And teenagers, or near enough, brought us this too. In his 2005
book What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counterculture Shaped
the Personal Computer Industry, John Markoff notes that:
Personal computers that were designed for and belonged to single
individuals would emerge initially in concert with a counterculture

20

David Robb, U.S. Film Industry Topped $43 Billion in Revenue Last Year,
Study Finds, But It’s Not All Good News, DEADLINE (July 23, 2018),
https://deadline.com/2018/07/film-industry-revenue-2017-ibisworld-reportgloomy-box-office-1202425692/.
21
John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 6 (2019).
22
Id. at 7.
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that rejected authority and believed the human spirit would triumph
over corporate technology, not be subject to it.23

But, as Markoff goes on to note, the barbarians of yesterday have
themselves become the gatekeepers of today. Barlow naturally drew
upon the cultural fault lines of 1960s America in limning the heroes and
sure-to-lose villains of the digital world, but today those lines aren’t quite
so clear. The new boss turned out to be the same24 as the old boss––and
our conflicts can as easily appear to be with one another as between
citizen and state, or consumer and conglomerate. The causes that Barlow
embodied and stood for––marked by values of humanity, of openness, of
adventure, of good humor, and of inclusion––are ones that endure at
every layer of the digital stack. A synecdoche: Barlow’s A Declaration of
the Independence of Cyberspace remains free, but the authoritative
version of The Economy of Ideas (as rendered in a 1994 issue of
WIRED)25 is . . . metered through a paywall.

23

JOHN MARKOFF, WHAT THE DORMOUSE SAID: HOW THE SIXTIES
COUNTERCULTURE SHAPED THE PERSONAL COMPUTER INDUSTRY xv (2005).
24
THE WHO, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO’S NEXT? (Track Records 1971).
25
See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994),
https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/ (last accessed Aug. 3, 2019).

DANCING ON THE GRAVE OF COPYRIGHT?
ANUPAM CHANDER† AND MADHAVI SUNDER††

“[I]n the years to come, most human exchange will be virtual rather
than physical, consisting not of stuff but the stuff of which dreams are
made. Our future business will be conducted in a world made more of
verbs than nouns.”1
–John Perry Barlow (1994)

INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS AN ECONOMY OF VERBS
John Perry Barlow would have wanted us dancing on the grave
of copyright.2 Indeed, he told us so. He predicted that the internet would
render copyright’s legal fences obsolete. How can you contain
information? Ideas are contagious. “Information wants to be free.”3
When produced in its ethereal form, information would be impossible to
contain. Intellectual property is a “sinking ship,” and the lawyers
preparing intellectual property for digitization are merely rearranging the
deck chairs.4
Intellectual property law attached when the “word became
flesh,” Barlow argued. A thought would become intellectual property
when it entered a “physical object, whether book or widget.”6 Intellectual
property grew up to protect things—books, machines, and later, records
and movies. As the economy moved to focus on information powered by
the internet, would intellectual property survive? Barlow predicted that
5
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1
John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the
Global Net, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8, 31 (2019).
2
See id. at 14 (“While there is a certain grim fun to be had in it, dancing on the
grave of copyright and patent will solve little, especially when so few are willing
to admit that the occupant of this grave is even deceased and are trying to up by
force what can no longer be upheld by popular consent.”).
3
Id. at 18.
4
To be more precise, Barlow believed that the lawyers were either (1)
rearranging “deck chair[s],” (2) issuing “stern warnings” of disaster and
punishment, or (3) maintaining a “glassy-eyed denial.” Id. at 9.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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the rise of an “economy of verbs”—an economy focused on actions and
experiences—would render intellectual property rights largely obsolete.7
The “tottering travesties of case law”8 used to protect earlier economic
products would prove useless in the new world of services and
experiences.
The quarter century since Barlow’s writing allows us to assess
his prophecy. The economy moved in the very direction that Barlow
anticipated—from an economy focused on the ownership of things to an
economy based on services and experiences.9 In high-income countries,
services now account for three-quarters of the gross domestic product.10
But intellectual property proved more resilient and adaptable
than Barlow predicted. Intellectual property law both offered exceptions
where necessary, while simultaneously expanding to cover new forms of
creativity and activities. In this short essay, we argue that, for good or ill,
intellectual property has reconfigured itself for an economy driven by
information and experience.
But the evolution is hardly complete. New forms of expression
keep testing the limits of intellectual property. Consider the blockbuster
game Fortnite. Epic Games offers Fortnite game play for free—but users
pay for virtual clothing or various “emotes”—dances that allow users to
express themselves online during in-game play. Indeed, Fortnite players
paid some $2.4 billion in 2018 for the right to engage in such
expressions—literally, to “emote.”11 Internet entrepreneurs have figured
out a way to commodify dancing itself. Barlow believed that the internet
7

Id. at 26 (“One existing model for the future conveyance of intellectual
property is real time performance, a medium currently used only in theater,
music, lectures, stand-up comedy and pedagogy.”). Barlow’s prediction came
several years before the influential article by B. Joseph Pine II & James H.
Gilmore, Welcome to the Experience Economy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jul.–Aug.,
1998), https://hbr.org/1998/07/welcome-to-the-experience-economy. Pine and
Gilmore similarly depicted the new Experience Economy with show tickets on
their book cover.
8
Barlow, supra note 1, at 24.
9
See generally Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property in Experience, 117 MICH.
L. REV. 197 (2018) (describing rise of the Experience Economy).
10
Patricia Buckley & Rumki Majumdar, The Services Powerhouse: Increasingly
Vital to World Economic Growth, DELOITTE (July 12, 2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/insights/us/en/economy/issues-by-the-numbers/tradein-services-economy-growth.html (“In 2015, services’ value added accounted
for 74 percent of GDP in high-income countries, up from 69 percent in 1997.”).
11
Patrick Shanley, ‘Fortnite’ Earned $2.4 Billion in 2018, HOLLYWOOD REP.
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/heat-vision/fortnite-earned24-billion-2018-1176660.
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would liberate us from the commodifying forces of intellectual
property—but rather, the internet brought commodification into
previously intimate, sacred spaces. This essay considers IP in
expressions of joy and shared meaning online in the form of emotes,
GIFS, and memes: the stuff of which dreams are made. These aesthetic
experiences bring playfulness and humanity to the internet. Are they the
proper subject of intellectual property? Are such forms of cultural
innovation and appropriation better addressed by ethics or law?

I. FROM GOODS TO A GOOD TIME:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EXPERIENCE
Barlow was right about where the economy would go. He was
wrong that intellectual property would not follow. A quarter century on,
the Economy of Verbs is here.12 As The Economist puts it, in today’s
economy, “goods and services are no longer enough.”13 Today’s
consumers are made happier through “‘experiences’ over commodities,
pastimes over knick-knacks, doing over having.”14 The move from
nouns to verbs in fantasy properties exemplifies this shift in the nature of
both consumption and entertainment. From Star Wars to Harry Potter,
fans do not just want to watch or read about their favorite characters—
they want to be them. They don the robes of Gryffindor, flick their
wands, and drink the butterbeer. The owners of fantasy properties
understand this, expanding their offerings from light sabers in 1977 to
the Galaxy’s Edge, Disney’s new “100% immersive” Star Wars-inspired
resort opening in 2019.15
Cyberspace and new technologies have enabled “whole new
genres of experience, such as interactive games, Internet chat rooms and
multi-player games, motion-based simulators, and virtual reality.”16
Experiencing the Galaxy’s Edge will no doubt require that you wear a
radio frequency identification (RFID) chip, transmitting your identity
and precise location to sensors throughout the park, allowing computers
12

This section is adapted from Sunder, Intellectual Property in Experience,
supra note 9.
13
Economics Discovers Its Feelings, ECONOMIST (Dec. 19, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/8401269.
14
Id.
15
Jennifer Fickley-Baker, Plans Unveiled for Star Wars-Inspired Themed Resort
at Walt Disney World, DISNEY PARKS BLOG (July 15, 2017),
https://disneyparks.disney.go.com/blog/2017/07/plans-unveiled-for-star-warsinspired-themed-resort-at-walt-disney-world/ (quoting Bob Chapek, Chairman
of Walt Disney Parks & Resorts).
16
Pine & Gilmore, supra note 7.
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to monitor and inform local engagements with you. Facial recognition
will empower many of these experiences. The move toward “simulated
lived experience in cyberspace”17 places renewed emphasis on
performance. “In cyberspace . . . one goes from watching the screen to
going behind the screen and becoming the performance.” Cyberspace
theorist Randall Walser describes the move thusly: “print and radio tell;
stage and film show; cyberspace embodies.”18
Barlow correctly predicted how “interactivity . . . will be a
billable commodity.”19 But while performers would sell tickets to an
authentic experience, they could not commodify it and protect it as
intellectual property, or so Barlow thought. “The protections which we
will develop will rely far more on ethics and technology than on law,” he
surmised.20
Intellectual property, however, has not only survived the doom
of the information economy—it has thrived. Today, intellectual property
has fully evolved from goods to a good time. As consumer researchers
have become savvier about how to package and market the human need
for fantasy, play, imagination, and haptic experience, areas of thought
and expression once free as the air we breathe are increasingly becoming
commodified and metered fare, regulated by licenses and royalties,
requiring permission and payment.
Increasingly, owners of cultural properties are issuing cease-anddesist demands to third parties and offering their own official pay-to-play
options. Amazon.com launched Kindle Worlds, a forum to write and sell
fan fiction based on specific licensed media properties.21 YouTube
algorithms to protect copyright are wreaking havoc on Game of Thrones
fan theory sites, where fans use video clips from the popular HBO series
to discuss everything from character development to symbolism in The
World of Ice and Fire.22 The Tolkien estate shut down an unlicensed
Lord of the Rings summer camp.23 Disney filed a trademark suit against
17

JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 170 (2001).
Id.
19
Barlow, supra note 1, at 27.
20
Barlow, supra note 1, at 30.
21
After five years, Kindle Worlds has just been retired. See Kindle Worlds,
AMAZON, https://kindleworlds.amazon.com/worldsAmazon (last visited Jan. 13,
2018).
22
Chris Mills, HBO is Abusing Copyright to take ‘Game of Thrones’ Fan Videos
Off YouTube, BOY GENIUS REP. (May 10, 2016), http://bgr.com/2016/05
/10/game-of-thrones-youtube-theories-hbo/.
23
Mike Masnick, Tolkien Estate Strikes Again: Forces Summer Camp to
Change Name, TECHDIRT (Apr. 20, 2011, 11:40 AM), https://www
18

147

DANCING ON THE GRAVE OF COPYRIGHT? [Vol. 18

a game maker for creating a mobile version of the fictional card game
from the Star Wars universe, “Sabacc,” in which Han Solo famously won
the Millennium Falcon from Lando Calrissian.24 Netflix sent a ceaseand-desist letter to the owners of a pop-up bar in Chicago based on its
popular new television series, Stranger Things, with the quip, “We love
our fans more than anything, but you should know the Demogorgon is
not always as forgiving.”25 The Cartoon Network prevented fans from
opening an unauthorized Rick and Morty themed pop-up bar in
Washington, DC, claiming the move “wasn’t polite and aimed at
profiting off of Rick and Morty fans.”26 Fans responded that the bar
would have been a labor of love and that the company was denying fans
the freedom to “geek out.”27
The economy of verbs is now fully delimited by intellectual
property. The full pantheon of intellectual property rights—copyrights,
trademarks, utility patents and design patents—are marshalled to create
exclusive rights in look and feel, aura, and aesthetic experience.28 Everexpanding merchandising rights, based on copyright’s derivative work
right and trademarks’ prevention of sponsorship and endorsement
confusion, have propelled the commodification of experiences to go
beyond the enclosure of speech into the enclosure of cultural practices.
The result is that copyright and trademarks have crept into some of the
most intimate spaces of human thought and action: our fantasy lives.
Intellectual property laws seek to govern who we imagine ourselves to be
and to commodify every endorphin of glee when we hear a reference to
our favorite characters or stories. This enclosure has serious implications
for humanity. As Yale psychologist Paul Bloom observes, American

.techdirt.com/articles/20110419/01104713954/tolkien-estatestrikes-again-forcessummer-camp-to-change-name.shtml.
24
Ashley Cullins, Hollywood Docket: ‘Star Wars’ Sabacc Game Sparks Another
Lawsuit, HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 4, 2018), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com
/thr-esq/hollywood-docket-star-wars-sabacc-game-sparks-lawsuit-1108386.
25
John Lynch, Netflix Asked a ‘Stranger Things’ Pop-Up Bar to Shut Down with
this Humorous Cease-and-Desist Letter, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-stranger-things-pop-up-bar-funny-ceaseanddesist-letter-2017-9.
26
Jessica Sidman, Rick and Morty-Themed Bar Shut Down After Threats from
Turner Broadcasting, WASHINGTONIAN (Aug. 18, 2018),
https://www.washingtonian.com/2018/08/18/rick-and-morty-themed-bar-shutdown-after-threats-from-turner-broadcasting/.
27
Id.
28
Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV.
529, 529 (2017).
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adults spend on average four minutes a day on sex and over four hours a
day in imaginary worlds.29
The demands to cease such activity follow the old, refuted logic:
“If value, then right.” Rochelle Dreyfuss first offered this pithy
formulation, but the logic had been repudiated much earlier. Felix Cohen
explained the circularity that this approach rests upon: “The vicious
circle inherent in this reasoning is plain. It purports to base legal
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of fact, the economic
value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally
protected.”30
In recent writing, one of us (Sunder) has repudiated this
expansion of rights, decrying the threat to fundamentally human activity,
such as the ability to play, imagine, learn with others, and to reference
the cultural works that shape our lives and societies.31 Unlike Barlow, the
critique does not turn on the form in which information is conveyed—
that is, bottles or no bottles, in Barlow’s parlance. Rather, the critique is
premised on the nature of art itself. Perhaps the most influential theorist
of aesthetic experience is John Dewey. Dewey argued that aesthetic
progress ought to be measured not by the creation of artistic works, but
by the extent of human engagement and participation with cultural
works.32 Dewey’s insights are all the more poignant today in the wake of
DIY (do-it-yourself), the Maker Movement, and User Generated Content
(UGC) enabled by new technologies and the Internet. Kenneth Arrow’s
theory of “learning by doing” and Michael Polanyi’s account of tacit
knowledge, which reveals how scientific knowledge must be
experimented within labs with mentors and colleagues, are also gaining
new purchase in copyright scholarship and in the digital context, as we
increasingly recognize that cultural knowledge, too, must be actively
experienced, repeated, held, touched, tasted, and practiced with others to
be fully known and enjoyed. Performance theory, which describes the
development of individual agency through physical “embodiment” in the
cultural worlds we love, also has important lessons for crafting limits on
property rights in experience, especially in cyberspace, where
embodiment is the primary mode of experience and play.

29

PAUL BLOOM, HOW PLEASURE WORKS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WHY WE LIKE
WHAT WE LIKE 155 (2010).
30
Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 814 (1935).
31
Sunder, supra note 9.
32
See generally JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE (1934).
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II. ONCE MORE, WITH FEELING: COPYRIGHTING EMOTES
Now, copyright and trademark are poised to dive further into the
realms of imagination and experience. Instead of dancing on the grave of
copyright, we consider copyrighting dance itself.
Today, dancing online is sold as a commodity, to the tune of
literally billions of dollars. As mentioned earlier, Epic Games offers its
blockbuster videogame Fortnite for free. Players fight to the death in a
battle royale (the concept itself borrowed from an earlier Japanese manga
and movie). The game’s explosive popularity stems not just from the
exciting competition, but the inclusion of aesthetic elements of joy and
style in the form of avatar skins and “emotes.”33 Emotes are literally ingame expressions: “After a kill, players can dance . . . , adding a fillip of
humor and split-second grace to the victory.”34 The sale of emotes and
skins made Epic over $2 billion in profits in 2018 alone.35
Emotes often borrow popular dance moves—typically, without
licensing. Recently, a number of individuals who created the original
dance moves have sued Epic. Alfonso Ribeiro, a star of the television
show “The Fresh Prince of Bel-Air,” sued Epic Games appropriating his
signature “Carlton dance.” The rappers 2 Milly and BlocboyJB have also
sued Epic on similar grounds for the “Milly Rock” and “Shoot” dances,
respectively. The lawsuits argue that Epic’s unauthorized use of the
artists’ dance moves violates their intellectual property rights, including
copyright, trademark, and right of publicity.36
The first round of the legal battle royale went to the corporation.
The U.S. Copyright Office denied registration on Ribeiro’s dance moves
known as “The Carlton Dance,” characterizing it as “simple routine”
“not registrable as a choreographic work.”37 The U.S. Copyright Office’s
33

Sarah L. Kaufman, The Dances in ‘Fortnite’ Have Become Nearly as
Contagious as the Game, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2018/09/10/the-dances-infortnite-have-become-nearly-as-contagious-as-the-game/?utm_term=.79f41746
6135 (arguing that aesthetics in the form of skins and emotes allow players to
create personal style, making the game both more fun and immensely
profitable).
34
Id.
35
Shanley, supra note 11.
36
Elizabeth A. Harris, A Real-World Battle Over Dancing Avatars: Did Fortnite
Steal the Floss?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/11/arts/fortnite-floss-dance-lawsuits.html.
37
Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 12, Ribeiro v. Take-Two Interactive Software, 2:18-cv-10417 (filed
Feb. 13, 2019) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss].
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longstanding position is that social dances are not copyrightable38 and
that individual dance steps are un-copyrightable ideas that must remain
in the public domain as “the building blocks of choreographic
expression.”39 A recent Supreme Court decision adds a further stumbling
block for the plaintiffs: they cannot file a copyright lawsuit without a
copyright registration.40
While there are important questions about copyrightability, there
is also a racial dimension to the conflict. Some of the artists complaining
of theft are African-American. When Epic offered its first in-game
concert, it invited a white electronic musician, Marshmello, to perform,
partnering with him to offer a “branded” (and likely duly licensed)
Emote.41 “Meanwhile black artists must resort to lawsuits to even be
acknowledged,” bemoans cultural critic Yussef Cole, saying that it is not
simply Fortnite’s failure to share profits with black creators, but its
erasure of the dances’ authorship that is the true offense. “To recognize
someone’s contribution to culture is to lend that person, and their
community some measure of power.”42
The law has not thus far not offered support for copyright in the
popular dance moves of the “Milly Rock,” the “Carlton Dance,” or
“Shoot.” The dances are renamed and repackaged for predominantly
white audiences,43 the serial numbers connecting them to black creators
and their communities rifled off. There are reasons to worry about the
38

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 52 COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF
CHOREOGRAPHY AND PANTOMIME 1 (2017) (“Choreography and pantomimes
consisting of ordinary motor activities, social dances, commonplace movements
or gestures, or athletic movements may lack a sufficient amount of authorship to
qualify for copyright protection.”).
39
See Motion to Dismiss, supra note 37, at 10.
40
See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.Com, L.L.C., 139 S. Ct.
881, 886 (2019) (providing certain exceptions).
41
Yussef Cole, Fortnite’s Appropriation Issue Isn’t About Copyright Law, It’s
About Ethics, WAYPOINT (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://waypoint.vice.com/en_us/article/a3bkgj/fortnite-fortnight-blackappropriation-dance-emote (describing long history of social dancing first
developed by black performers “on dance floors and sidewalks, rather than on
stages and in studios” being “plagued by appropriation and unoriginality”).
42
Id.
43
Id. (“[W]hen these dances are turned into to Emotes, their connections with
poverty and racism are elided and they are reduced to nothing more than a funny
dance, cut off and erased, made vanilla and palatable. This is not simply bad
luck, it is the latest in a long trend of omission. . . . Shoot becomes Hype, Milly
Rock becomes Swipe It. Blackness becomes a grey area, becomes bundles of
mocap data, and is made ultimately invisible.”).
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extension of copyright to a very limited set of dance steps, but, given the
context of a wealthy corporation further enriching itself based on the
creativity of others, there seems little occasion for a victory dance.

III. CAN HAS CHEEZBURGER?: THE LAW OF MEMES AND GIFS
“Information wants to be free.” This is perhaps the best-known
slogan of the information age. John Perry Barlow credited “this elegant
statement of the obvious” to Stewart Brand. Barlow recognized that the
statement implied agency in information,44 an idea that science and
technology studies scholars would find familiar. Barlow explicitly
borrowed biologist Richard Dawkins’ concept of a meme—in Barlow’s
words, “self-replicating patterns of information that propagate
themselves across the ecologies of mind . . . ”45
Barlow was not content with mere replication, but also
evolution: information would not only propagate, it would “evolve
constantly into forms which will be more perfectly adapted to their
surroundings[,]” he wrote.46 Barlow wrote:
Digital information, unconstrained by packaging, is a
continuing process more like the metamorphosing tales of
prehistory than anything which will fit in shrink wrap. From the
Neolithic to Gutenberg, information was passed on, mouth to ear,
changing with every re-telling (or re-singing). The stories which
once shaped our sense of the world didn’t have authoritative
versions. They adapted to each culture in which they found
themselves being told.47

Everything old was new again.
As Barlow predicted, the internet would explode with replicating
and evolving memes. From grumpy cat to doge, memes often serve to
entertain and to inform, and often both. Sites like
44

See Barlow, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that slogan “information wants to be
free” “recognizes . . . the fact that [information] might be capable of possessing
something like a ‘desire’ in the first place”).
45
Id. In a subsequent article describing “Godwin’s Law of Nazi Analogies,”
Mike Godwin would describe a “meme” as “an idea that functions in a mind the
same way a gene or virus functions in the body.” Mike Godwin, Meme,
Counter-Meme, WIRED (Oct. 1, 1994),
https://www.wired.com/1994/10/godwin-if-2/. For a fuller discussion of memes,
see Angela Watercutter & Emma Grey Ellis, The WIRED Guide to Memes,
WIRED (Apr. 1, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/guide-memes/.
46
Barlow, supra note 1, at 19.
47
Id.
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ICanHas.Cheezburger.com (named after an original nonsensical meme)
collect such memes.48 Usually, the meme borrows an image or set of
video stills and adds a caption that removes the image from its original
context and deploys it in a way that the original image creator would not
have anticipated. Websites and apps offer the ability to write one’s own
captions to popular memes, tailoring them to one’s own politics or
viewpoints.49 One popular meme takes a clip from a 2004 German film
to add different captions to a scene where Hitler learns that the Nazis
have lost Berlin.50
But memes were not the only new vocabulary of the internet:
emojis and GIFs also emerged as a form of expression. Eric Goldman
writes that emojis offer “a powerful and efficient way to express
ourselves.”51 He observes, “The right emoji can convey emotional
valence, cultural jokes, or other valuable information to a message.”52
Most importantly, emojis “make communicating fun.”53
Where memes seem to have developed independently without
need for a particular corporate sponsor, GIFs and emojis needed
technological encoding to function across platforms. GIFs emerged only
when a corporation sponsored a file format that allowed compressing
graphical information so that it could be shared widely without
burdening limited communications resources. Compuserve invented the
“Graphic Interchange Format” in 1987 as a means of bringing “a little
color and movement to the Web.”54

48

See, e.g., I CAN HAS CHEEZBURGER?, https://icanhas.cheezburger.com/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2019).
49
See, e.g., MEME CREATOR, https://www.memecreator.org/ (last visited May
16, 2019) (collecting popular memes and permitting users to generate new
captions for them).
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See Aaron Schwabach, Reclaiming Copyright from the Outside In: What the
Downfall Hitler Meme Means for Transformative Works, Fair Use, and Parody,
8 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 2 (2012) (“[P]arodies, posted on YouTube and
elsewhere, using clips from the 2004 German film Der Untergang (released in
the US as Downfall), particularly the climactic rant scene after Hitler (played by
Bruno Ganz) learns that Felix Steiner has not mobilized troops to break the
Soviet assault on Berlin—meaning that the Nazis have lost the war.” (footnote
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Since that time, GIFs have become a means to invoke cultural
references to express an idea with a flourish. As Arwa Haider notes, “In
an age of 24/7 information, where there’s pressure to stand out, and a
general expectation that we should react to news in real time, we need to
say something as quickly and emphatically as possible—so we say it
with gifs.”55 Where memes are often used to originate and promote ideas,
even complicated ones, GIFs are often used to express a response.
Haider explains: GIFs “embody a range of expressions that have become
everyday patter, thanks to social media: the ‘eye roll’, the ‘facepalm’, the
‘mic drop’. These are potent little shots of melodrama; gifs are inherently
camp.”56
This does not mean that GIFs are free of problematic aspects.
Some have noted that non-black users often use GIFs featuring black
figures to express themselves—that black people are deployed to
perform the emotional labor “as a kind of modern
minstrelsy, . . . reinforc[ing] racist caricatures.”57 This works by
exploiting our culture’s racist association of “black people with
excessive behaviors”58—the kind of dramatic gesture often found in
GIFs. Not only is the usage of GIFs distributed unequally, the types of
available GIFs also exhibit disparities. Because there are few Latino,
Asian American, and Native American celebrities in Western media,
there seem to be few GIFs featuring these races. A quick perusal of GIF
repository Giphy.com will attest to this absence.59 This may reduce the
reinforcement of racist caricatures, but it also compels non-white and
non-black individuals to utilize folks who don’t look like them to express
themselves, furthering a sense of invisibility in contemporary culture.
Unlike emojis, which are designed for public use, GIFs and
memes rely on copyrighted works—almost invariably without the
permission of the copyright holders. These devices often borrow stills
from broadcast video or movies. They often focus on particularly striking
moments, a pose or gesture within a larger scene. So why haven’t GIFs
and memes succumbed to a wave of copyright infringement claims?
For his part, John Perry Barlow did not believe that sharing
memes was illegal. He tweeted this point:
55

Arwa Haider, How the GIF Won the Internet, BBC (Aug. 29, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20170825-how-the-gif-won-the-internet.
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Reaction GIFs, TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.teenvogue.com/story/digital-blackface-reaction-gifs.
59
See GIPHY, https://giphy.com (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
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60

Not only is sharing a meme unlikely to constitute copyright
infringement (the sharing is implicitly licensed), the meme itself is likely
to qualify as a fair use of the underlying copyrighted work.
Yet, we have not seen a deluge of litigation challenging these
uses, even when the copyright owners are Hollywood studios with a
history of asserting their intellectual property claims against
infringement. Indeed, we can identify no case bringing a copyright
infringement or other legal claim against either a GIF or a meme. This is
because most GIFs and memes are likely protected as fair use, thereby
protected from copyright infringement claims.
GIFs and memes are likely protected as fair use largely because
users make a transformative use of the original work. GIFs and memes
take an original gesture and allow others to utilize it to communicate
their own emotions or thoughts. Transformative works “lie at the heart of
the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of
copyright.”61 This is true even though most memes do not take aim at the
original work but employ it for critical analysis of contemporary
phenomena. Copyright law clearly privileges critique and parody that
makes fun of the original work, but the most popular uses of GIFs and
memes do not fall squarely into that realm. Because of the highly
transformative nature of GIFs and memes, however, we believe that most
GIFs and memes would find legal protection from copyright
infringement claims as fair use.
Take the American Chopper meme. In its most common format,
it consists in a set of five stills from a Discovery Channel reality

60

John Perry Barlow (@JPBarlow), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:47 AM),
https://twitter.com/JPBarlow/status/123816905608929281.
61
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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television show that depicted tensions between a father and son.62
Fingers are pointed, and, in the fourth panel, a chair gets thrown—all of
which makes for a dramatic backdrop to an otherwise pointy-headed,
back-and-forth intellectual argument. Meme creators offer captions that
offer point and counterpoint on a variety of subjects. As one writer notes,
“What makes American Chopper truly unique in the meme world is that
it gives equal weight to both sides of an argument.”63 The original
television show and memes based on these five stills are worlds apart.
They discuss different subjects in a different form for a different purpose.
Another popular meme, the Distracted Boyfriend meme, uses the
original photo and repurposes it entirely as social commentary. The
meme borrowed stock photos showing three individuals engaged in a
complicated relationship, but captions allow each of the individuals to
become a stand-in for another person or concept. The Distracted
Boyfriend meme seems to have originated in a Turkish Facebook group,
deployed to comment on musician Phil Collins’ move from progressive
rock to pop.64

62

See Opheli Garcia Lawler, The Star of the ‘American Chopper’ Meme Didn’t
Know What a Meme Was, VICE (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/7xddj4/the-star-of-the-american-choppermeme-didnt-know-what-a-meme-was.
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David Britton, What the American Chopper Meme Taught Us in 2018, DAILY
DOT (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/american-chopperargument-2018-meme/.
64
See Tiffany Kelly, Why ‘Distracted Boyfriend’ is the Meme of 2017, DAILY
DOT (last updated Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/distractedboyfriend-meme-2017/.
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David Britton observes, “If you use Distracted Boyfriend, you’re
commenting on how you’re ignoring something you should be paying
attention to in favor of something you find more captivating.”65 The
meme also reveals how readily susceptible to repurposing memes often
are: as Tiffany Kelly notes, “The distracted boyfriend meme is a modern
version of a caption contest. Who is the distracted boyfriend? Who is the
woman distracting the boyfriend? Who is the offended girlfriend? Just
fill in the blanks!”66 The Distracted Boyfriend meme also shows how
memes cross global boundaries of culture.
Even businesses now deploy GIFs and memes.67 But the fact that
their use is inevitably commercial does not necessarily defeat their fair
use claim. The courts have upheld a variety of commercial acts as fair
use. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
a rap group’s parody of a song could constitute fair use despite its
commercial purpose: “the more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use.”68
A meme may be protected even if the people depicted in the
meme object to its politics. The Seventh Circuit held that a T-shirt using
a significantly modified photo of a Wisconsin mayor to criticize that
mayor was fair use because the copyright holder did not claim the
modified version reduced demand for the mayor’s photograph and
because it significantly modified the original.69
Of course, borrowing from popular broadcast properties can
violate copyright. When a company published a book of trivia questions
about the television show Seinfeld, including many instances of actual
dialogue from the show, the studio sued and won, prevailing over a
defense of fair use.70 A number of factors contributed to the court’s
ruling that the trivia book did not constitute fair use. The trivia book had
“slight to non-existent” transformative purpose.71 Furthermore, the
65
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Cir. 1998).
71
Id. at 142.
66

157

DANCING ON THE GRAVE OF COPYRIGHT? [Vol. 18

defendant’s trivia book would be “likely to fill a market niche that Castle
Rock would in general develop.”72 These factors distinguish this case
from the facts typical in the creation of GIFs and memes.

IV. LAW OR ETHICS?
There are certainly reasons to think that copyright and other
forms of intellectual property are not the right weapons in battles over
cultural appropriation. For starters, too many property rights in bits and
memes will stifle innovation and the further development of culture. For
this reason, Barlow seemed to think intellectual property was “OP,” or
overpowered—too high-powered and absolute to regulate a field as
dynamic as culture. Barlow suggested that ethics, not law, were more
suitable to assess privileges and obligations where, as here, Epic Games
is making billions off the backs of predominantly black creators whose
dances and style bring immense cultural and economic value to the
game.
More recently the eminent philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah
has staked a claim in the cultural appropriation wars. “[W]hen an
American pop star makes a mint from riffing on Mbaqanga music from
South Africa, you can wonder if the rich American gave the much poorer
Africans who taught it to him their fair share of the proceeds,” Appiah
contemplates.73 “If he didn’t, the problem is not cultural theft but
exploitation. People who parse such transgressions in terms of ownership
have accepted a commercial system that is alien to the traditions they aim
to protect.”74 Appiah concludes that “[d]isrespect and exploitation are
worthy targets of our disapproval, but the idea of cultural appropriation is
ripe for the wastebasket. . . . The rhetoric of ownership is alluring and
potent, but when we’re describing the quicksilver complexities of
culture, it just isn’t appropriate.”75
It is understandable that Appiah, a scholar of identity, does not
see property as a nimble enough tool for regulating cultural production
and dissemination in a complex and unequal society on fair terms. But
that is precisely the task of modern property and intellectual property
law! In truth, the criticism of the property claims of black creators of
72
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popular social dances can be applied to most intellectual property claims.
Copyright protects works as mundane as calendars, coupons and
competition cards, kitsch from ashtrays to lamps,76 and useful articles
such as the stripes and chevrons on cheerleading uniforms.77 Copyright
protects The Macarena and has Girl Scouts running scared to perform the
social dance sans paying royalties for the music.78 But copyright draws a
line at popular dance moves created by African American artists?79 In
truth, very little in the way of copyright doctrine supports the Copyright
Office Circular recommendations. Copyright protection requires a very
low bar of originality80 and self-consciously refuses to discriminate
between high and low art.81 We must confront the reality that our
copyright law is rife with inconsistencies, as best, and racial and cultural
biases, at worst.
And then there is the question that if we are to regulate by ethics,
whose ethics? Barlow imagined Cyberspace as an opportunity to return
to the Western frontier (dubbing it, with Mitch Kapoor, the “electronic
frontier”) where community norms, not law from above, would regulate
modes of life.82 “Having come from a place where people leave their
keys in their cars and don’t even have keys to their houses, I remain
convinced that the best obstacle to crime is a society with its ethics

76

See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 221 (1954) (opening the door to copyright
in everyday useful articles, from silverware to ashtrays).
77
See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1002, 1012
(2017) (“The [colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the surface of the
cheerleading uniforms] are therefore separable from the uniforms and eligible
for copyright protection.”).
78
Backlash from one California Girl Scout troupe’s performance of a “silent
Macarena” for fear of copyright reprisals spurred Congress to pass the Fairness
in Music Licensing Act of 1998, which increased the number of bars and
restaurants exempt from royalties. See Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2012)).
79
Cole, supra note 41.
80
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 352 (1991) (“The
standard of originality is low, but it does exist.”).
81
See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)
(articulating the now famous “non-discrimination principle” in copyright law,
warning that judges are not suited to evaluate the artist or aesthetic merit of art).
82
Barlow, supra note 1, at 24 (romantically yearning for the early frontier days
when “order was established according to an unwritten Code of the West which
had the fluidity of etiquette rather than the rigidity of law. Ethics were more
important than rules. Understandings were preferred over laws, which were, in
any event, largely unenforceable”).
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intact,” Barlow mused.83 But Barlow’s “ethics” derive from a
homogeneous, well-to-do community—or one that forcefully created
homogeneity by routing out Native Americans, Mexican Americans and
other non-whites from the settlers’ “frontier.” Can black or indigenous
creators rely on frontier “ethics”? Should we allow conflicts over
contested resources to be determined by the ethics of those in power in
Cyberspace—the “brogrammers” of Silicon Valley?
We must always be attendant to the ethical implications of law.
But our ethical inquiry should start by asking, how does law affect real
people on the ground, including the weakest and the poorest? How does
our diversity affect our sense of trust in “community norms”? Our
discussions of the future role of intellectual property laws—in
cyberspace and real space—need to account for historical and ongoing
racial, class, and gender exploitation in the production and dissemination
of culture.84 Miley Cyrus twerking at the Video Music Awards (VMAs)
in 2013 caused international outrage. As one critic memorably put it,
“the effect was not of a homage but of a minstrel show, with a young
wealthy woman from the [S]outh doing a garish imitation of black music
and reducing black dancers to background fodder and black women to
exaggerated sex objects.”85 What are the implications of an intellectual
property law that would allow for the appropriation of the creative works
of black bodies and minds through the erasure of the human authorship
embedded in those works? Intellectual property is a tool for power, and
that includes the ability to name a resource as property or public domain.
We must confront the violence of the law, which is not neutral, but beset
by implicit racial, cultural, gendered and class biases.
Memes, like genes, travel and evolve. They are the building
blocks of culture, just as genes are the building blocks of life. At the
same time, we must be ever cognizant of the social context in which
culture is produced. Cultural production and the laws that regulate it are
deeply imbricated in the construction of society and economy, including
the creation and maintenance of colonial power and unequal distributions
83

Id.
See, e.g., KYRA D. GAUNT, THE GAMES BLACK GIRLS PLAY: LEARNING THE
ROPES FROM DOUBLE-DUTCH TO HIP-HOP 94–97 (2006) (recounting how
everyday musical games of black girls becomes a bedrock inspiration of “black
popular music making” in popular male centered hip-hop, including Nelly’s
“Down, Down Baby”).
85
Hadley Freeman, Miley Cyrus’s Twerking Routine was Cultural Appropriation
at its Worst, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/27/miley-cyrustwerking-cultural-appropriation.
84
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of wealth and knowledge. This truth should not lead us to throw up our
hands, letting ethics but not law play a role in the difficult questions of
our time. To the contrary, intellectual property law must confront its own
role in apportioning respect, power, and wealth in our worlds, and be
resolved to do better.
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CONCLUSION IN FORM OF MEME

WHAT DIDN’T HAPPEN:
AN ESSAY IN SPECULATION
PETER JASZI

Most of us held off celebrating the beginning of a renewed slow
trickle of works into copyright’s public domain until the first seconds of
New Year’s Day, 2019, but (if it hadn’t been so early in the day), we
would have been entitled to raise a glass at 4:04 PM on the preceding
December 27th, when the last substantive business undertaken in 2018 by
either house of Congress was concluded in the Senate. (Like the House,
which wrapped up its business at 4:02, the World’s Greatest Deliberative
Body had convened that day at 4:00.) At that moment, a last-minute
push to extend copyrights beyond the 20-year bonus terms awarded in
the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension became a practical and
mathematical impossibility. This was all the more true since no
legislation to achieve that result had been introduced in either house
during the 115th Congress.
Obviously, non-events matter, not only in the Holmesian
heuristic sense (per the “curious incident” recited in The Adventure of
Silver Blaze), but substantively as well. Some of the last 25 years’ most
important positive developments in copyright policy have—in fact—
been negatives: the collapse of the SOPA/PIPA bills in 2012, the
congressional failure to enact categorical and comprehensive
paracopyright legislation in 1998,1 and the long and ultimately successful
effort (throughout the mid-and late-90’s) to block enactment of sui
generis database protection in U.S. law.2 The congress’s failure to enact
term extension legislation (despite having been greenlighted by the
Supreme Court in Eldred v. Reno) is another example.
So one minor goal of this essay is to celebrate the power of
inaction. Another is to acknowledge the pleasure of having your
1

As originally called for by a Clinton administration Commerce Department
Task Force on Information Infrastructure. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF
THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995) [hereinafter
WHITE PAPER]. In the event, the final version of the new Chapter 12 of U.S.
Code Title 17, introduced in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
constrained as it was by a workable mechanism for defining exceptions to the
prohibitions against “circumvention,” has proven inconvenient, expensive, and
downright frustrating but not a measurable drag on innovation.
2
For references to this still largely untold story, see INDRANATH GUPTA,
FOOTPRINTS OF FEIST IN EUROPEAN DATABASE DIRECTIVE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF IP LAW-MAKING IN EUROPE (2017).
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predictions proven wrong. I’m happy to say that in 1995 I told a Senate
panel that a 20-year term extension would “represent[] a down payment
on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.”3 Obviously, and
happily, it didn’t work out that way. My main objective in what follows
is to suggest what accounts for that particular negative result. In other
words, how did the time-honored notion of periodic add-ons to copyright
duration, so recently viewed as non-controversial, become politically
toxic over less than two decades? 4
In search of an explanation, you are invited to return with us now
to those thrilling days of yesteryear to witness what is arguably the
primal scene in which influence and ideology conceived the
contemporary term extension movement. In May 1962, the stage was set
in a House of Representatives Judiciary Committee hearing room.
Congress recently had begun the process of devising comprehensive
copyright reform legislation, and it was already clear that (among other
things) it eventually would change the law in various ways. The most
foreseeable and (then) least controversial of these would be to introduce
a modest prospective extension of copyright term. It was just as easy to
predict that any change in the formula would put the next generation of
copyright owners at a durational advantage vis-à-vis the current one—so
that transitional provisions to harmonize existing and new copyright
terms would be politically necessary in the final legislative package. But
because all of this was going to take some time (14 years, as it turned
out!) there was a more immediate problem: If copyright terms calculated
the old-fashioned way continued to run their course, some rightsholders
would lose their existing protection before the new dispensation kicked
in. A rough and ready solution would be to extend existing renewal
terms while the new legislation was being considered, and this bill before
the House was the first such “interim extension” to be proposed.5 The
3

The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 72 (1995) (statement of Peter Jaszi, Professor of
Law, American University). My near contemporary reflections on this richly
demoralizing experience can be found in Peter Jaszi, Goodbye to All That—A
Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-Grounded
Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 595
(1996).
4
See Timothy B. Lee, Why Mickey Mouse’s Copyright Term Extension
Probably Won’t Happen Again, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/01/hollywood-says-its-not-planninganother-copyright-extension-push.
5
See Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection in Certain Cases: Hearing
on H.J. Res. 627 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 87th Cong. (1962) [hereinafter Hearing on Extending
the Duration of Copyright Protection]. The 1961 Report of the Register of
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Judiciary Committee had consulted with the Justice Department, which
had expressed strong reservations, writing that it would be “unwise” to
extend the term of copyright from the viewpoint of the public “which
is interested in the early passing of copyrighted material into the
public domain.”6
Then as now, it was unusual but not unheard of for a member of
Congress to appear as a witness before a committee other than their own;
it was even more unusual when that member was one of the most
powerful members of the body. Nevertheless, the next voice you hear is
that of Majority Whip Hale Boggs (D-LA) countering the
administration’s stated position with remarks leading up to this oldfashioned stemwinder of a conclusion:
This startling statement is wholly inconsistent with reality. The
public does not gain from the “early passing of copyrighted
material into the public domain.” When a copyright passes into the
public domain, the public is not the beneficiary. The right to make
the profit passes from the creator or the original publisher to a
person who has contributed nothing to the work. The cost of a
ticket to a Bach, Beethoven, or Brahms concert is no less than to
one which provides the music of contemporary composers.
Listening to radio or watching television programs which use public
domain material costs no less than programs utilizing copyrighted
works. Copyrighted and public domain works are sold in books in
same price ranges.
The public cannot have any real interest in depriving authors,
composers, or artists of their incomes from the books or songs or
plays which they have written, or from the picture which they
create. What benefit can result to a society dedicated to free
enterprise from depriving some of its citizens of the earnings of
their productions during their lifetime. Are we to say to our young
authors, playwrights, composers, and others that they may live by
their talents provided they do not live too long? Are we to say to
Copyrights that kicked off the reform process made a relatively modest
suggestion: retain the long-prevailing general approach based on a relatively
short initial term of 28 years commencing at publication, but extend the
additional “renewal” term potentially upon application from 28 to 48 years. See
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT Law 50–51 (Comm. Print 1961),
https://www.copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf (proposing a
maximum general term of “76 years from first dissemination” [20 years longer
than the law then provided]).
6
Hearing on Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection, supra note 5, at
30 (statement of Rep. Cramer, referring to a letter from the Attorney General).
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them that no matter how great their skills, despite their talents, and
irrespective of the dedication to their work, if they commence
writing too young and live too long, there is no place for them in
our free enterprise society? Are we to tell them that the only
property of value which can be transmitted to their dependents must
be in the form of stocks, bonds, cash, or real property and that
intellectual property must be valueless to them?
There is no benefit to the public from the “early passage of
works into the public domain.” That is a foreign philosophy—on
which is the very anthesis of the standards by which we live. In our
society the creator of intellectual property cannot be the forgotten
man, or we shall become a forgotten society.7

Why Rep. Boggs chose to insert himself into this debate on the
side of interim copyright extension remains (at least to me) unclear. But
for present purposes the politics of his intervention is less interesting
than its rhetoric. Most notably (in addition to summoning the spirit of
capitalism and darkly denouncing foreign influence), he models an
approach to assessing (and denigrating) the value of the public domain
which would dominate discussion for decades to come. In effect, Boggs
suggests, allowing works to exit copyright would confer a public benefit
only if it had a measurable effect on conventional measures of consumer
welfare such as the unit price of a book or a concert ticket—and
advocates of the term limitation have failed to meet their burden on that
point. In the absence of such a showing—Boggs asserts—there is no
reason to resist creators’ “natural” property claims.8
7

Hearing on Extending the Duration of Copyright Protection, supra note 5, at 6
(statement of Rep. Hale Boggs).
8
The proposed interim extension was enacted, and was the first of nine similar
bills passed over years to preserve copyrights already in their renewal terms,
ultimately qualifying them for the 20-year extension provided in the Copyright
Act of 1976. Where prospective protection was concerned, however, the 1976
Act departed dramatically from the approach proposed back in 1961; following
general international practice, it abolished the two-term scheme in favor of a
basic unitary term consisting of the life of the author plus fifty years. In
retrospect, we can see that the elimination of the renewal formality represented
the single most dramatic extension of copyright term in U.S. history, since under
the old dispensation the vast majority of copyrights wound up at the end of the
initial term. See generally Jamie Carlstone et al., Copyright Renewal of U.S.
Books Published in 1932: Re-analyzing Ringer's Study to Determine a More
Accurate Renewal Rate for Books, 79 COLLEGE & RES. LIBRARIES 697 (2018),
available at https://doi.org/10.5860/crl.79.5.697. But that’s another story.
So is the one that follows, but I can’t resist. The specific claim that Boggs
understands as deriving from the frictionless operation of authors’ rights is, at
least, relatively modest in scope, i.e., “creators should be able to live by their
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talents,” as well as to pass along something (unspecified in extent) to their
“descendants.” More than a half century earlier, that hot-and-cold champion of
creative entitlement, Samuel Langhorne Clemens, had been more explicit in his
testimony on what would become the Copyright Act of 1909: “I like that
extension of copyright life to the author’s life and fifty years afterward. I think
that would satisfy any reasonable author, because it would take care of his
children. Let the grand-children take care of themselves. That would take care
of my daughters, and after that I am not particular. I shall then have long been
out of this struggle, independent of it, indifferent to it.” To Amend and
Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright: Arguments Before the Committees
on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives, Conjointly, on the Bills
S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, 59th Cong. 196–201 (1906) (statement of Mr. Samuel
L. Clemens); Mark Twain in White Amuses Congressmen, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
1906, at 5,
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1906/12/08/101852379.pdf.
Did he mean the last, or was the joke just too good to let pass? Either way, we
can recognize in Twain’s main discourse a version of the argument from
generational succession that would gain traction in years to follows. Consider,
for example, the actuarially dubious congressional rationale for the CTEA
memorialized by Justice Ginsberg in Eldred v. Ashcroft:
Members of Congress expressed the view that, as a result of increases
in human longevity and in parents’ average age when their children are
born, the pre-CTEA term did not adequately secure the right to profit
from licensing one’s work during one’s lifetime and to take pride and
comfort in knowing that one’s children—and perhaps their children—
might also benefit from one’s posthumous popularity. 141 Cong. Rec.
6553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see 144 Cong. Rec. S12377
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Among the main
developments [compelling reconsideration of the 1976 Act's term] is
the effect of demographic trends . . . on the effectiveness of the lifeplus-50 term to provide adequate protection for American creators and
their heirs.”).
537 U.S. 186, 207, n.14 (2003).
Indeed, in her 1995 congressional testimony, Register of Copyrights Mary
Beth Peters had recited that “[p]rotection of two succeeding generations is the
standard goal recognized in [the] Berne [Convention]” citing various authorities
including recitals of the 1994 EU Directive on Copyright Term. Copyright
Term, Film Labeling, And Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989,
H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives,
104th Cong. 175 n.39 (1995). Subsequently, defending the constitutionality of
the CTEA before the Supreme Court, the U.S. government asserted that in 1908,
the revision of the Berne Convention to provide for a basic term of “life-plus50” years was designed “to provide compensation during authors’ lives and
during the lives of any children or grandchildren”—and that, as a result, changes
in life expectancy justified the 20-year add-on. Brief for Respondent at 25,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
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Viewed from an author-centric perspective, all this makes perfect sense. A
copyright system that is author-directed, root and branch, could be expected to
elevate considerations relating to the welfare of creators’ survivors over, say,
public access. Certainly, this explanation of the rationale for term extension
provides relatively little room for weighing the consequences on pro and con.
But there is a problem with this plausible-sounding explanation, which no one
stopped to consider at the time: It is demonstrably untrue!
In fact, the records of the 1908 Diplomatic Conference (and that of 1967,
where term was discussed again for good measure) are innocent of any mention
of this author-centric rationale for term expansion. Sam Ricketson, the foremost
historian of Berne, has stated that “in the debates that took place at various
Berne revision conferences on the question of duration, one is hard pressed to
find reasoned justifications for the move for longer terms of protection.” Sam
Ricketson, The Copyright Term, 23 INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
L. 753, 778 (1992). Indeed, a 1991 Memo on the project for what was then
called the “Berne Protocol” (later rechristened the WIPO Treaty on Copyright)
states (shades of Mark Twain) that the original intent had been to “make
reasonably certain that at least the first generation of [heirs]” would benefit.
Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention, 1st Sess.,
Nov. 4–8, 1991, WIPO Doc. BCP/CE/I/3, ¶ 159, (Oct. 8, 1991). So where does
this line of reasoning find its source? The answer may be found in Claude
Masouyé’s widely-read but authoritatively non-authoritative 1978 “Guide to the
Berne Convention,” a WIPO publication which recites that “It is not merely by
chance that fifty years was chosen. Most countries have felt it fair and right that
the average lifetime of an author and his direct descendants should be covered,
i.e. three generations.” CLAUDE MASOUYÉ, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 46
(1978). Of course, as then-WIPO Secretary General Árpád Bogsch made clear
in his introduction, the Guide is not, in itself, “an authoritative interpretation.”
What was Masouyé’s authority? None is cited, but the closest I can come is his
own 1959 article, advocating for (without any identified source or precedent) the
position later enshrined in the official-seeming volume. Claude Masouye, Vers
une prolongation de la durée de la protection, 24 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU
DROIT D'AUTEUR 93 (July 1959) (Fr.), https://www.la-rida.com/fr/articlerida/3406. There, the evidentiary trail ends, as does this digression. Or almost.
I would be remiss to omit noting that Silke Von Lewinski’s Term of Protection
in Copyright repeats the rationale, although it adds no evidence for it. See Silke
von Lewinski, EC Proposal for a Council Directive Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 23 INT’L REV. OF INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 753, 785 (1992).
So what, exactly, is demonstrated by this story of an all-too-plausible
explanation that has—in fact—no visible means of support? On the one hand,
perhaps, only that even the most distinguished scholars can, from time to time,
get carried away with themselves. On the other, I’d suggest, is a different
cautionary proposition: That the author-construct apparently enjoys, like the
Shadow, the power to cloud human minds. It is not for nothing that at p. 3 of his
statement, Rep. Boggs cites the century-old (and distinctly foreign) observation
that “equally with the builder or the planter, the author’s ownership of his work
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There’s nothing particularly remarkable in Boggs’ framing. For
decades, arguments on both sides of the issue were primarily made in
what might be called a “consumerist” frame, with crisscrossing claims
about whether a more robust public domain would (or wouldn’t) offer
more conventional information goods at lower prices. For many (or
most) of that era’s public domain advocates, myself included,9 engaged
with the issue primarily, if not exclusively, in similar terms. Even the
heroes of the early resistance to term extension, such as the late Professor
Dennis Karjala, cast their arguments about the costs of a longer
protection period primarily in terms of the loss to the public of specific
finished derivative works (such as motion pictures based on public
domain originals) that it might bring about—an expanded argument, to
be sure, but one with roots in the dominant consumerist rhetoric
nonetheless.10 It’s not a coincidence, therefore, that the “business
model” of the exemplary named plaintiff in the ultimate court challenge
to the constitutionality of the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term

is, in (literary raconteur and presumably proud parent) Disraeli’s famous words,
‘the most natural of all titles, because it is the most simple and least artificial. It
is paramount and sovereign, because it is a tenure by creation.’” 1 ISAAC
DISRAELI, THE CALAMITIES AND QUARRELS OF AUTHORS: WITH SOME INQUIRIES
RELATING TO THEIR MORAL AND LITERARY CHARACTER, AND SOME MEMOIRS
FOR OUR LITERARY HISTORY 30 (New York, W.J. Widdleton 1868), which the
publisher describes as “edited by his son, the Hon. Benjamin Disraeli” (‘silverfork’ novelist turned politician). Isaac Disraeli (b.1766) had died more than a
decade before the first British printing of this posthumous collection, which is
undated but may be as early as 1859.
9
In retrospect, my own 1995 comment that “discussions of the public domain
which center on whether high quality reprints of classics cost more or less than
cheaply produced mass market paperbacks trivialize the concept of the public
domain by overlooking its more central function as the source to which the
creative men and women of each generation turn for the materials they refashion
into new and newly valuable works of imagination” may have been on the track,
but read now it seems infuriatingly non-specific. Likewise, it is sobering to
reread David Lange’s beautiful 1981 article, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981), which launched a thousand inquiries, and
realize that it says almost nothing about the virtues of limited copyright as such
(rather than the vices of supplementary pseudo-copyright in state law). But see
id. at 150 n.16–19.
10
See Statement Of Copyright And Intellectual Property Law Professors In
Opposition To H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, & S. 505, “The Copyright Term Extension
Act,” from Dennis S. Karjala, Professor of Law, Arizona State University, to
Comms. on the Judiciary of S. & H.R. 12–13 (Jan. 28, 1998),
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1
998Statement.html.
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Extension Act was giving away physical exemplars of downloaded
books (while encouraging others to follow suit).11
This narrow, market-oriented understanding of the value of the
public domain enabled, in turn, another set of tropes, in which the public
domain was figured as a kind of information limbo in which neglected
works linger precisely because nobody owns them. Here’s Bruce
Lehman, the Clinton administration’s “IP Czar,” in comfortable colloquy
with Senator Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) in the run up to the CTEA,
comprehensively missing the point about Shakespeare and the public
domain:
SEN. DEWINE: . . . Your contention . . . was that going into public
domain is really not necessarily to the benefit of the consumer . . .
How far do you take that? . . . .
MR. LEHMAN: . . . I can give you probably an example. I think
that sometimes you go to book stores, and you will see very old
films that have fallen into the public domain . . . [S]ome of those
films you will see in a book store have been reissued and sold very
cheaply as, you know, video cassettes maybe for $6 or $7 or
something like that. That would be an advantage. But you have to
balance that off by the fact that there are probably a lot more films
that have been lost to the public forever and never reissued at all
[nor] made available because nobody had the economic incentive to
do so.
SEN. DEWINE: To preserve them.
MR. LEHMAN: That is right, to preserve them and to put them out.
And I would also just say, if you think of your own behavior, if you
go into a book store, there are lots of books—you know,
Shakespeare is not under copyright anymore. Do you really see a
big difference in price between the public domain stuff and the
nonpublic domain stuff? Does that even enter into your
consciousness as a consumer?12

Representations of the public domain as a limbo of the unowned
still pop up from time to time, but—as the political collapse of copyright

11

For more on programmer/provocateur Eric Eldred and his Eldritch Press, see
generally Eric Eldred, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Eldred
(last visited on May 19, 2019).
12
The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S.
Judiciary Comm., 104th Cong., 38 (1995) (testimony of Hon. Bruce Lehman,
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office);
but see MARIE HALL ETS, JUST ME 12 (1965) (“‘Rabbit,’ I said. [He didn’t have
any name because nobody owned him.]”).

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

170

term extension demonstrates, they no longer dominate. So what
changed? My speculative sketch of a tentative answer follows.
Material objectification characterized not only millennial
discussions of the public domain; it also marked emerging discourse
about what came to be known as Internet policy—although we hadn’t yet
even settled on a name for the thing itself. It was “cyberspace” to those
like John Perry Barlow, who were committed to its disembodied
potentialities, and “the information superhighway” or (worse) the
“National Information Infrastructure” to its would-be regulators.
Although Barlow insisted in 1996 that “increasingly obsolete information
industries would perpetuate themselves by proposing laws, in America
and elsewhere, that claim to own speech itself throughout the world . . .
[that] would declare ideas to be another industrial product, no more noble
than pig iron.”13
(Or—he might have added—printed books.)
Nevertheless, in the political debates of 1994–98, toward which he
gestures here, the Internet was figured primarily as a complicated nearfrictionless system of virtual conduits for the distribution (or
misappropriation) of finished content.14 Indeed, this portrayal continued
to hold rhetorical sway when the Internet found itself under close judicial
scrutiny for the first time in connection with the file-sharing wars of the
13

John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, 18
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5, 6 (2019).
14
Consider this, from the opening pages of the government report that started
the trouble:
The NII of tomorrow . . . will be much more than these separate
communications networks; it will integrate them into an advanced highspeed, interactive, broadband, digital communications system.
Computers, telephones, televisions, radios, fax machines and more will
be linked by the NII, and users will be able to communicate and
interact with other computers, telephones, televisions, radios, fax
machines and more—all in digital form. The NII has tremendous
potential to improve and enhance our lives. It can increase access to a
greater amount and variety of information and entertainment resources
that can be delivered quickly and economically from and to virtually
anywhere in the world in the blink of an eye. For instance, hundreds of
channels of “television” programming, thousands of musical
recordings, and literally millions of “magazines” and “books” can be
made available to homes and businesses across the United States and
around the world.
White Paper, supra note 1, at 8 (citations omitted). There are valuable nearcontemporary discussions of such figures of speech. See RAYMOND GOZZI JR.,
THE POWER OF METAPHOR IN THE AGE OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA (1999); see also
Annette N. Markham, Metaphors Reflecting and Shaping the Reality of the
Internet: Tool, Place, Way of Being (2003) (unpublished paper)
(https://annettemarkham.com/writing/MarkhamTPW.pdf).
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early 2000’s. Both foes and friends of Napster and its sequelae
celebrated in, effect, the technology’s potency as a mode of distribution,
rather than confronting its potential to build disembodied communities of
interest(s).15
Soon thereafter, the grip of this rhetoric on the public
imagination began to loosen. Thanks to sweeping changes in the way we
think and talk about networked digital technology, no one ever again can
refer to the Internet as a “series of tubes” without major risk of
embarrassment.16 What once was viewed as a delivery system is now
commonly figured as a space for virtual interaction and collaboration––
in accord with Barlow’s foundational vision.17 And it is this shift that (in
turn) has enabled the emergence of what was for many a whole new way
to think about the public domain: less as a repository for disregarded
cultural cast-offs and more as a rich mine of source material.18 To those
of us with an early inchoate sense of the potential value inherent in the
unowned, it provided a new wealth of practical and appealing examples
of why the public domain really mattered. For others, direct experience
online was a powerful teacher in its own right. Either way, the trends

15

Copyright scholars did this discussion no favors by generally conceding the
issue of end-user infringement and focusing instead on the metes and bounds of
secondary liability. In retrospect, there was more space than we were then
aware to discuss the application of fair use to at least some peer-to-peer sharing
practices.
16
Not an “Internet of Things” but the Internet as Thing. See Cory Doctorow,
Sen. Stevens’ Hilariously Awful Explanation of the Internet, BOING BOING (July
2, 2006, 11:45 PM), https://boingboing.net/2006/07/02/sen-stevenshilariou.html.
17
And, giving credit where credit is due, that of Howard Rheingold.
Oxymoronically clashing title and sub-title notwithstanding, his book gave many
of us a first glimpse of the future. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE
VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1993).
18
Not that the old rhetoric ever vanished entirely from the scene. In 2014, a
New York Times article carried the following lead:
They show up in discount DVD bins, or more often today online,
sometimes looking a little worse for the wear. A general pall of
darkness might cloud the image; the dialogue might be a bit tinnier than
you remembered. Often the quality is not too shabby, though in the
case of the web, it can be a surprise that they’re online at all. They’re
films that have fallen out of copyright for one reason or another and
must weather the wilds of the public domain.
Nicolas Rapold, Even Good Films May Go to Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/movies/old-filmsfall-into-public-domain-under-copyright-law.html.
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thus set in motion led directly to the Great Legislative Nonevent of
2018.19
This broad and consequential shift began, I would suggest, with
the availability of Web browsers and search engines, along with
increased opportunities to cut, paste, and modify digital files using a
growing host of applications and programs. Before the early 1990s,
taking creative advantage of the public domain entailed scouring
physical collections in search of old information objects, investing time
and money in transcribing them, and recasting them using skilled
techniques that hadn’t changed dramatically in decades (if not centuries).
But 1993 alone saw AOL offering access to the whole Internet to its
users for the first time, the introduction of both the Mosaic browser and
Photoshop 2.5; although flatbed scanner and OCR technology had been
around since 1978, they became practically available to individual users
only in the early 90s. In addition to a proliferation of tools that enabled
increasingly convenient exchange of digital files, the following decade
would see accelerated progress in public access to information online.
The Internet Archive, with its ever-expanding storehouse of material
(including rich collections of public domain works) became searchable
by the public in 2001, and catalogues of other digitized records followed;
in 2003, both “Open WorldCat” and an online index of public domain
titles digitized by Project Gutenberg were launched. Within a few years
of the CTEA’s enactment, the world in which this provision (and the rest
of copyright law) had altered materially and irreversibly—just as Barlow
had called it.
The opening of the Internet did not, in itself, create or even first
release the impulse to tinker with and recast found material for new
purposes. Elite writers and artists had been at it since Classical times,20
and in the late twentieth century Vidders21 and Ziners22 making creative
19

We might have known, had we been paying closer attention. In 2001, the
Digital Future Coalition, of which I had been an organizer, secured a small grant
from the MacArthur Foundation to study “messaging” strategies for public
interest campaigns around copyright policy. The goal was to identify key words
and concepts that might be deployed to counter the copyright industry’s very
effective communications campaign. We commissioned the Belden &
Russonello strategic consulting firm to conduct a series of structured focus
groups at sites across the U.S., and the results (never published nor, more’s the
pity, systematically implemented) were clear: the tropes of “freedom” and
“choice” had the potential to trump “piracy” and “property.”
20
See, e.g., Cento: Poetic Form, POETS.ORG (Feb. 20, 2014),
https://poets.org/text/cento-poetic-form.
21
See Morgan Dawn, A History of Vidding, VIDELICET,
https://vidders.github.io/articles/vidding/history.html (last visited May 18, 2019)
(“Vidding is communal poetry . . . .”).
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(and painstaking) use of analog technology showed the way. Internet
access did radically enlarge the population of people with the tools to
express that impulse. In so doing, it also expanded practical appreciation
for what could be done with diverse source material, including the rich
trove that is the public domain.23
Of course, there is more to the story. All honor goes to those
who, in the dark years after the CTEA’s enactment, kept the flame of the
public domain alive. The Eldred litigation itself, however unlikely of
conventional success, clearly raised levels of public awareness about the
issue, particularly among Internet users. The attention, in turn, energized
a powerful and persistent trope in which responsibility for term extension
was laid squarely at the feet of the Mouse-You-Love-to-Hate; despite its
tendency to obfuscate the real stakes and the forces actually at work,24
the meme had enormous power as an organizing tool. Essential books
like Laurence Lessig’s Free Culture (2004) and Remix (2008), or James
Boyle’s The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind
(2008), made indelible contributions, as has Duke University Law
School’s Center for the Study of the Public Domain (directed by Jennifer
Jenkins). Beginning in 2005, campaigns to raise awareness of the
“orphan works” problem that term extension did so much to exacerbate,
although they ultimately brought no legislative relief, had the secondary
effect of helping to refigure the public domain as a rich granary rather
than a run-down Roach Motel.
In an environment marked by ubiquitous high-speed Internet
connectivity, 200 million active websites, and a vast array of information
tools, the Web hasn’t brought us everything we hoped—and has brought
much we might never have wished to see. Ultimately, though, it was the
Internet itself that came to the rescue of copyright’s open spaces. In this
at least, John Perry Barlow’s organic vision of cyberspace has been
realized.

22

See A Brief History of Zines, DUKE UNIV. LIBRARIES,
https://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/findingdb/zines/timeline/ (last visited May
18, 2019).
23
The ease with which information can be retrieved and repurposed online is not
restricted to material that is out of copyright. In fact, the forces at work behind
the markup in the cultural value of copyright-free material also helped to drive
the transformation of the fair use doctrine from 1994 onwards. See generally,
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2d. ed. 2018).
24
In fact, the music industry was more vocal and effective in pushing for the
CTEA.

A DECLARATION OF THE MISSION OF
UNIVERSITY IN BARLOWSPACE1
CHARLES R. NESSON

Universities and schools, on behalf of future generations, I ask
you to preserve space for freedom of mind into the future. Only in such
shared mindspace will human liberty of thought survive.
John Perry Barlow, in his A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace, spoke presciently of this very space––‘Cyberspace is the
mind space.’ Barlow claimed self-sovereignty in mind space for himself
and for all of us.
The exercise of free mind space requires trust. But trust is not an
inherent feature of the open net. We must find and build trust within
closed classrooms within the wider environment of the open net. Unless
the cyberspace of our future contains interior closed spaces in which
human trust and freedom of mind can live, truth as we have known it will
not survive.
The great universities and schools of the world supported by
philanthropy made it their mission to build free mind space in the past.
They must make it their mission to build and preserve this space for truth
into the future. In Barlow’s vision, they must build “a civilization of the
Mind in Cyberspace.”
Contrast Barlow’s vision with Lessig’s. Lessig’s cyberspace is
exogenous, a universe of forces building an ever-tightening internet
surrounding and constraining us. Lessig looks out into this dystopian
world from the vantage of a ‘pathetic red dot,’ targeted and being
crushed by forces of outside control. Lessig is not wrong to be worried.
But his focus is the wide-open net.
Barlow’s cyberspace is interior to Lessig’s red dot. Within that
space, we in the universities can create a free mind space for aspiring self
sovereign individuals, students of law and the humanities. From the
viewpoint of a university in pursuit of truth, we can envision the red dot
as anything but pathetic. In classrooms, students can be insulated from
and protected from the surveillance and distrust of the open net. They
can speak their minds and experience themselves as self-sovereign.
1

Also available as Charles R. Nesson, A Declaration of the Dependence of
Barlowspace, https://cyber.harvard.edu/eon/BarlowSpace.html (last visited July
31, 2019).
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In our university settting, we come together to seek truth. We
feel subjectively, individually, that we know what is true and good. We
feel justice in our hearts but we are also aware that others differ. In our
classrooms, we can subscribe to a common quest for the resolution of
difference through free discussion. Our mission must become not just
knowledge transfer but the experience of recognizing and transcending
bias. Universities must evince and protect their faith in the search for
truth through freedom of mind.
Until now, our universities’ focus has been on the open net.
Their research has created wealth in the marketplace and surveillance
tools for government. Now is the time to balance concern for the
crumbling hearsay truth of the open net by look inside, reframing the
experiential learning process for students as they grow into the new
cyber world.
Reification of free mindspace for student minds to grow is
critical to preserving truth into the future. If we teach our children how to
communicate with each other, they will accomplish more in solving the
problems they address. The creation of Barlowspace lies within
University domain. The development of framework and code-platform
for intercommunication among students and faculty is and must be a
university-led research-and-development construction project.
How can university intensify student learning experience so as to
express and teach self-sovereignty? What is its spirit? How can it be
maintained in the face of corrupting force? Answer: By creating Barlow
space classrooms––spaces protected within a respected boundary of selfimposed constraint. Barlowspace classrooms will preserve freedom of
mind.
Many who loved John Perry Barlow and put faith in his vision
feel disappointingly overwhelmed by the Lessigian world. To find
freedom of mind amid the enveloping surveillance and lurking trolls of
the open net has proven to be more difficult than many expected. The
game is not over. Create space for freedom of mind NOW. Let us call it
Barlowspace in his honor.
eon
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